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Abstract
This thesis investigates the role of skills and universities in explaining differences in eco-
nomic performance between firms and regions. The first chapter examines the relationship
between university entry and GDP growth between 1950 and 2010 based on new data
that combines university entry in 1,500 regions across 78 countries. It finds that a 10%
increase in a region’s universities is associated with 0.4% higher GDP per capita in that
region, with evidence of spillovers to neighbouring regions. Part of the university effect
appears to be mediated through increases in human capital and innovation, and we also
find evidence that universities shape views on democracy.
Focusing on the UK, the second chapter studies how university growth impacts on local
industry composition and productivity using panel data on firms and nearby university
enrolments over the period 1997-2016. This spatial analysis reveals that university growth
stimulates high-tech start-ups and the effects are stronger for higher quality, research
intensive universities and areas of higher initial human capital. Employment effects are
more muted, though smaller establishments appear to get larger as universities grow. On
average, positive productivity impacts are found only in more high-tech intensive areas.
The third chapter provides evidence for a complementarity between modern manage-
ment practices and higher education using data on manufacturing firms, universities and
labour markets across 19 countries. It finds that firms further from universities have lower
management scores, even when controlling for a rich set of observables and region fixed
effects. Analysis using estimates of regional skill premia suggests that variation in the
price of skills drives these effects.
The fourth chapter examines differences in economic performance across the UK using a
variety of data sources and measures. Ten stylised facts are presented which are relevant
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Chapter 1
The Economic Impact of Universities:
Evidence from Across the Globe1
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1.1 Introduction
A striking feature of the last hundred years has been the enormous expansion in university
education. In 1900, only about one in a hundred young people in the world were enrolled
at universities, but over the course of the Twentieth Century this rose to about one in
five (Schofer and Meyer, 2005). The term “university” was coined by the University of
Bologna, founded in 1088, the first of the medieval universities. These were communi-
ties with administrative autonomy, courses of study, publicly recognised degrees and
research objectives and were distinct from the religion-based institutions that came before
(De Ridder-Symoens and Rüegg, 1992). Since then, universities have spread worldwide
in broadly the same form, and it has been argued that they were an important force
in the Commercial Revolution through the development of legal institutions (Cantoni
and Yuchtman, 2014) and the industrial revolution through their role in the building of
knowledge and its dissemination (Mokyr, 2002).
While there is an extensive literature on human capital and growth, there is relatively
little research on the economic impact of universities themselves. In this paper, we develop
a new dataset using the World Higher Education Database (WHED) that contains the
location of universities in 1,500 regions across 78 countries in the period since World War
II (when consistent sub-national economic data are available). We focus on how univer-
sity formation is correlated with future economic growth. Over this period university
expansion accelerated in most countries; a trend partially driven by the view that higher
education is essential for economic and social progress. This was in contrast to the pre-War
fears of “over-education” that were prevalent in many countries, should enrolments much
extend beyond the national elites (Schofer and Meyer, 2005; Goldin and Katz, 2008).
There are a number of channels through which universities may affect growth includ-
ing (i) a greater supply of human capital; (ii) more innovation; (iii) support for democratic
values; and (iv) demand effects. Firstly, and most obviously, universities are producers
of human capital; and skilled workers are more productive than unskilled workers. Geo-
graphical distance seems to matter as areas with better university access benefit both from
improving the chances that locally born young people will attend college (e.g. Card (2001))
and also because students who graduate are more likely to seek work in the area where
the university is located. The empirical macro literature has generally found that at the
country level, human capital (typically measured by years of schooling) is important for
development and growth (e.g. Sianesi and Van Reenen (2003)). Growth accounting and
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development accounting relate educational attainment to economic performance and find
a non-trivial contribution.2 Explicit econometric analysis usually, although not always,
confirms this positive relationship.3
A problem with these empirical studies is that they are at the country level and subject
to the concern that there are omitted aggregate variables (e.g. Bils and Klenow (2000);
Hanushek and Woessmann (2009)). At the sub-national level, Gennaioli et al. (2013) show
that regional years of schooling is important for regional GDP per capita in the cross section
and Gennaioli et al. (2014) confirm this relationship also holds for growth regressions.
Furthermore, human capital appears to also have an indirect effect via spillovers which
are analysed inter alia by Moretti (2004a) at the firm level and Moretti (2004b) and Glaeser
and Lu (2018) at the individual level. In an historical setting, Squicciarini and Voigtländer
(2014) show that “upper tail” knowledge was important in the industrial revolution, and
they measure this type of knowledge using city level subscriptions to the Encyclopédie in
mid-18th century France.
A second channel through which universities may affect growth is innovation. This
may be an indirect influence because, as in the previous point, universities increase
educational supply.4 But it could also be a direct influence as university researchers
themselves produce innovations, sometimes in collaboration with local firms. A number
of empirical papers have found that universities increase local innovative capacity.5 A
drawback of this literature is that it uses proxies for innovation such as patents rather
than looking at economic output directly. Moreover, the work is also focused on single
countries, somewhat limiting its generalisability.
A third way universities may matter is by fostering pro-growth institutions. Univer-
sities could promote strong institutions directly by providing a platform for democratic
dialogue and sharing of ideas, through events, publications, or reports to policy makers.
A more obvious channel would be that universities strengthen institutions via their role
as human capital producers. The relationship between human capital, institutions and
2 For example, Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005).
3 For example, Barro (1991), de La Fuente Angel and Domenech (2006) and Cohen and Soto (2007).
4 This may be wider than just via technology, Feng and Valero (2018) and Bloom et al. (2017) also find a
role for universities in helping diffuse productivity-enhancing managerial best practices.
5 This literature stems from Jaffe (1989) who uses US state level data to provide evidence of spillovers
from university research to patenting and R&D spending by firms. A number of papers have shown that
such effects are localised (see for example, Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993), Anselin, Varga and Acs
(1997), Fischer and Varga (2003), Belenzon and Schankerman (2013)). Andrews (2017) exploits quasi random
allocation of universities to US counties over the period 1839-1954 to estimate their causal impact on patenting.
Toivanen and Väänänen (2016) consider how universities affect innovation via their role as human capital
producers: they use distance to a technical university as an instrument in estimating the effect of engineering
education on patents in Finland (which they find to be positive and significant).
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growth are much debated in the literature. Indeed, there remains controversy over whether
institutions matter at all for growth.6 Some papers have argued that human capital is
the basic source of growth, and the driver of democracy and improved institutions (e.g.
Glaeser et al. (2004)). But the relationship between education and democracy/institutions
is contested by Acemoglu et al. (2005) who argue that the effects found in the cross section
of countries are not robust to including country fixed effects and exploiting within-country
variation.
Finally, universities may affect growth through a more mechanical “demand” channel.
Increased consumption from students and staff and the universities’ purchase of local
goods and services could have a material impact on GDP. This would occur when a new
university attracts new students and staff into the region, or when university costs are
financed though national governments from tax revenues raised mainly outside the region
where the university is located.
We show that university growth has a strong association with later GDP per capita
growth at the sub-national level. Even after including a host of controls (including country
or region fixed effects to control for differential regional trends, and year dummies) we
find that a 10% increase in the number of universities in a region is associated with about
0.4% higher GDP per capita. We show that reverse causality does not appear to be driving
this, nor do demand effects. We also find that increases in universities in neighbouring
regions is also correlated with a region’s growth. Finally, we show that the association of
per capita GDP and university presence works partially through increasing the supply of
human capital and also through raising innovation, but both these channels appear to be
small in magnitude. In addition, in the cross sectional analysis we find that universities
appear to be correlated with more pro-democratic views even when we control for human
capital, consistent with a story that they may have some role in shaping institutions over
longer time horizons.
If policy-makers decided to open new universities in areas with strong economic
potential, any positive correlation could simply be due to expectations of growth causing
university formation rather than vice versa. Our view is that in the post-war period,
university expansion was largely a policy pursued by national governments rather than
simply a response to local sub-national conditions. Governments were focused on social
equity (Dahrendorf, 1965), improving technological capacity (in response to the Cold War,
6 See, for example, Acemoglu, Robinson and Johnson (2005) and Acemoglu et al. (2014) who argue
institutions matter a lot, and Gerring et al. (2005) for a summary of papers that conclude that they do not.
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especially the 1957 Sputnik crisis (Barr, 2014)) and a general recognition of the value of
human capital (Becker, 1964). This kind of “development planning” (Schofer and Meyer,
2005) stood in contrast to pre-war period views which often saw little need to extend
tertiary education beyond a narrow elite.
In the Appendix (1.A.4) we describe three country case studies of largescale university
expansion which all have a substantial exogenous element to local economic conditions.
Nonetheless, we attempt to address endogeneity concerns by using lagged university
openings, controlling for a rich set of observables and including both unobserved regional
fixed effects and regional trends in the regressions. We do not have credible external
instrumental variables to rule out all possibilities of endogeneity bias. In particular, time
varying unobservables at the region level cannot be controlled for in this framework. If,
for example, some regional policy-makers opened new universities and also pursued
other growth enhancing policies, the reported association might emerge without a causal
effect of universities on growth. The strength of our analysis is in the comprehensiveness
of the new data across space and time and the associations we document should be seen
as suggestive rather than definitive.
To date, few papers have explicitly considered the direct link between university
presence and economic performance. Cantoni and Yuchtman (2014) argue that medieval
universities in 14th century Germany played a causal role in the commercial revolution
(using distance from universities following the Papal Schism, an exogenous event which
led to the founding of new universities in Germany). In a contemporary setting, Hausman
(2017) links university innovation to economic outcomes in US counties, finding that long-
run employment and pay rises in sectors closely tied with a local university’s innovative
strength, and that this impact increases in proximity to university. Aghion et al. (2009) con-
sider the impact of research university activity on US states. Using political instruments,
they find that exogenous increases in investments in four year college education affect
growth and patenting. Kantor and Whalley (2014) estimate local agglomeration spillovers
from US research university activity, using university endowment values and stock market
shocks as an instrument for university research spending. They find evidence for local
spillover effects to firms, which is larger for research intensive universities or firms that
are “technologically closer” to universities.7 Feng and Valero (2018) use international data
7 In related work, Kantor and Whalley (2016) find evidence of agricultural productivity effects from
proximity to research in US agricultural research stations. Effects appear persistent where stations focused on
basic research and farmers were already at the technology frontier.
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to show that firms that are closer to universities have better management practices (Bloom,
Sadun and Van Reenen, 2017).
This paper is organised as follows. Section 1.2 describes the data and some of its
key features including interesting trends and correlations which give us a macro level
understanding of the global rise in universities over time. Section 1.3 sets out our econo-
metric strategy, and Section 1.4 our results. Section 1.5 explores the mechanisms through
which universities appear to affect regional growth and finally, Section 1.6 provides some
concluding comments.
1.2 Data
Our regression analysis is based upon information on universities in some 1,500 regions
in 78 countries. This represents the set of regions for which our university data can be
mapped to a regional time series of key economic variables obtained from Gennaioli
et al. (2014), and covers over 90 per cent of global GDP.8 We first describe the full World
Higher Education Database (WHED) across all countries, with some key global trends
and correlations. Then we focus on the 78 countries for which regional economic data are
available, describing how we aggregate the WHED data into regions, and present some
initial descriptive evidence.
1.2.1 World Higher Education Database
WHED is an online database published by the International Association of Universities
in collaboration with UNESCO.9 It contains information on higher education institutions
that offer at least a three year or more professional diploma or a post-graduate degree.
In 2010, there were 16,326 universities across 185 countries meeting this criterion. The
database therefore excludes, for example, community colleges in the US and further
education institutions in the UK and may be thought of as a sample of “higher quality”
universities. Key variables of interest include university location, founding date, subjects
and qualifications offered and other institutional details such as how they are funded.
Our regional analysis is based on that sample of countries for which GDP and other
data are available from 1955, which covers 78 countries, comprising 14,868 (or 91%) of the
institutions from the full listing. Our baseline results simply use the year-specific count of
8 Based on World Bank GDP in 2014 (US dollars, PPP).
9 For more information, see http://www.whed.net/home.php.
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universities by region as a measure of university presence, always controlling for regional
population. To calculate this, we first allocate each university to a region (for example, a
US state), and then use the founding dates of universities in each region to determine the
number of universities that were present at any particular date.10 High rates of university
exit would invalidate this type of approach, but we find that this does not appear to be an
issue over the decades since the 1950s (see the Data Appendix 1.A).
A disadvantage of the “university density” measure is that it does not correct for the
size or quality of the university. Unfortunately, this type of data is not available on a
consistent basis across all countries over time, but we present robustness results on a
sub-sample where we do have finer grained measures of university size, and use various
measures of university type as proxies for quality.
1.2.2 The Worldwide Diffusion of Universities
We begin by presenting some descriptive analysis of the university data at the macro level
using the full university database. Figure 1.2.1 shows how the total number of universities
has evolved over time; marking the years that the number doubled. The world’s first
university opened in 1088 (in Bologna) and growth took off in the 19th Century, growing
most rapidly in the post-World War II period (see Panel A). In Panel B we normalise
the number of worldwide universities by the global population to show that university
density also rose sharply in the 1800s. It continued to rise in the 20th Century, albeit at a
slower rate and has accelerated again after the 1980s when emerging countries like Brazil
and India saw rapid expansions.
A number of additional descriptive charts are in the Appendix. The distribution
of universities across countries is skewed, with seven countries (US, Brazil, Mexico,
Philippines, Japan, Russia and India, in descending order) accounting for over half of the
universities in the world in 2010 (the US accounts for 13% of the world’s universities).
We also examine the “extensive margin” – the cumulative number of countries that have
any university over time with Bhutan being the latest country to open a university in
2003. By 2010, the vast majority of countries in the world had at least one university. We
also provide an historical overview of the diffusion of universities from the 1880s in four
advanced economies: France, Germany, the UK and US, and two emerging economies:
10 Of the full sample of 16,326 universities, we were unable to obtain founding date information for 669
institutions (4% of the total). 609 of these fall into our core analysis sample (in the 78 countries for which
regional economic data are available). These institutions are therefore omitted from analysis.
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Figure 1.2.1: Worldwide Universities Over Time
1 
 
A: University Count 
 
NOTES: The evolution of global universities over time; years where the total number doubled are marked. 
Source: WHED. 
 
B: University Density and Population 
 
NOTES: This chart shows the evolution of global university density (universities per million people) and 
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India and China at the country level. We compare the timing of historical university
expansions to growth and industrialisation. Descriptively, the data looks broadly in line
with the thesis of Mokyr (2002) that the building and dissemination of knowledge played
an important role in the industrialisation of many countries.
For further description of the data at the national level, we examine the cross sectional
correlations of universities with key economic variables. Unsurprisingly, we find that
higher university density is associated with higher GDP per capita levels. It is interesting
that countries with more universities in 1960 generally had higher growth rates over
the next four decades. Furthermore, there are strong correlations between universities
and average years of schooling, patent applications and democracy.11 These correlations
provide a basis for us to explore further whether universities matter for GDP growth
within countries, and to what extent any effect operates via human capital, innovation or
institutions.
1.2.3 Regional Economic Data
We obtain regional economic data from Gennaioli et al. (2014) who collated key economic
variables for growth regressions at the sub-national level.12 The outcome variable we
focus on is regional GDP per capita. Since for many countries, regional GDP data and
other variables such as population or years of education are not available annually we
follow Barro (2012) and compute average annual growth rates in GDP per capita over five
year periods.13 We also gather patents data at the regional level as a measure of innovation.
For 38 countries, we obtain region-level European Patent Office (EPO) patents from the
OECD REGPAT database covering 1978 to 2010.
Table 1.2.1 has some descriptive statistics of our sample of 8,128 region-years. The aver-
age region has GDP per capita of just over $13,000, average growth of 2% per annum and
nearly ten universities (this is quite skewed with a median of 2, so in our robustness tests,
we show that our results are not sensitive to dropping region-years with no universities).14
11 We use Polity scores as a measure of democracy, as is common in the literature. See for example Acemoglu
et al. (2014).
12 The availability of regional data for different countries is outlined in Gennaioli et al. (2014).
13 We interpolate missing years, but do not extrapolate beyond the final year (or before the first year of
data). Our results are robust to dropping interpolated data.
14 A related fact is that the median growth rate of the number of universities is zero (5,856 observations).
This implies that 28 per cent of the observations have an increase in the number of universities. We also










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As we set out in the next section, our core regressions will control for the level and
growth of population15, and a number of geographic characteristics – including an in-
dicator for whether a region contains a country’s capital. Measures of regional human
capital (college share and years of education) are available for sub-samples of region-years.
People in the average region have an average of seven years of education with just seven
percent of them having attended college.
Figure 1.2.2 shows that the raw correlations between growth rates of universities and
GDP per capita that we saw at the country level are also present within countries. Panel
A simply plots the average annual growth in regional GDP per capita (on the y-axis) on
the average annual growth in universities (on the y-axis), over the whole time period for
which data are available (which differs by region). Average GDP per capita growth rates
are plotted within 20 evenly sized bins of university growth, and country fixed effects are
absorbed so that variation is within country. Panel B plots GDP per capita growth rates on
lagged university growth for the 8,128 region-years (on which we conduct the core of our
analysis that will follow). In both graphs it is clear that there is a positive relationship.16
1.3 Empirical Framework
The underlying model we are interested in is the long-run relationship between universi-
ties and economic performance:
lnpY{Lic,tq “ α1lnpUniic,tq ` α2lnpPopic,tq (1.3.1)
where Y{Lic,t is the level of GDP per capita (“GDPpc”) for region i, in country c, and year
t; and Uniic,t is the number of universities in the region17 and Pop is the population. In
the empirical application we lag the university coefficient by at least five years as there is
unlikely to be immediate effect. Using the fifth lag seems natural as almost all students
15 It would be desirable to control for working age population, together with total population, since this is
expected to affect production and growth. Unfortunately, demographic data at the regional level over time
across a wide range of countries is not available, but we note that the region trends in our core regressions
should control for demographic shifts.
16 In addition, these graphs show that there are observations with very high university growth in the top
bin. We explore which region-years were driving this found that they are evenly spread across 60 countries
and different years, so they do not appear to be data errors. Dropping the observations in the highest growth
bin actually strengthens the correlation in this simple scatter plot. We keep all the data in the main regressions,
but show that the results are robust to dropping these observations or winsorising the top and bottom 5%
observations of lagged university growth and GDP growth.
17 We add 1 to the number of universities before taking logs so we can include region-years where there are
no universities. We show robustness to other ways of dealing with the zeros such as dropping observations
with no universities.
27




A: Average growth rates, one observation per region 
 
NOTES: 1,498 region observations are grouped equally into 20 bins, variation is within country. Source: WHED 
and Gennaioli et al. (2014) for regional GDP per capita and population 
 
B: Average growth rates, region-year observations 
 
NOTES: 8,128 region-year observations are grouped equally into 20 bins, variation is within country. Source: 
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will have graduated in a five year period and it is standard practice to calculate growth
rates in 5 year blocks (for example, Barro (2012), Gennaioli et al. (2014)). In addition,
using the lag means that we eliminate the effects of a contemporaneous demand shock
that raises GDP per capita and also results in the opening of new universities. Since the
impact of universities could take place over a longer period of time we consider this to be
a conservative approach.18 We also look at results using longer distributed lags (which
means losing more of the early years of the sample). These specifications result in larger
long-run implied impacts of universities, presumably because it takes longer for human
capital to build up in the area.
The cross sectional relationship is likely to be confounded by unobservable region-
specific effects. To tackle this we estimate the model in long (five-year) differences to
sweep out the fixed effects. Our main estimating model is therefore:
∆lnpY{Lic,tq “ α1∆lnpUniic,t´5q ` α2∆lnpPopic,t´5q ` X1ic,t´5α3 ` ηi ` τt ` ε ic,t (1.3.2)
We control for a number of observables X , that may be related to GDP per capita
growth and also the growth in universities including the lagged level of population,
country and regional level GDP per capita (to allow for catch up) and ε ic,t an error term
which we cluster at the region level. Finally, as well as time dummies (τt) we include
region fixed effects (ηi) which in these difference equations allow for region-specific time
trends, which is a demanding specification. We show the robustness of the results to
including country by year dummies. We do not initially include any other measure of
human capital and innovation in these specifications, so that we can capture the total effect
that universities have on growth. However, we explore the effect of adding human capital
and innovation when we try to pin down the mechanism through which universities
impact on growth. Our data are from the match of the WHED and Gennaioli et al. (2014)
databases which attempted to obtain university, education and GDP data from every
sub-national region in the world. Since this is where the variation in the data lives we
cluster standard errors at this regional level in our baseline results (see Abadie et al.
(2017)). However, we also show more conservative approaches, for example clustering at
18 For example, using cross country panel data, Dias and Tebaldi (2012) find effects of human capital
growth on GDP growth with a 10 year lag; Breton and Breton (2016) show that increased average schooling
takes around 40 years to translate into GDP increases; and Marconi (2018) shows that increases in secondary
schooling only show up in GDP when workers are 45-64. Of course, the impact of universities does not
necessarily only come from graduate supply. It may also come through university-business linkages, executive
education and effects on institutions. We discuss these further below.
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the country level.
We also explore the extent to which GDP per capita growth in region i may be affected
by growth of universities in other regions within the same country and discuss this
econometric specification in subsection 1.4.4 below.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Basic Relationships
As an initial investigation, we examine the regional cross sectional correlations between
universities and regional GDP per capita, based on the year 2000. Column (1) of Table
1.4.1 shows that there is a significant and positive correlation between GDP per capita
and universities: controlling for population, a 10% increase in the number of universities
is associated with around 6% higher GDP per capita. Column (2) includes country
fixed effects which reduces the university coefficient substantially from 0.680 to 0.214.
We include a host of further geographic controls in column (3) - whether the region
contains a capital city, its latitude, inverse distance to ocean, malaria ecology and the log
of cumulative oil and gas production.19 This reduces the coefficient on universities still
further to 0.160. In column (4) we add years of education. This reduces the coefficient on
universities by around two-thirds.20 In column (5) we repeat the column (2) specification
but restrict to the sample for which patents data are available, and add years of education
in column (6). Again, this reduces the coefficient on universities, by about half. In column
(7), we see that adding a measure of patent “stock” reduces our coefficient on universities
to 0.056, but it remains significant.
19 Specifically, we take the natural log of 1+ this value, so that we retain zeroes in our sample.
20 The coefficient on years of education is highly significant and similar in magnitude to the cross section
results in Gennaioli et al. (2013). In regressions of regional income per capita on years of education, controlling


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.4.2 presents our main results on our core sample.21 Column (1) is a simple correla-
tion between the growth of regional GDP per capita and the lagged growth of universities
with no other controls. The estimated coefficient is 0.0469 and highly significant.
To control for the fact that populous regions are more likely to require more universi-
ties, we add the lagged level of the population in column (2) which lowers the university
coefficient slightly. Adding country and year fixed effects in column (3) has little effect.
In column (4) we add the lagged level of regional GDP per capita (as in the convergence
literature from Barro (2012) – see below), the growth in population, and several regional
covariates (latitude, inverse distance to the coast, malaria ecology, and oil and gas produc-
tion since 1950) and a dummy for the region with the capital city. In column (5) we control
for lagged country-level GDP per capita which should capture time varying macro shocks.
Columns (6) and (7) replicate columns (4) and (5) but include regional fixed effects, a very
demanding specification which allows for regional trends. These do not much affect the
university coefficient and in fact it is higher at 0.0467 in the most general specification.
Overall, these results suggest that on average, a 10% increase in the number of universities
in a region is associated with around 0.4% higher GDP per person.22 Our baseline results
cluster at the regional level, but column (8) clusters the standard errors at the much more
conservative level of the country and shows that the coefficient on universities remains
significant. Finally column (9) includes a full set of country by year dummies which is a
very demanding specification. Although the coefficient on universities falls by about half,
it remains significant.
21 Allowing for the lag structure, the panel covers 11 waves, from 1960 to 2010 and spans 1498 regions.
The panel is unbalanced, driven by the availability of regional economic data which is better in later years.
For example, in the core sample of 8,128 region years, there are only 211 observations of GDP per capita
growth in 1960 (which requires regional GDP per capita in 1955 for its calculation). This sample includes
advanced economies like UK, US, Germany, France and Italy, and some South American countries like Brazil
and Mexico. By contrast, most regions are included in our sample in the later years (for example 1304 of the
1498 regions are observed in 2005) though economic data are not available for some countries in later years
(for example data for Venezuela spans 1960-1990).
22 Our analysis is carried out on a sample that drops 54 observations from China pre 1970, before and
during the Cultural Revolution, when universities were shut down. Our effects survive if these observations
are included, with the coefficient on university growth becoming 0.0320, still significant at the 1% level. We
drop them because of the unique nature of this historical episode and the fact that this small number of











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The other variables in the regressions take the expected signs. The coefficient on the
regional convergence term is nearly 2% in columns (4) and (5).23 Country GDP per capita
has a negative coefficient in these specifications. This becomes a positive relationship once
regional fixed effects are included. Having a capital city in a region is associated with
around one percentage point higher regional GDP per capita growth. In the Appendix,
we show that the geographic controls in columns (4) and (5) generally have the expected
signs.
We explore different distributed lag structures, and find that in general a single five
year lag is a reasonable summary of the data, although there are smaller but significant
effects at the 10 year lag, and even the 25 year lag on the full sample24 (see Appendix).
We might expect the effect of universities on regional GDP to grow over time, due to the
gradual accumulation of graduates entering the workforce, or the building of regional
innovative capacity. However, over longer time frames, there are more factors at play
which are not captured in our estimation framework, and our sample is reduced since
a longer time series of economic data is not available for all countries. Interestingly, the
contemporaneous (unlagged) effect of university growth is zero or negative (although not
significant), suggesting that it takes some time for benefits to be felt, while presumably
some costs are incurred at the regional level. There is some evidence for stronger effects
at the 10 year lag and longer lags when considering only the US, UK, France and West
Germany (advanced Western economies which we might associate with the “Sputnik
Crisis”).
1.4.3 Robustness and Heterogeneity
Specification and Sample Checks
We conduct a large number of robustness checks on our baseline specifications with and
without regional trends (i.e. columns (5) and (7) of Table 1.4.2), as detailed in the Appendix.
Firstly, we do a block of specification checks: weighting by the region’s population share;
controlling for the current population changes (to partially address the concern that
the effect of the university is simply to pull in more people to the region, who spend
or produce more and hence raise GDP per capita growth – see section 1.5 below); and
using growth in university density instead of the count. Secondly, we check sampling
23 In the fixed effects specifications (7) and (8) this is larger, potentially reflecting the downward (Nickell-
Hurwicz) bias in the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable which is particularly an issue in short panels
(see Barro (2012) and Gennaioli et al. (2014)).
24 A similar pattern is found when we include each lag separately.
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issues: dropping regions which never have a university; dropping region-years with no
universities; dropping the observation when a region opens its first university; winsorising
the top and bottom 5% of university growth and/or GDP per capita growth as the
dependent variable and dropping observations where we have interpolated GDP per
capita. A third set of measurement issues includes adding a dummy for regions where
more than 5% of universities in the original listing have missing founding dates (and are
therefore excluded from our analysis) and exploring whether the definition of university
in WHED (i.e. only institutions that offer four year courses or postgraduate degrees) may
be a problem. The results are robust to all these checks (and some others described in the
Appendix).
Finally, to investigate the potential concern that our results are driven by expectations
of growth in the region we explore “Granger Causality” tests. We use the growth in
universities as the dependent variable and regress this on the lagged growth in regional
GDP per capita, and the other controls. We see that even as all controls are added, the
lagged growth of regional GDP per capita has no relationship with current growth in
universities and does not appear to “Granger cause” the opening up of universities.25 As
another test of reverse causality, we add lagged growth in regional GDP per capita to our
core specification and find that the coefficient on universities rises to 0.0525 and remains
significant.26
Heterogeneity
To examine the heterogeneity in the university coefficient we first examine whether
the university effect differs by groups of countries where we have reasonable numbers of
observations: (i) the US, UK, France and West Germany; (ii) the rest of Europe and Canada;
(iv) Latin America; (v) Asia (including Australia) and (vi) Africa. There is a positive
relationship between university growth and growth in regional GDP per capita in all areas
ranging from coefficients of 0.004 to 0.116 (see Appendix), although it is not significant in
some groupings. We also examined whether there is heterogeneity across time periods
within these groupings. It is interesting to note that in US, France, West Germany and the
UK there are significant effects in the pre-1990 period and post-1990 period. Conversely, in
25 Interestingly, there is a negative and significant relationship between university growth and the lagged
level of universities, suggesting catch-up. Similarly there is a negative relationship between lagged years of
education and university growth. There is however, a positive relationship between the growth in years of
education and university growth.
26 While empirical evidence suggests that current growth is not a good predictor of future growth in the
long-run (Easterly et al., 1993), there might be persistence in the short run. If this is the case, and lagged
growth in universities is correlated with lagged growth in regional GDP per capita, then our results could be
affected by reverse causality.
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Asian countries, we find that there is a positive significant coefficient on university growth
in the post 1990 period only.
We also test whether within a country, the university effect is driven by richer or
poorer regions – the latter being consistent with catch-up growth. We find that interacting
the university effect with a variable that normalises a region’s GDP per capita by that
country’s frontier region (the region with the highest GDP per capita in that year) gives a
negative and significant coefficient. It does appear therefore that new universities have a
stronger impact on laggard regions within a country.
University size and quality
A concern with our econometric strategy is that our use of university numbers is a very
imperfect measure of university presence. Universities are not homogeneous, but vary in
size and quality. Clearly, both of these dimensions are likely to matter in terms of economic
impact (although it is not obvious why this would necessarily generate any upwards bias
in our estimates). An alternative measure would be to use changes in enrolments over
time. Even if such data were available for all countries (which it is not) one would be
particularly concerned about demand side endogeneity driving enrolments. This issue
notwithstanding, we can focus on the United States where state level enrolments dating
from 1970 are published by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).27 We find
that university numbers and total enrolments are highly correlated (around 0.9 in a given
year) and that there is a strong positive relationship between the growth in universities
and growth in students between 1970-2010.28 This gives us some reassurance that the
number of universities is a reasonable measure of university presence at the regional/state
level.
Ideally, to measure quality we would like to have global rankings for all our institutions,
carried out annually throughout our sample period.29 However, university rankings tables
only tend to cover the top few hundred institutions in the world, and tend to be available
only for recent years.30 Our data do contain some key attributes of universities which may
be indicative of quality, specifically whether or not a university is a research institution (as
27 See http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=98.
28 See Figure 1.C.4 in the Appendix.
29 Some studies have considered the quality dimension within individual countries. For example, using
data from the UK, Abramovsky and Simpson (2011) find that research quality affects the location of firm
R&D; and Helmers and Rogers (2015) find that university quality affects the patenting of small firms. Valero
(2018) also finds that universities of higher quality in the UK have a larger impact on start-up activity and
productivity in nearby firms.
30 For example, the Shanghai Rankings have been compiled since 2003 and cover the world’s top 500
universities.
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Table 1.4.3: Differences in University Quality
Dependent variable:
Regional Growth in GDP pc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A: Full sample
Lagged growth in #unis 0.0467*** 0.0512*** 0.0415*** 0.0496*** 0.0462***
(0.0107) (0.0123) (0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0137)
Lagged growth in PhD share -0.00272 -0.00447
(0.00289) (0.00392)
Lagged growth in STEM share 0.00203 0.00520
(0.00303) (0.00332)
Lagged growth in prof. share -0.000988 -0.00187
(0.00309) (0.00351)
Observations 8128 8128 8128 8128 8128
B: US, UK, FR, DE
Lagged growth in #unis 0.0509*** 0.0166 0.0182 0.0311* 0.0136
(0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0176) (0.0174) (0.0172)
Lagged growth in PhD share 0.0171*** 0.0146**
(0.00421) (0.00634)
Lagged growth in STEM share 0.0153*** 0.00383
(0.00398) (0.00429)
Lagged growth in prof. share 0.00988** -0.0000893
(0.00482) (0.00722)
Observations 1023 1023 1023 1023 1023
C: All other countries
Lagged growth in #unis 0.0482*** 0.0539*** 0.0437*** 0.0519*** 0.0487***
(0.0112) (0.0129) (0.0135) (0.0137) (0.0145)
Lagged growth in PhD share -0.00352 -0.00524
(0.00307) (0.00409)
Lagged growth in STEM share 0.00176 0.00518
(0.00318) (0.00345)
Lagged growth in prof. share -0.00125 -0.00182
(0.00325) (0.00370)
Observations 7105 7105 7105 7105 7105
NOTES: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. Panel A
includes the full sample of countries, and Panel B restricts to the US, UK, France and West Germany.
Within each panel, our core regression (Column (7) from Table 1.4.2) is replicated in column (1).
Then in columns (2) to (5), the lagged growth of the shares of universities of different types are
added as labelled.
indicated by whether or not a university can grant PhDs); whether it offers STEM (science,
technology, engineering or mathematics) subjects, and whether it offers “professional
service” related courses (which we define as business, economics, law, accounting or
finance related courses).31 Table 1.4.3 adds these variables to the analysis by considering
31 The way we ascertain subjects offered by each university is by extracting key relevant words from the
information provided in WHED. For some universities the descriptions offered can be quite broad (e.g. it may
specify “social sciences” instead of listing out individual subjects). We try to keep our STEM and professional
course categories broad to account for this, but there are likely to be cases where we do not pick up the
accurate subject mix at a university.
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the effect of the growth in the share of each type of university over and above the growth
in the number of all universities.32 Panel A shows the result for the full sample of countries.
Each column includes one of these measures in turn. The effects are not significantly
different from zero, suggesting that on the entire sample there seems to be a general
university effect which does not vary much by type of university as defined here.
Again, we disaggregate this analysis between the more advanced economies of Western
Europe and the US in Panel B of Table 1.4.3 and other countries (in Panel C). Increases
in the share of PhD granting institutions, STEM and professional course institutions are
significant in Panel B but not in Panel C. When all of these shares are included together in
column (5), only the share of PhD granting institutions remains significant. This analysis is
suggestive evidence that the research channel may be more important in countries nearer
the technology “frontier” (as in Aghion, Meghir and Vandenbussche (2006)).
Barro growth regressions
Our main specifications in Table 1.4.2 included lagged regional (and country) GDP
per capita, as is standard in growth regressions to capture convergence. There are of
course issues of bias when including a lagged dependent variable, particularly in fixed
effects regressions with a short time dimension,33 and in fact our baseline results are
robust to dropping these regressors.34 An alternative econometric approach is to consider
“conditional convergence” regressions (Barro, 1991, 2012). In the Appendix (Table 1.D.7)
we replicate as closely as possible the results in Gennaioli et al. (2014). Column (1) has
their basic specification and column (2) includes years of education. Columns (3) and
(4) repeat these specifications but adds in the lagged level of universities.35 Universities
have a positive and significant coefficient over and above years of education. As we
would expect if some of the effect of universities is via their production of human capital,
the effect of universities is higher when years of education are omitted. Note that the
interpretation of the university coefficient is different because in steady state we need
to divide by the absolute value of the convergence coefficient (0.015). This implies a
10% increase in universities generates a 1.6% increase in long-run GDP per capita (=
32 We note that these characteristics apply to the universities’ status in 2010. In the absence of a full time
series of when universities begin to offer different courses or qualifications, we simply assume that these
characteristics apply since the universities were founded.
33 See Hurwicz (1950) and Nickell (1981), and discussion in the context of growth regressions in Barro
(2012).
34 Estimating our core regression (Table 1.4.2, column (7) without lagged regional and country GDP per
capita, the coefficient is 0.0434, significant at the 1% level.
35 Column (1) follows their Table 5, column (8), omitting years of education, and column (2) includes years
of education. The coefficients are very similar: the convergence term is between 1.4% and 1.8%, and the
coefficient on years of education is nearly identical at around 0.004.
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0.1˚ 0.00243/0.015). This is much larger than our baseline estimates of 0.4%. Due to the
econometric difficulties of interpreting the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable
in these kind of dynamic panel data models, we prefer our baseline estimates, but note
that we might be under-estimating the strength of the growth- university relationship in
our more conservative approach.36 Finally, to understand better the difference between
the growth and levels effects, we include also the lagged level of universities in our core
regression (Table 1.4.2, column (7)). This actually raises the coefficient on lagged university
growth to 0.0587, still significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on the lagged level of
universities is -0.00452 (significant at the 5% level), so it does not appear that there is any
substantive effect of the level of universities on growth.
Summary on robustness
We have shown that our results are robust to different specification and, to the extent
that the data allow, consideration of the size and quality dimensions. However, this
framework does not allow us to address potential endogeneity due to time-varying
unobservables. Although there is no direct way to address this without an external
instrumental variable, there are non-trivial time lags between (i) an unobservable local
shock and a policy decision to build a university; (ii) the decision to build and opening up
of the institution and (iii) the opening of the university and the economic impact. Hence,
in our view such local shocks are unlikely to be the reason we observe the relationships
documented in our data.
1.4.4 Geographical Spillover Effects of Universities
If the effects we are finding are real we would expect to see that universities do not just
affect the region in which they are located, but also neighbouring regions. To examine
this we extend equation 1.3.2 to include the growth of universities in other regions, which
may be the nearest region (j) or simply all other regions in the country (-i). Therefore, we
include the growth in region i’s own universities (∆lnpUniic,t´5q) as well as a potential
36 Table 1.D.8 in the Appendix presents a similar analysis, but in long difference format. For each region
the dependent variable is the average annual growth rate over a 50, 40 or 30 year time horizon to 2010. This is
regressed on starting period universities and other controls. The samples differ according to availability of
regional economic data over different time frames. These specifications also show positive (and significant in
the case of the 50 year and 30 year differences) relationships between initial period universities and subsequent
growth once country fixed effects are included.
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spillover effect from universities located in neighbouring regions (∆lnpUnijc,t´5q):
∆lnpY{Lic,tq “ θ1∆lnpUniic,t´5q ` θ2∆lnpUnijc,t´5q ` X1ic,t´5θ3 ` X1jc,t´5θ4
`ηi ` τt ` uic,t
(1.4.1)
The lagged population level and population growth in region j are in the controls, (X1jc,t´5).
We allow for spatial variation by interacting university growth with the term distj
which is the distance between region i and its nearest region j relative to the median
distance to nearest region in the same country, see equation 1.4.2. This measure is time
invariant, so the term itself in absorbed by region fixed effects. The estimating equation
therefore becomes:
∆lnpY{Lic,tq “ φ1∆lnpUniic,t´5q ` φ2∆lnpUnijc,t´5q ` φ3distj ˚ ∆lnpUnijc,t´5q
`X1ic,t´5φ4 ` X1jc,t´5φ5 ` ηi ` τt ` uic,t
(1.4.2)
where the effect of the nearest region of median distance within a country (so the distance
term equals 1) is φ2 ` φ3. We expect φ3 to be negative so that the effect of region j gets
smaller for regions further away within a country.
Table 1.4.4 contains the spillover analysis with column (1) replicating our baseline
result with column (2) including lagged university growth in the nearest region. This
shows that universities in the nearest region have a positive but insignificant association
with home region growth. However, on closer inspection it appears that some “nearest
regions” are actually very geographically distant. A fifth of observations are in regions
over 200km from the next nearest region (based on distance between centroids), so column
(3) we drop these observations. In this sample the nearest region university coefficient
is around half the magnitude of the home region’s universities. Therefore, using the full
sample again in column (4), we control for the growth in universities in the nearest region
interacted with the distance to that region relative to the country’s median.37 Consistent
with column (3), the interaction is negative and significant. In column (5) we add the
relevant controls for the neighbouring region – the lagged population and population
growth (which should also control for a demand shock in the neighbouring region in the
previous period). These have little effect on our coefficients or their significance.
37 We take this measure relative to median to reduce the effects of outliers (for example Hawaii and Alaska







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Finally, we look at the effects of university growth in all other regions (including
nearest region) in the country on our home region. Column (6) adds the lagged growth in
universities in all regions of a country, excluding the home region. Column (7) also adds
the relevant controls (lagged population and population growth for the other regions).
These effects are now larger than our main effect and again highly significant.38 The
implication is that a 10% increase in universities in the rest of the country (which in
most cases will represent a greater absolute increase than a 10% increase in home region
universities) is associated with an increase in home region’s GDP per capita of around 0.6
per cent.
Overall, this analysis suggests that universities not only affect the region in which they
are built, but also their neighbours and that there does appear to be a spatial dimension to
this, in the sense that geographically closer regions have stronger effects.
1.4.5 Magnitudes
Using the coefficients in Table 1.4.4 we can estimate a country-wide effect of a univer-
sity expansion on the typical region in our dataset. The average region has nearly 10
universities (see Table 1.2.1), and the average country has 20 regions (and therefore 200
universities). Increasing the universities in one region by 10% (from 10 to 11) is associated
with a 0.4% uplift to its GDP per capita according to our main result. For each other region,
this represents a 0.5% increase in universities in the rest of the country (a rise from 190
universities to 191). Multiplied by 6% (the coefficient on other regions in column (7) of
Table 1.4.4), this implies an uplift to all other regions’ GDP per capita of 0.03%. Assuming
the regions in this hypothetical country are identical, the uplift to country-wide GDP per
capita is simply the average of these effects: 0.05%.
As a sense check for this result, we collapse our regional dataset to the country level
and run macro regressions of GDP per capita growth on lagged university growth. The
coefficient on universities is 0.047 (but insignificant). According to these results, a 10%
increase in universities at the country level would be associated with a 0.47% increase in
GDP per capita. Therefore a 0.5% increase in universities at the country level (equivalent to
our hypothetical expansion) would imply a 0.03% uplift – this is smaller (but in the same
ballpark) as the 0.05% we calculate using the results from our better identified regional
38 Standard errors in this analysis are clustered at the region level. Conservatively clustering at the country
level does not affect significance in the nearest region analysis. The coefficients on growth in all other regions
(columns (6) and (7)) remain significant at the 10% level.
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analysis.
While this seems like a significant amount of benefit, we also need to consider the costs
of university expansion.39 Given that the costs of building and maintaining universities
will vary widely by country, we choose to focus on a particular institutional setting for
this calculation. In the UK in 2010, there were 171 universities across its 10 regions. As
an experiment we add one university to each region, a total increase of 10 universities
(6%) at the country level. Using similar steps as in our hypothetical country above (but
taking into account the actual numbers of universities in each UK region in 2010), we
calculate that the overall increase to GDP per capita (or GDP, assuming population is
held constant) is around 0.7%.40 Applied to UK GDP in 2010 (£1,614 billion according
to the ONS41) this comes to just over £11 billion per year. A crude approximation of the
annual costs associated with a university can be made based on university finance data:
in 2009-2010 the average expenditure per institution in the UK was around £160 million.42
Multiplying this by the 10 universities in our experiment, the implied annual cost for the
additional universities is £1.6bn, or 0.1% of GDP. So, in this example the potential benefits
of university expansion appear far larger than the costs (0.7% vs. 0.1%).
While this calculation is highly simplified, it shows that there is a large margin between
the potential benefits of university expansion implied by our regression results and likely
costs. We note that the costs of setting up universities, and methods of university finance
vary by country so we cannot generalise this result to other countries, nor make statements
about the optimal number of universities in particular regions. Similar calculations for
39 It is unlikely that these are controlled for in our regressions: a large portion of university financing tends
to be at the national level, and costs are incurred on an ongoing basis (e.g. property rental or amortisation and
staff salaries are incurred every year) and so would not be fully captured by the inclusion of lagged country
GDP per capita as a covariate.
40 For each of the ten regions in the UK in turn, we calculate the log difference implied by adding one
university to that region’s universities, and multiply this by 0.04 (of the coefficient on university growth from
Table 1.4.2 column (7)). We then calculate the log difference in the count of universities in all other regions,
and raise home region GDP per capita by that multiplied by 0.06 (of the coefficient on university growth in
“other regions” from Table 1.4.4). We abstract from the 5 year lag in this calculation. We then add up the total
uplifted GDP across regions, and divide by total population (assumed unchanged).
41 Series ABMI, Gross Domestic Product: chained volume measures: Seasonally adjusted £m, Base period
2012
42 Data on university finance, by institution, can be found at the UK Higher Education Statistical Author-
ity (HESA) website (https://www.hesa.ac.uk/index.php?option=com_content& view=article& id=1900&
Itemid=634). Total expenditure in the year 2009/10 was nearly £26 billion across 163 institutions listed
in HESA, implying around £160 million per institution. University expenditure contains staff costs, other
operating expenses, depreciation, interest and other finance costs. We checked if this figure has been relatively
stable over time, finding that by 2013-14, average expenditure was £180 million. At this higher amount, the
implied costs of our expansion rise to 0.11% of GDP. Note that the number of institutions present in 2010
was 171. The majority of institutions in WHED correspond to those listed in HESA, but there are a small
number of discrepancies due to differences in the classifications of some institutes or colleges between the two
listings. This does not matter for our purposes, as are simply using the HESA data to calculate the average
expenditure of a typical university.
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other countries could be made by delving into particular institutional settings.
1.5 Mechanisms
Having established a robust association of GDP per capita with universities we now turn
to trying to understand the mechanisms through which universities may affect growth.
1.5.1 Human Capital
We add measures of growth in human capital to our baseline regressions to see how this
influences the university coefficient. In Table 1.5.1 we consider the relationship between
universities and college share. Column (1) replicates the core result from Table 1.4.2
column (7), and column (2) shows the same specification on the reduced sample where
college share is non-missing, for which the university coefficient is a bit larger at 0.08.
Column (3) adds the lagged growth in college share which in itself is highly significant,
and reduces the university coefficient slightly from 0.0843 to 0.0802. Column (4) uses
contemporaneous growth in college share and column (5) adds in the lagged college
share which reduces the coefficient to 0.0775. This represents a reduction in the university
coefficient of 8% compared with column (2).
In column (6) we include also the level with both lags, with little change in the univer-
sity coefficient. In column (7) we look at the raw correlation between contemporaneous
growth and the lagged growth in universities (with only country fixed effects as controls),
and find it to be relatively small but highly significant. Adding all the other controls
dampens this relationship further and this small effect of university growth on college
share is what explains the fact that adding in growth in human capital causes only a
small reduction in the coefficient on universities. This analysis suggests that a 1% rise in
the number of universities gives rise to around a 0.4 percentage point rise in the college
share.43
43 Table 1.D.9 in the Appendix uses another measure of human capital: years of education, which is
available for a larger sample of countries and years. The qualitative results are similar. The Appendix 1.B.2
also gives some simple simulations showing that the magnitude of effect of universities on human capital is




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The best measure of innovation output available consistently at the regional level over time
is patents, although unfortunately patents with locational information are not available for
our entire sample of countries and years. We consider the effects of adding the growth in
cumulative patent stocks44 to our regressions, using patents filed at the European Patent
Office which are available for over 38 of our countries between 1975 and 2010 (Table 1.5.2).
Column (1) runs the core regression for the this sample of countries, and over the time
period that we have patents data. Column (2) then includes the contemporaneous change
in patents stock (allowing five years for the university growth to have an effect), which
reduces the coefficient on university growth from 0.0156 to 0.0126 (a reduction of nearly
20 per cent). Patents themselves have a positive and significant association with GDP per
capita growth: A 10% increase in the patent stock is associated with 0.5% higher per capita
GDP. Column (3) considers the raw correlation between lagged university growth and
current patent stock growth (including only year dummies), and shows it is positive but
not significant. Column (4) then adds the standard controls with little effect.
This analysis provides tentative evidence that innovation is part of the story of why
universities have an economic impact, though not the entire story. This may be because
the effect of newer universities on patents takes a while to accumulate.
1.5.3 Institutions and Democracy
The use of country fixed effects throughout our analysis should rule out the possibility
that the effects of universities simply reflect different (time invariant) institutions, since
these tend to differ mainly at the country level. We have shown that the results survive
the inclusion of country-year fixed effects in the robustness, this would capture country
specific changes in institutions or changes in government. To the extent that time invariant
institutions vary within countries, say at the US state level, our regional fixed effects
analysis should address this.
Institutions do vary over time, however, and it is possible that universities contribute
to this. There is a positive and significant correlation between country level democratic in-
stitutions (as proxied by Polity scores45) and universities. This correlation also exists when
44 Patent stocks are calculated with an assumed depreciation rate of 15%. Initial patent stocks are calculated
by dividing the first observed patent flow for a region by the depreciation rate plus the average growth rate
in patents flow over the sample period for that region. Results are not sensitive to alternative depreciation
assumptions.
45 Polity scores were sourced from the Policy IV project (http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html),
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Table 1.5.2: Universities and Innovation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: ∆ GDPpc ∆ GDPpc ∆ patents ∆ patents
Lagged growth in #universities 0.0156 0.0126 0.0300 0.0310
(0.0143) (0.0137) (0.0547) (0.0552)
Growth in EPO patent "stock" 0.0540***
(0.00581)
Lagged level of regional GDP per capita -0.0956*** -0.0963***
(0.00706) (0.00679)
Lagged level of country GDP per capita 0.0729*** 0.0688***
(0.00815) (0.00773)
Lagged level of population/100 2.604*** 2.151*** 7.709***
(0.766) (0.740) (2.271)
Lagged growth in population -0.201*** -0.177*** -0.499***
(0.0612) (0.0587) (0.158)
Observations 3559 3559 3559 3559
# clusters 757 757 757 757
NOTES: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. Column
(1) replicates our core regression (column (7) from Table 1.4.2), but restricts to the relevant sample
for patents data. Column (2) adds in the contemporaneous growth in cumulative patent “stock” to
the regression. Column (3) regresses the growth in patent stock on the growth in universities as a
raw correlation, with no other controls. Column (4) then adds the standard time varying controls
(reported) and geographic controls (not reported).
we consider the 1960-2000 change in universities and polity scores (see the Appendix for
more discussion). To our knowledge, a time series of data on regional institutions over our
sample period is not available, but we can explore the relationships between perceptions
of democracy, as obtained from the “World Values Survey” and lagged university presence
in the cross section. Our measure is a categorical variable which gives the approval of
a democratic system for governing one’s own country, as this is more widely available
across survey waves compared with other questions on democracy.46 We note however,
that the experience in one’s own country (for example, if corruption prevents democracy
operating effectively) may affect this judgement. Therefore, in the robustness we test
whether results hold for a another more general survey question47 (available for fewer
survey waves). World Values Survey data begins in the 1980s and we pool data into a
cross section due to insufficient observations in some region–year cells to generate reliable
variation over time.
the polity2 variable is used as this is more suited for time series analysis.
46 Specifically, the question asks respondents to say whether having a democratic political system is a (1)
very good, (2) fairly good, (3) fairly bad, (4) bad way of governing their country. The scale is reversed for our
estimation so that a higher score reflects higher approval.
47 This question asks respondents if they (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, (3) disagree or (4) strongly disagree
whit this statement “Democracy may have problems but is better than any other form of government”. Again,
the scale is reversed for our estimation so that a higher score reflects higher approval.
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Table 1.5.3: Universities and Democracy
Dependent variable:
Approval of Democracy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
15 year lagged ln(1+#unis/pop) 0.0294*** 0.0257*** 0.0231** 0.0230**
(0.00934) (0.00960) (0.00946) (0.00997)
Male 0.0376*** 0.0338*** 0.0337***
(0.00477) (0.00468) (0.00468)
Age (years) 0.00177*** 0.00222*** 0.00221***
(0.000300) (0.000302) (0.000302)
Married -0.00119 -0.00420*** -0.00407***
(0.00127) (0.00126) (0.00123)
Children -0.00696*** -0.00342* -0.00348*
(0.00200) (0.00196) (0.00194)
Employed 0.0173*** 0.0239*** 0.0239***
(0.00551) (0.00616) (0.00613)






Observations 138511 138511 138511 138511
# clusters 693 693 693 693
Country and year dummies yes yes yes yes
Geographic controls no no no yes
NOTES: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
OLS estimates, 54 countries. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level. Region con-
trols include latitude, inverse distance to ocean, malaria ecology, ln(oil and gas production)
1950-2010 and a dummy for if a region contains the country’s capital city. “Employed” is a
dummy=1 if the individual is full, part time, or self-employed.
Table 1.5.3 shows the results of these regressions.48 We start with a simple correlation
between our measure of university density lagged by 15 years from the survey year,
controlling for country and year fixed effects (column (1)).49 This shows that there is
a highly significant association between university presence in a region and approval
of a democratic system. The relationship is robust to including a host of individual
demographic characteristics (column (2)) and education (column (3)). The result that one’s
own education is positively related to approval of democracy is consistent with Chong
48 This analysis is carried out on 58 of the 78 countries in our core sample, where World Values Survey
data are available. World Values Survey data are available for Nigeria which is in our core sample, but it was
not possible to map the regions to the regions used in WHED due to the fact that both sources used very
aggregated but different regions.
49 We explored different lag structures, and found that it takes time for universities to affect perceptions
(see column (3) in Table 1.D.10 which shows a smaller positive, but insignificant effect of five year lagged
university density on democratic approval). By contrast, on the full sample of countries there appear to be no
effects for longer lags. When we consider the sub-sample of OECD countries where the results are stronger
we see that the effects are similar in magnitude and significance for the 30 year lag.
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and Gradstein (2009). But the result that local universities matter over and above an
individual’s education suggests that they may be a mechanism whereby democratic ideals
spillover from those who have had direct contact with universities, or there is some kind
of direct diffusion of ideas from universities into their surrounding regions.50 Column
(4) adds our standard geographic controls. While data constraints mean it is not possible
to account for any potential impact of this type of mechanism on growth, this analysis
suggests that institutions could be part of the story, albeit on a longer term basis.
1.5.4 Demand
Could our results simply be driven by a mechanical impact of universities on regional
GDP? Students and staff in a university consume more goods and services. Including
changes in population in our regressions (lagged, and contemporaneous) should have
largely controlled for the possibility that universities simply contribute to growth through
a mechanical demand channel associated with people coming into the region. Moreover,
showing that our university coefficient remains significant after including changes in
human capital (see Table 1.5.1) should also address the concern that the effects are simply
driven by higher earners entering the region.
To the extent that university finance comes from inside the same region, there should
be no mechanical demand effect as this should already be netted off. For example, in the
US, states have historically provided more assistance to tertiary institutions and students:
65 per cent more on average than the federal government over the period 1987 to 2012,
though now the share is more equal.51 But if university finance comes from outside the
region this could also result in higher GDP per capita as the university purchases goods
and services within the region (including paying salaries to staff and support services).
We think it unlikely that the regressions are merely capturing this type of effect. The
initial shock to region GDP associated with the new university is likely to occur in the
year it is founded (when transfers begin, and include capital and set up costs), and the
level effect should be captured by lagged regional GDP which we control for in the
regressions. Ongoing transfers may rise incrementally over the years as the university
50 Further supporting this, we find that the result survives dropping students and graduates from the
regression entirely (see Table 1.D.10 for more robustness tests and further discussion).
51 This difference has narrowed in recent years as state spending declined since the financial crisis, and
federal investments grew sharply. Today the total expenditure is similar, though spending categories differ:
state funding focuses more on general running expenditure and federal funding on research and student




increases its size and scope, but we might expect the largest effect on growth would be in
the initial years rather than in the subsequent five year period. Furthermore, the evidence
of university spillovers from other regions (Table 1.4.4) also suggests demand is not the
main mechanism.
Notwithstanding these arguments, we carry out a simple calculation to show that even
under very generous assumptions, direct effects are unlikely to explain a large portion
of our results. We use the hypothetical experiment of a new university of 8,500 students
and 850 staff opening in the average region of our dataset. We estimate the effects of the
transfer into the region assuming that all the costs of our new university are met from
sources outside the region, and that these are spent within the region. We assume that the
average cost per student is $10,000, and therefore the cost for a university of 8,500 students
is $85 million. With a university of constant size, building up year-group enrolments over
four years, there would be no effect in the following five year period. If we assume total
enrolments grow by 5% per year, we can explain around 15% of the regression coefficient
on universities.52
1.5.5 Summary on Mechanisms
In summary, it appears some of the effects of university growth on GDP growth work via
human capital and innovation channels, though the effects of these are small in magnitude.
In addition, universities may affect views on democracy but this appears to be on a longer
term basis. We have shown that the university coefficient is not merely driven by demand
effects.
1.6 Conclusions
This paper presents a new dataset on universities in nearly 1,500 regions in 78 countries
since 1950. We have found robust evidence that increases in university presence are
positively associated with faster subsequent economic growth. A 10% increase in the
number of universities is associated with over 0.4% higher GDP per capita in a region.
This is even after controlling for regional fixed effects, regional trends and a host of other
confounding influences. The benefit of universities does not appear to be confined to the
region where they are built but spills over to neighbouring regions, having the strongest
52 For further detail, see Appendix.
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effects on those that are geographically closest. Using these results, we estimate that the
economic benefits of university expansion are likely to exceed their costs.
Our estimates use sub-national time series variation and imply smaller effects of uni-
versities on GDP than would be suggested from cross sectional relationships. But we
believe our effects underestimate the long-run effect of universities through building
the stock of human and intellectual capital which are hard to fully tease out using the
panel data available to us. We reiterate that the coefficients on universities are conditional
correlations as we do not have compelling instrumental variables to establish causal-
ity. Nevertheless, in our view the empirical evidence here does suggest some effect of
universities on growth.
Understanding the mechanisms through which the university effects works is an
important area to investigate further. We find a role for innovation and human capital
supply although these appear to be small in magnitude, and show that the university
effects do not appear to be driven by demand or transfers into a region. Better data on the
flow of business-university linkages, movements of personnel and other collaborations
would help in unravelling the underlying mechanisms. In addition, focusing on the
relationships between universities and local economic performance in individual countries
where better causal designs and richer university data is available would be a valuable
extension.
We provide suggestive evidence that universities play a role in promoting democracy,
and that this operates over and above their effect as human capital producers. Exploring
the extent to which this may account for part of the growth effect is another important
area for future research.
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WHED contains data on 185 countries (which includes 176 countries plus 9 administrative
regions/dependencies: Hong Kong, Macao, Curaçao, French Guyana, French Polynesia,
Guadeloupe, Martinique, New Caledonia and Reunion). We cross-check the 176 countries
to a full list of independent states (from the US State Department 53 and find that there
are only 16 more independent states not included in the database. These are Antigua and
Barbuda, Comoros, Djibouti, Dominica, Eritrea, Grenada, Kosovo, Micronesia, Nauru,
Palau, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles,
Solomon Islands and South Sudan.
WHED contains information on higher education institutions that offer at least a post-
graduate degree or a four year professional diploma. It therefore excludes, for example,
further education institutions in the UK or community colleges in the US and may be
thought of as a sample of “higher quality” universities.
We compare the country totals in WHED as at 2010 to data from “Webometrics”54,
a source where higher education institutions (including ones that would not qualify for
inclusion in WHED) are ranked by their “web presence”. This source puts the total number
of universities worldwide at 23,887 in 2015 (part of this difference will be due to growth
over the 2010-2015 period). In the results section, we discuss a robustness check where
we drop countries from our regressions with a very large divergence between the two
sources.
1.A.2 Validating Our Approach
Our approach for calculating university presence by region uses the founding dates of
universities to determine the number of universities that were present at any particular
date. We consider that a “university” is founded on this initial founding date, even if it was
a smaller higher education institute or college at that date. This is often the case, but our
approach is reasonable since only the better quality institutions are likely to subsequently
become universities. Furthermore, there are many cases where a number of universities
or higher education institutes were merged together into what is today recorded as one




such cases if we were merely counted the number of institutions present at any given date.
One key concern with this strategy is that it would not be suitable in a world where
university exits are commonplace. Say a number of universities were present in the
past and closed down before WHED 2010. A region could have actually seen a fall in
universities, but our method would not capture this since it includes only surviving
universities. Anecdotally we know that the period since the 1960s has been one of
university growth across the globe, but we investigate this issue further in order to gain
more comfort on the validity of our approach. We do this by obtaining historical records of
the universities and higher education institutions present in the 1960s, and assess whether
significant numbers of these are missing from WHED 2010.
The appropriate sources are the predecessors to WHED: “The International Handbook
of Universities” (1959, published by the IAU annually); “American Universities and
Colleges” (1960, published by The American Council on Education) and “The Yearbook of
Universities of the Commonwealth” (1959, published by the Association of Universities
of the British Commonwealth). As the name suggests, the “American Universities and
Colleges” yearbook contains fully fledged universities, but also smaller colleges (including
religious institutions), many of which would not be included in WHED today. The
international handbook lists universities and other institutions not considered of “full
university rank” separately. We include all of these institutions because the distinction is
not consistent between countries – for example in France, these latter institutions contain
all the grandes écoles which are considered to be of very high quality but are outside the
framework of the French university system; and in China only one institution is listed as
a full university while other institutions include a number of institutions with the name
“university”. The Commonwealth yearbook contains only fully fledged universities.
The main exercise we carry out is to name match between 1960 yearbooks and WHED
2010. There are 2,694 institutions listed across 110 countries in the three yearbooks in 1960,
this compares with 5,372 institutions (in 132 countries) which according to WHED 2010
were founded pre 1960 – this is higher because WHED counts universities from the date
they are founded, even if they are not founded as a fully-fledged university (as discussed
above). The country level correlation of the number of universities present in 1960 in the
two sources is 0.95. The matching process involves a number of iterations: exact matching,
“fuzzy” matching, and manual matching. The process is complex because name changes
and mergers are commonplace, therefore internet searches on Wikipedia or university
58
websites were necessary. Where an institution was found to have been merged into a
university that is present in WHED 2010 we considered it a match. The results of this
process are summarised in Table 1.D.11. We find that university closure is extremely rare,
and we only find evidence of this in the US, where 33 small (mostly religious) colleges
are present in the 1960 yearbook and were found to have closed down, mainly due to
bankruptcy. 155 institutions worldwide were found to still be in existence but not be
listed in WHED. This was usually because they do not meet the WHED listing criteria (a
university that offers at least a four year degree or postgraduate courses). Indeed, of the
155 institutions in this category, 115 were not considered fully fledged universities in 1960,
and 33 of the remaining 40 were US colleges (mostly religious).
Based on these facts, we believe that it is reasonable to use the WHED founding dates
as an (albeit imperfect) basis for a time series of university presence by region.
1.A.3 Describing Country Level University Growth in Selected Countries
This section gives an historical overview of the diffusion of universities from the 1880s in
four advanced economies: France, Germany, the UK and US, and two emerging economies:
India and China. We compare the timing of historical university expansions to growth
and industrialisation (see Figure 1.C.5 for a measure of industrialisation over time in
the UK, US, France and Germany sourced from Bairoch (1982)). This analysis provides
a visual “sense-check” for the thesis developed by Mokyr (2002) that the building and
dissemination of knowledge played a major role in the Industrial Revolution.
In the United Kingdom, universities have been established in waves: the “Ancient
universities” starting with Oxford in 1100s were the first seven universities which were
founded before 1800. Then a number of universities were chartered in the 19th Century,
followed by the “Red Brick” universities before World War I. A large expansion occurred
after World War II, around the time of the influential Robbins Report into Higher Education
(Robbins, 1963). Former polytechnics were converted to universities in 1992, but in our
data these higher education institutions are counted from when they opened in their
original form. These waves can be seen in the university density line as shown in Figure
1.C.6, Panel A, which also plots national GDP per capita data (from Maddison), suggesting
that the first expansions coincided with industrialisation in the 1800s (Figure 1.C.5 shows
that industrialisation picked up from the 1830s in the UK). The raw university count trend
is shown in Panel B.
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In the US, the first university was Harvard, founded in 1636. By the time of the
American Revolution there were nine colleges modelled on Oxford and Cambridge in
England. However these were very small, exclusive and focused on religion and liberal
arts. At that time, there were no law or medical schools, so one had to study these subjects
in London. It was Thomas Jefferson who had a vision for state education, separate from
religion, but this only took hold after the Civil War with the land grant colleges. This
sharp rise in university density can be seen in Figure 1.C.7. Industrialisation in the US
began to pick up in the 1860s (see Figure 1.C.5). University density reached much higher
levels than in Britain: at 13 universities per million people in 1900 versus just over 2 in
the UK. The difference is that in the US, density came down again as population growth
outpaced the opening of new universities which continued to grow as shown in Panel B;
though the downward trend did slow during the post war period (we can see the slight
kick in university numbers from the 1950s in Panel B). However, the fall in university
density must be considered in the context that over the same period, university size has
also been increasing in the US and (this can be seen in Figure 1.C.8 and in our analysis on
enrolments). Furthermore, there has been a sharp rise in “Community Colleges” in the
US, which provide college access qualifications, and are not counted in our dataset.
In France, Figure 1.C.9 shows that university density really started picking up in the
1800s with the opening of the “Grande Écoles” which were established to support industry,
commerce and science and technology in the late 19th Century. Indeed industrialisation in
France was more gradual, and started picking up in the late 1880s, early 1900s. The next
dramatic increase in universities numbers and density occurred in the 1960s during de
Gaulle’s reforms of the French economy.
Cantoni and Yuchtman (2014) discuss the opening of the first universities in Germany
following the Papal schism in the late 14th Century. However, during the 1800s, Figure
1.C.10 shows that university density actually fell, as population growth outpaced the grad-
ual increases in university numbers which can be seen in Panel B. Historically, Germany
had a low share of college graduates as higher shares of the population were educated via
the apprenticeship system. A deliberate push to expand university education began in the
1960s, with new public universities founded across the country (Jäeger, 2013). This was
motivated by the need to compete in technology and science against the backdrop of the
Cold War; but also social reasons, namely the notion that education is a civil right to be
extended beyond the elites, and is crucial for democracy.
60
China and India saw much later expansions as shown in Figure 1.C.11 and Figure
1.C.12. China started opening up to Western advances in science in the 1800s, and followed
Soviet influence in the 1950s with centrally planned education. We can see a sharp rise in
university density from the 1900s to 1960. The spike in the 1960s is due to the Cultural
Revolution, when higher education institutions were shut down for 6 years, and all
research terminated. When the universities were reopened, they taught in line with Maoist
thought. It was from the 1980s that institutions began to gain more autonomy and when
China began its rapid growth trajectory, though so far growth in universities has not
outpaced population growth. In India, expansion occurred after independence in 1947.
During the colonial era, the upper classes would be sent to England for education. The
British Raj oversaw the opening of universities and colleges from the late 1800s, but
university density only started rising more rapidly after 1947 and recently has picked up
pace again. We note that the in both countries, there are around 0.4 universities per million
people, which is still a lot lower than in the UK or US.
Finally, we note that in general, expansions in university numbers have been accompa-
nied by increases in university size. As we saw in Figure 1.C.8 (using UNESCO data that
are only available from 1970), university students normalised by population have been
growing overall in the US and the UK since the 1970s (with a dip in the late 1990s in the
US) and more recently in China and India.
1.A.4 Case Studies of University Expansion in Selected European Countries
As three case studies we consider European countries that undertook largescale expansions
in the 1960s and 1970s, and where decisions over the geographical roll-out of universities
appear to be unrelated with expectations of a region’s economic growth prospects. First,
the UK undertook a large expansion in the 1960s, around the time of the influential
Robbins Report on Higher Education (Robbins, 1963). One key motivation was to develop
UK science and technology in response to Soviet advances (Barr, 2014). The so-called
‘plate glass’ universities (Beloff, 1968) were created on greenfield sites outside small or
medium-sized towns and away from large population or industrial centres. This was in
contrast with previous universities which had typically emerged “bottom up”, starting
life as colleges to meet local needs (often founded by industrialists) and upgrading to
university status later (Shattock, 2012). Students were recruited nationally and grants
were also administered at the national level by the “University Grants Committee”.
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As a second case study, we look at West Germany (Rüegg, 2010) where a high number
of university openings took place in the early 1970s. Here key objectives were to improve
equality of opportunity and the modernisation and democratisation of society (Jäeger,
2013). Within the country, locational decisions were primarily driven by the objective of
achieving an equal distribution of higher education. There was also a belated response to
the rise of East Germany and the threat from what was perceived as rapid technological
advances in the Soviet bloc.
Thirdly, in Finland, there was a large increase in the number of universities and their
geographical spread in the 1960s and 1970s. The expansion of the university sector was
closely linked with regional development policies (Rüegg, 2010), but locational decision-
making processes were drawn out and uncertain, with committees split over favoured
locations (Toivanen and Väänänen, 2016). It appears that decisions were primarily influ-
enced by political forces rather than economic activity of different areas.
1.B Further Results
1.B.1 Specification and Sample Checks
In Table 1.D.3, we show that our regressions are robust to a series of checks. We perform
these on columns (5) and (7) of Table 1.4.2. In row (2) we conservatively cluster standard
errors at the country level, to account for correlation between the errors of regions within
the same country over time. While the standard errors rise a little, the association between
lagged university growth and GDP per capita growth remains significant at the 1% level.55
In row (3) we weight the regression by the region’s population as a share of total country
population, in case low density regions (which might be outliers) are affecting the results.
Again, this weighting has little effect on the university coefficient. In row (4) we include
country-year dummies instead of lagged country-level GDP per capita, to control for
time varying factors at the country level (including national income) that may affect both
university growth and GDP per capita growth (for example a general increase in funding
for higher education, or a change in national government). This does reduce the coefficient,
but it is still highly significant. In row (5) we control for the current (as well as lagged)
55 We also estimate these regressions using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors to allow for cross-sectional
dependence in a panel. The results are still highly significant (at the 1 per cent level) and given that such
methods are not intended for panels with small T and large N (our core sample has T=13 and N=1,498) we
prefer to stick with region-level clusters in our core specifications. We note that our results are robust also to
clustering at the country level which is a more conservative specification as it allows the standard errors in
one region-year to be correlated with standard errors in any other region-year within the same country.
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change in population to address the concern that the effect of the university is simply to
pull in more people to the region, who spend or produce more and hence raise GDP per
capita growth. Our university effect remains strong and therefore it does not appear to be
driven by population growth. Row (6) uses growth in university density (universities per
million people) instead of university count, with very similar results. We prefer to use the
university count in our core analysis, with controls for population growth, as changes in
university density can be driven either by the numerator (universities) or the denominator
(population) and can be more difficult to interpret.
We then perform a few checks to see whether regions with no universities, or regions
getting their first university are driving the results. Row (7) of Table 1.D.3 drops regions
which never have a university in the sample period, and row (8) drops region-years with
zero universities, and the coefficients remains unchanged. To make sure our results are
not driven by extreme university growth observations we do two things. Row (9) drops
region-year observations where a region opens its first university, and in row (10) we
winsorise the top and bottom five per cent of university growth which both strengthen
the results.56 Row (11) uses similarly winsorised GDP per capita growth as the dependent
variable, which dampens reduces our coefficient slightly but it still significant at the 1%
level. In row (12) we show that the results are not sensitive to dropping observations
where we have interpolated GDP per capita. To address measurement problems in terms
of missing founding dates, in row (13) we include a dummy for regions where more than
five percent of the universities have missing founding dates. Finally, we explore whether
the definition of university in WHED (i.e. only institutions that offer four year courses or
postgraduate degrees) may be a problem, in the sense that there may be some countries
that have a larger share of institutions outside this category which could be important
for growth. For this purpose, we compare the most recent university numbers in our
database to an external source, Webometrics.57 Row (14) shows that our results are robust
to dropping the 29 countries where there are more than double the number of institutions
in Webometrics compared to the WHED listing.
56 In further robustness checks we also explore if there are any heterogeneous effects for regions opening
their first universities by interacting the dummy with the university growth variable. The coefficients on both
the dummy and interaction term are not significantly different from zero.
57 http://www.webometrics.info/en/node/54
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1.B.2 Simulation of the Effects of a New University on the Average Region’s
Human Capital and GDP
To assess the plausibility of the magnitudes identified in the main text we consider some
quantitative calculations of university expansion.
To look at a representative case we take the average region in the dataset as summarised
in Table 1.2.1: a population of just under 3 million, GDP per capita of $13,056 (and hence
GDP of $39 billion), a college share of 7%, average years of education of 7.37, and just
under 10 universities.
We assume that a new university with a capacity of 8,500 students is opened in the
region. We believe that a university of 8,500 students a generous size for a new university,
based on to average enrolments in our sample countries over the years where country level
enrolments data are available.58 The annual intake of students is 2,125, so the university
is at capacity in four years. We assume it takes four years to graduate with a bachelors
degree and a staff student ratio of 10,59 so that there are 850 staff present at the university
at full capacity. We assume that students enter the region to begin studying, and stay in
the region post graduation, adding to its human capital stock. We keep the university size
constant for the five year period following its opening. We assume that staff enter the
region in the first year and remain there. We assume that the typical graduate has 18 years
of education.
This experiment involves adding one university to an existing stock of 10 universities,
which represents a 10% increase over a five year period, or an average of 2% per year. To
compare to our regression results, which represent the impacts of a 1% increase in univer-
sities, we need to double the regression coefficients. Our core coefficient on universities
in column (7) of Table 1.4.2 is 0.0467. This implies that a 1% increase in the number of
universities is associated with a 0.0467% increase in GDP per capita in the subsequent 5
years. Therefore the implied increase in GDP per capita following a 2% change would be
around 0.09%.
The impact of a 1% increase in universities in the previous period on college share
58 We obtained total tertiary education enrolments from UNESCO which is available since the 1970s, and
divided by the number of universities in our data, to get the average number of universities by country in
each year where the data are available. The average over the period is just under 8,200. Obviously, this will
represent existing as well as new universities. Moreover, this is likely to be an overstatement since, as we
previously discussed, not all tertiary institutions are included in WHED. The average growth rate in students
per university implied by this country level data over the period is 2.5% per annum.
59 This is a generous assumption. In the UK, for example, staff-student ratios range between 9 and 25 (see
http://www.thecompleteuniversityguide.co.uk/league-tables/rankings?o=Student-Staff%20Ratio)
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from Table 1.5.1, column (8) is an increase in college share of 0.004, which represents 0.4
percentage points since college share is measured as a fraction. Therefore we double this
to 0.008 to compare with the experiment. Similarly, the impact on years of education is a
0.02% increase, so we double this to 0.04%.
Using this simple example we generate impacts on college share and years of educa-
tion growth in the next five year period and compare these to the predictions from our
regressions.
Our calculation involves a churning out of 2,125 new graduates per year and this
results in an average annual rise in college share of 0.0006 (or 0.060 percentage points)
in the next five year period. This is actually smaller than the 0.008 implied from our
regressions, and could be due to more inward migration of skilled people following the
opening of universities, which we do not capture controlling only for population changes.
On the other hand the implied average annual rise in years of education is 0.09% which is
more similar to the 0.04% implied by the regressions (which, as we noted are based on a
different sample from the college share regressions).
While there are differences here, our simulation shows that the effects on human capital
even with generous assumptions about the size of a new university, will be relatively
small. This is in line with what we find in the regression analysis.
1.B.3 Demand Effects of Universities
Using this same example of the representative region, we can simulate the demand effects
of university expansion. If the university is funded from outside the area then GDP may
increase mechanically as demand from a university (e.g. rent, supplies, building and
maintenance) and its staff and students boost the local economy.
We assume that the cost per student in our new university is $10,000 per year, which is
likely to be an overestimate of the average university in our sample.60 For a university of
8,500 students this implies total costs of $85 million. Since this represents annual costs, we
assume that the transfer continues in each subsequent year. Therefore the uplift to GDP
will be felt only in the initial years. Assuming that total enrolments stay fixed at 8,500
over the five years following university entry (which is the key period we use for our
regressions), there would be no uplift to GDP per capita in that period. Alternatively, if we
60 In 2011 the OECD average tertiary education spending by educational institutions was $13,958 (see
Education at a Glance 2014: OECD Indicators, Indicator B1). On average OECD countries spent 41% of GDP
per capita per student in 2011. $ 10,000 represents 77% of GDP per capita in our average region-year ($
13,056).
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assume enrolments are growing by 5% per year61 this would only account for around 15%
of calculated effect of a 2% increase in universities implied by our baseline specification
(0.09%).
1.B.4 Universities and Democratic Approval
Figure 1.C.3 Panel E shows that there is a positive and significant correlation between
country level polity scores and university density, in the cross section (for 2000). Figure
1.C.13 also shows that there is a positive and significant correlation between the change in
university density and change in polity scores over 1960-2000.
Table 1.D.10 reports a number of robustness tests around the regressions of approval of
democracy on lagged university presence reported in Table 1.5.3. Column (1) repeats Table
1.5.3 column (4). Column (2) shows that this effect might be slightly stronger for OECD
countries, as an interaction term between an OECD dummy and the lagged university
presence is positive, but it is not significant at conventional levels. Column (3) shows
that the main result is much smaller in magnitude and insignificant for 5 year lagged
university presence, and actually negative for a 30 year lag. Column (5) shows that
our main result can be closely replicated using a different survey measure for approval
of democracy, “democracy is best” which asks respondents whether they agree with
the statement that democracy is better than any other form of government. Column
(6) does not include country fixed effects. This shows that the positive relationship we
find between universities and approval of democracy is valid within countries. Across
countries, factors not controlled for in these regressions (for example, levels of corruption)
appear to influence the result. We investigated which countries appear to be driving this
negative relationship and found, for example, that the Philippines (a country with high
levels of corruption) has high university density but low approval of democracy. Column
(7) clusters at the country level and significance holds. Column (8) weights by population,
to account for the fact that some regions with low population may have less representative
responses. Column (9) drops students and graduates and the main result gets stronger.
Finally, column (10) shows that the results are robust to estimation using an ordered-probit
model.
61 The average growth rate in students per university implied by the UNESCO country level enrolments
data over the period since the 1970s is 2.5% per annum.
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1.C Appendix Figures















NOTES: This chart shows the total number of countries that have universities over time, with some key countries 



















































1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
Oldest university founding year
68
Figure 1.C.3: Country Level Correlations
5 
 
A: Universities and income in 2000 
 
NOTES: Each observation is a country in 2000. Source: WHED and World Bank GDP per capita. 
 
B: Universities in 1960 and GDP per capita growth (1960-2000) 
 
 
NOTES: Each observation is a country. Average annual growth rates over the period 1960-2000 on the y axis. 
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C: Universities and average years of schooling in 2000 
 
NOTES: Each observation is a country in 2000. Source: WHED and years of schooling obtained from Barro-Lee 
dataset  
 
D: Universities and patents in 2000 
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E: Universities and democracy in 2000 
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N=153 b=4.58 se=.72 R2=.21





NOTES: Each observation is a region (US state), weighted by the region’s share in total US population in 2010. 
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Figure 1.C.6: Universities and Industrialisation in the UK
10 
 
A: University density and GDP per capita trends 
 
NOTES: This chart shows the evolution of university density (universities per million people) and GDP per 
capita over time. Source: WHED and Maddison GDP per capita data. 
 
B: University count trend 
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Figure 1.C.7: Universities and Industrialisation in the US
11 
 
A: University density and GDP per capita trends 
 
NOTES: This chart shows the evolution of university density (universities per million people) and GDP per 
capita over time. Source: WHED and Maddison GDP per capita data. 
 
B: University count trend 
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Figure 1.C.9: Universities and Industrialisation in France
13 
 
A: University density and GDP per capita trends 
 
NOTES: This chart shows the evolution of university density (universities per million people) and GDP per 
capita over time. Source: WHED and Maddison GDP per capita data. 
 
Panel B: University count trend 
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Figure 1.C.10: Universities and Industrialisation in Germany
14 
 
A: University density and GDP per capita trends 
 
NOTES: This chart shows the evolution of university density (universities per million people) and GDP per 
capita over time. Source: WHED and Maddison GDP per capita data. 
 
B: University count trend 
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Figure 1.C.11: Universities and Industrialisation in China
15 
 
A: University density and GDP per capita trends 
 
NOTES: This chart shows the evolution of university density (universities per million people) and GDP per 
capita over time. Source: WHED and Maddison GDP per capita data. 
 
B: University count trend 
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Figure 1.C.12: Universities and Industrialisation in India
16 
 
Panel A: University density and GDP per capita trends 
 
NOTES: This chart shows the evolution of university density (universities per million people) and GDP per 
capita over time. Source: WHED and Maddison GDP per capita data. 
 
Panel B: University count trend 
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1.D Appendix Tables
Table 1.D.1: Full Results of Baseline Covariates Specification
Dependent variable:
Regional Growth in GDP per capita
(1)
Lagged growth in #universities 0.0444***
(0.0105)
Lagged level of regional GDP per capita -0.0127***
(0.00131)
Lagged level of country GDP per capita -0.0213***
(0.00422)
Lagged level of population -0.0855**
(0.0387)
Lagged growth in population/100 -0.113***
(0.0385)












NOTES: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5%
level and * at the 10% level. This table replicates Table 1.4.2,
column (5) to show the geographic controls. Note, ln(oil and

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.D.3: Summary of Robustness Tests
Coefficient, lagged uni growth N
Covariates Region Trends
(1) Benchmark 0.0444*** 0.0467*** 8128
(0.0105) (0.0107)
A. Specification
(2) Cluster at country level (78 clusters) 0.0444*** 0.0467*** 8128
(0.0138) (0.0162)
(3) Population weights 0.0410*** 0.0427*** 8128
(0.0126) (0.0133)
(4) Country-year fixed effects 0.0281*** 0.0226** 8128
(0.0103) (0.00992)
(5) Control for current population change 0.0439*** 0.0451*** 8128
(0.0104) (0.0106)
(6) University density 0.0304*** 0.0292*** 8128
(0.00904) (0.00865)
B. Sample issues
(7) Drop regions that never have uni 0.0432*** 0.0473*** 6642
(0.0105) (0.0107)
(8) Drop regions before they have uni 0.0424*** 0.0447*** 6041
(0.0108) (0.0109)
(9) Drop first university observations 0.0507*** 0.0623*** 7897
(0.0133) (0.0142)
(10) Winsorize university growth 0.0612*** 0.0642*** 8128
(0.0146) (0.0147)
(11) Winsorize GDP per capita growth 0.0342*** 0.0355*** 8128
(0.00775) (0.00795)
(12) Un-interpolated GDP per capita 0.0485*** 0.0468*** 5312
(0.0134) (0.0143)
C. Measurement issues
(13) Dummy, >5% missing founding dates 0.0421*** 0.0467*** 8128
(0.0106) (0.0107)
(14) Country total check (Webometrics) 0.0528*** 0.0578*** 5357
(0.0130) (0.0130)
NOTES: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
The dependent variable in all rows is regional growth in GDP per capita. Row (1) replicates



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.D.7: Barro Regressions with Lagged Universities
Dependent variable:
Regional growth in GDP per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged #universities 0.00243*** 0.00189**
(0.000758) (0.000755)
Lagged level of population/100 -0.235*** -0.200***
(0.0679) (0.0673)
Lagged level of regional GDP per capita -0.0141*** -0.0178*** -0.0150*** -0.0184***
(0.00142) (0.00165) (0.00148) (0.00169)
Lagged level of country GDP per capita -0.0361*** -0.0321*** -0.0356*** -0.0318***
(0.00353) (0.00373) (0.00353) (0.00372)
Lagged level of population density -0.000562 -0.00109** -0.000220 -0.000730
(0.000418) (0.000424) (0.000482) (0.000488)
Lagged years of education 0.00399*** 0.00386***
(0.000569) (0.000570)
Observations 8010 8010 8010 8010
Adjusted R-squared 0.273 0.279 0.274 0.280
# clusters 1504 1504 1504 1504
NOTES: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. Column (1)
replicates Gennaioli et al. (2014) Table (5), column (8), with geographic controls, year and country
fixed effects, but omits years of education. There are more observations because we have interpo-
lated GDP per capita in the sample (Gennaioli et al. (2014) only interpolate years of education and
population). Column (2) adds years of education. Column (3) replicates column (1), but adds the
five year lagged level of universities in a region, and lagged population. Column (4) then adds years
of education to the specification in column (3). Standard errors are clustered at the regional level.
The lagged number of universities is the natural log of 1 + the 5 year lagged number of universities.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.D.11: Matching WHED and 1960 Yearbooks
Outcome University Other Total
Match - exact 570 65 635
Match - fuzzy 653 138 791
Match - manual 384 696 1080
Not in WHED 2010 40 115 155
Death 33 0 33
Total 1680 1014 2694
NOTES: This table reports the outcome of the match-
ing process between WHED and historical yearbooks,
by universities and other types of institution.
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Chapter 2
The Local Economic Impact of
Universities: Evidence from UK
Firms1
1 I would like to thank Alan Manning, John Van Reenen, Nick Jacob, Rosa Sanchis-Guarner, Isabelle
Roland, Maria Sanchez-Vidal, Max Nathan, Richard Murphy, Steve Machin and Vincenzo Scrutinio for helpful
comments and advice. Financial support from the ESRC through the CEP is gratefully acknowledged. This
work contains statistical data from the ONS, which is Crown Copyright. The use of ONS statistical data does
not imply the endorsement of the ONS in relation to the interpretation or analysis of the data. This work uses
research datasets, which may not exactly reproduce National Statistics aggregates.
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2.1 Introduction
Universities are often regarded as key players in national and regional economic growth
strategies, producing human capital via students graduating into the workforce, and
generating innovations from their research activity. Since the 1990s, there has been
increased focus also on the so-called “third mission”, giving universities an explicit role
in socio-economic development (Laredo, 2007). This has included the establishment of
new functions such as technology transfer offices, science parks or incubator facilities
that have sought to translate research into marketable innovations. Areas characterised
by a high share of innovative industries and entrepreneurship, such as Silicon Valley
in the US or the Cambridge cluster in the UK, surround universities and appear to
benefit from agglomeration economies and associated knowledge spillovers.2 This is
something that policymakers seek to emulate in other geographical regions. The UK
government’s recently published industrial strategy lays out a vision for a “knowledge-
led” economy, in which “‘Innovation clusters’ will form and grow around our universities
and research organisations, bringing together world-class research, business expertise and
entrepreneurial drive” (HMG, 2017).
While there is a large body of literature on universities and innovation spillovers,3
fewer studies go on to link university research and innovation to local economic outcomes
(Hausman, 2017; Kantor and Whalley, 2014; Aghion et al., 2009) and little is known about
the impacts of universities on their local economies in more general terms (Valero and
Van Reenen, 2018). Of key interest from a growth perspective is the extent to which uni-
versities stimulate start-up activity. While many start-ups stay small or go out of business
after a few years, a small fraction become high growth firms or “gazelles” (Haltiwanger
et al., 2017). Such firms are considered to be key drivers of job creation and productivity
growth and are part of the dynamics of reallocation that characterise growth in advanced
economies, but have been in decline in recent years.4 Existing studies on the impact
of universities on start-ups tend to be focused on specific manufacturing sub-sectors.5
From a sectoral perspective, start-ups in the innovative high-tech sectors (across both
2 For reviews of the literature see Carlino and Kerr (2015) or Henderson (2007).
3 This literature begins with Jaffe (1989). See for example Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993), Anselin,
Varga and Acs (1997), Belenzon and Schankerman (2013), and Andrews (2017).
4 Decker et al. (2016) show that since 2000 there has been a decline in high-growth firms, especially those
that are young. Calvino, Criscuolo and Menon (2018) show that there have been similar trends across 19
countries, including the UK.
5 See for example Woodward, Figueiredo and Guimaraes (2006) who analyse the impact of university
science and engineering research spending on start-ups in the US manufacturing sector in the 1990s. Other
papers include Bania, Eberts and Fogarty (1993) and Zucker, Darby and Brewer (1998).
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manufacturing and services) are of particular importance for future growth (Bakhshi
et al., 2015).6 In contrast, start-ups in less innovative sectors might include more “lifestyle”
entrepreneurs who have no aspiration to significantly grow.7
In this paper, I examine how university expansion affects start-ups, employment and
productivity in nearby local economies using panel data on UK firms and universities
over the period 1997-2016. While I focus in particular on high-tech sectors, I also analyse
impacts across other sectors of the economy. The core analysis is conducted at the level of
small local areas (wards), and the main measure of university presence is the enrolments
of students within a given radius (30km) of the ward centroid. University size is used
as a proxy for university activity, since in general, a larger university might be expected
to have a higher impact via graduates entering the labour market, and more staff and
resource for research or other activities relevant for local industry.8
The key empirical challenge I face is the fact that university growth is unlikely to be
random. A number of common factors affect the growth of both universities and local
businesses. Furthermore, there may be direct feedback as successful local economies
draw in more students. For example, changing local or regional development policies or
other shocks are likely to be correlated with both university expansion and a growing
economy, and areas with growing economies might attract more students or induce
universities to expand. These issues imply that cross-sectional relationships between
university activity and business outcomes are likely to be confounded. To address these
endogeneity concerns, the analysis in this paper is based on a panel framework, with
ward level fixed effects to control for time invariant factors that might be correlated with
both university size and local economic performance. The university presence measure is
based on the three year lag of enrolments to avoid the effects of contemporaneous demand
shocks and create a plausible channel for enrolments to affect local economies (since most
students enrolled at a British university should have graduated after three years). In
addition, all regressions control for population within the same radius as students which
should capture local demand shocks, and also control for the mechanical demand effects
of students and university staff consuming goods and services in the local area.
6 See Haltiwanger et al. (2017). Acemoglu et al. (2013) provide evidence that innovative activity tends to
be concentrated in the high-tech sectors, and that within those sectors, high-growth firms are more likely to
be young.
7 See Hurst and Pugsley (2011).
8 In this context, this measure is preferred relative to the simple count of universities (Valero and
Van Reenen, 2018) since it reflects the scale of the university, and varies over time. The period since 1997
has not been one of significant entry of new universities in the UK, though a number of pre-existing higher
education institutions have been upgraded to university status.
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The analysis reveals the main effects of universities are at the extensive margin via the
entry of new establishments, and in particular single-unit establishments, which I refer to
as start-ups. Increased university presence generates modest but statistically significant
growth in the number of start-ups in high-tech sectors, with a 1% rise in students enrolled
within a 30km radius of a ward leading to a 0.09% increase in start-ups. These results
are robust to a number of different assumptions on specification. While I focus on the
high-tech sectors, I also show that there are positive effects in other services, including
hospitality, retail and recreation which might grow differentially with an increased student
population versus general population growth. In contrast, employment effects at the
area level are positive but insignificant, and the average establishment size actually falls
with increases in university size. This appears to be due to both the extensive margin (a
composition effect due to the entry of smaller establishments) and the intensive margin
(existing establishments getting smaller, in particular older, larger establishments) which
could be evidence of a process of creative destruction. Ward level productivity analysis
reveals that on average areas are not more productive when universities grow. This might
be expected since areas with higher numbers of start-ups might also have depressed
measured productivity due to lower mark-ups (Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson, 2008).
However, I find that areas with higher initial high-tech intensity become more productive
as universities grow, and at the intensive margin, establishment level analysis finds a
positive relationship for high-tech plants themselves.
Understanding the extent to which there are differential effects by university type
can reveal information about the mechanisms through which universities affect local
economies. To estimate heterogeneous effects, I include the share of students of different
types within 30km of the ward centroid in addition to the core university measure. I
find that the high-tech start-ups results are larger in magnitude for universities of higher
quality and research intensity, and also for those with a higher share of overseas students.9
Similar patterns are found in the productivity analysis.
While the core analysis addresses concerns about time invariant unobservables via the
inclusion of ward level fixed effects, and demand conditions by controlling for population,
concerns regarding endogeneity due to time varying unobservables and feedback effects
remain. To address these issues, I do two things. First, in the robustness, I show that results
largely survive inclusion of region-year fixed effects - a demanding specification where
9 This last finding is consistent with evidence from the US that has found that immigrants entering on
student visas are more innovative and entrepreneurial (Hunt, 2011).
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identification comes from comparing changes over time between local areas controlling
for shocks or policy changes within the larger geographical area. Second, I construct an
instrument based on historical patterns of overseas student enrolment (Machin and Mur-
phy, 2017) to generate exogenous variation in student numbers. This type of instrument
is widely employed in the literature on immigration, and uses prior settlement patterns
as a source of identification (Bartik, 1991; Card, 2001b). It is interesting to examine the
reduced form relationships, and instrument for the number of overseas students in order
to analyse their impacts on local economies which might make a useful contribution given
the ongoing political debate about their inclusion in the UK’s migration targets. As an
additional robustness check I use a fitted value of overseas students as an instrument for
total students. Since I cannot rule out a violation of the exclusion restriction - given that
overseas students appear to have a differential impact on local industry compared with
UK students - these results are interpreted with caution. The IV estimates are similar (and
slightly stronger) when I instrument for the university presence variable with the overseas
student instrument.
Overall, these results are supportive of there being a role of universities in generating
entrepreneurial activity and growth in high-tech sectors. These effects are particularly
strong for higher quality, research intensive universities, and in urban and high-skill areas
which we might expect to have higher absorptive capacity, thereby benefitting more from
agglomeration economies. Such findings are consistent with the literature that has found
that the effects of university research on local economies are small, but higher where
universities and local industry have stronger links (see, for example, Kantor and Whalley
(2014)). Taken together the results on high-tech start-ups and productivity suggest that
the economic effects of universities might be larger in the longer run, as local industrial
composition adjusts.
This paper contributes to the literature on university-industry links by shedding light
on the extent to which a general measure of university presence is related to local economic
outcomes, and how this varies by university quality or type. This is in contrast with most
previous work which tends to be focused on university research activity or specific sectors.
Moreover, this paper contributes to a smaller body of research on the economic impact
of universities in the UK. The UK provides an interesting context from a policy perspective,
being home to a world leading university sector which has grown rapidly in recent years10
10 Over the period 2000-2016, the share of 25-34 year olds with a degree has risen particularly rapidly in the
UK, compared to the OECD on average, or its main comparator countries the US, France and Germany, see
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and experienced a number of policy changes with respect to university finance and
assessment. UK universities account for around a quarter of gross domestic expenditure
on R&D, which is high by international standards.11 Today, assessments of research quality
place increasing emphasis on “impact”12, and policymakers highlight the important role
of universities in the new industrial strategy which seeks to improve both the UK’s
aggregate productivity performance and reduce regional disparities (HMG, 2017). While
the UK research base is strong by international standards (Elsevier, 2016), there has been
extensive policy focus on improving commercialisation (see for example, Dowling (2015)).
Some argue that the career incentives of academics are a key barrier to achieving more
economic impact (Willets, 2017), while others recommend more focus on improving
business demand for innovation (HOC, 2017).13 There are differing opinions as to whether
the university sector has reached an optimal size, or whether further growth would be
economically beneficial to the UK or particular regions. By shedding light on the local
economic impact of universities and how this varies by university, sector or type of firm,
this paper can help inform this debate in the UK, with relevance also for other advanced
economies with mature university sectors.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 provides a brief overview of findings
from the existing literature on the economic impact of universities and sets out how this
paper relates to it. Section 2.3 describes the data and some of its key features including
some correlations that motivate the paper. Section 2.4 sets out the econometric strategy,
and Section 2.5 the results. Section 2.6 provides some concluding comments.
2.2 Relevant Literature
In analysing the relationship between the number of students in a local area and economic
outcomes, this paper links to the human capital and growth literature. Human capital
has been shown to matter for regional economic outcomes (see for example Gennaioli
et al. (2013) and Gennaioli et al. (2014)). There is the direct impact of skilled workers being
OECD Education at a Glance, 2017 (Table A1.2). This increase is highlighted in Corry, Valero and Van Reenen
(2011) as contributing to UK productivity growth between the late 1990s and the financial crisis.
11 In the US, the equivalent share is 13% , for Germany it is 18%, and the OECD average is 17% (OECD
MSTI, Percentage of GERD performed by the Higher Education sector, 2016).
12 The most recent assessment, the REF 2014, was the first to assess impact outside of academia, defined
as “an effect on, change or benefit to the economy, society, culture, public policy or services, health, the
environment or quality of life, beyond academia”. Following review (Stern, 2016), the REF 2021 will give
impact increased weight.
13Also in development is a new Knowledge Exchange Framework to benchmark universities’ performance
at knowledge exchange and commercialisation.
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on average more productive than unskilled workers, as well as indirect spillover effects
of the human capital in cities or regions, as measured in individuals’ wages (Moretti,
2004a) or firm productivity (Moretti, 2004b; Gennaioli et al., 2013). Feng and Valero (2018)
show firms closer to universities tend to have higher management scores (Bloom and
Van Reenen, 2007) and employ a higher share of graduates which appears to be due
to universities increasing the supply and reducing the relative cost of graduates.14 For
university graduates to affect the local economy, at least some would need to remain in the
same area post-graduation, working in local firms or starting their own businesses. Data
on employment destinations of UK domiciled undergraduate students six months after
graduation show that across local enterprise partnerships (LEP), nearly 40% of students
on average stay in the same LEP as that in which they studied.15 It has been established
that proximity matters in terms of increasing the probability of locally born young people
attending university (e.g. Card (2001a)); and indeed in the UK, on average 34.5% of
students go to university in the LEP where they grew up.16 Therefore, in this context it
is reasonable to assume that universities increase local human capital in the workforce
both by training students from the local area, and by pulling students into a region from
elsewhere.
To the extent that the size and composition of universities reflect their research activity,
this paper connects to the literature on universities and local innovation spillovers. Such
spillovers can occur through formal or informal interactions between university research
and businesses, and the innovative activities of staff, students and graduates themselves.
To the extent that universities develop human capital in particular in the younger genera-
tions, they might be also be expected to be linked to the most creative or ground-breaking
innovations (Acemoglu, Akcigit and Celik, 2014). Innovation is not directly measured in
this paper, but the reduced form relationship between changes in university size and local
economic outcomes such as high-tech start-ups or productivity are likely to reflect changes
in innovative activity. The literature on innovation spillovers from university research
has been largely based on US data, and stems from Jaffe (1989), who finds evidence of
commercial spillovers from university research (to firm patenting or R&D). A number of
14 This pattern is also highlighted in the US using proximity to land-grant colleges by Bloom, Sadun and
Van Reenen (2017).
15 Data sourced from HEFCE, Geographical Mobility of Students, based on first degree students who
studied in higher education in the years 2010-11 to 2014-15 inclusive. This share is highest for London (at
72.7%) and lowest for Oxford (23.1%). Local Enterprise Partnerships are individual or grouped local authority
areas which partner with businesses.
16 This ranges from 65.1% for the North Eastern LEP, down to 14.2% for Thames Valley Berkshire, based on
HEFCE data.
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subsequent papers provide evidence of localisation (see, for example, Jaffe, Trajtenberg
and Henderson (1993), Anselin, Varga and Acs (1997), Belenzon and Schankerman (2013)).
Andrews (2017) exploits quasi random allocation of universities to US counties over the
period 1839-1954 to estimate their causal impact on patenting. This paper also examines
the channels driving these effects, and finds that the largest share of induced patenting
came from people who migrated into the university counties, rather than from staff or
graduates from the new universities.
Other papers relate university innovation or research activity to local economic out-
comes. Hausman (2017) exploits variation induced by the Bayh-Dole Act (1980) which
gave US universities property rights to innovations and therefore raised incentives to
patent, finding that employment and pay increased in sectors closely tied with university
innovative specialisms.17 Then there are papers that analyse the impacts of research
spending by universities. Kantor and Whalley (2014) develop an instrument for university
research spending based on endowment values, and find a positive but small effect on
labour income in large urban US counties, again with a larger effect for sectors that are
technologically closer to nearby universities. Aghion et al. (2009) show that increases
in research investments at universities affect growth and patenting in US states. The
impact of university research spending on start-ups is analysed by Woodward, Figueiredo
and Guimaraes (2006), who find a positive but small effect of science and engineering
research spend on high-tech start-ups in the US manufacturing sector in the 1990s.18 Using
the number of university researchers employed as a measure of investment, Andersson,
Quiley and Wilhelmsson (2009) study the effects of university expansion in Sweden that
occurred in the late 1980s and 1990s, and find that output per worker and patenting has
been greater in municipalities where more university researchers are employed, and that
the effects are strongly localised.
Studies in the UK tend to be focused on the relationships between scientific research
in universities and the extent or location of business research and innovation in specific
sectors. Considering the manufacturing sector only, Helmers and Rogers (2015) find
positive effects of university research on the patenting of small firms located near to
universities (but no impact on large firms), and that the quality of university research
17 Hausman finds that employment growth is largely driven by firm entry, in particular from multi-unit
firm expansions rather than single-unit entrants (though the latter group were more plentiful); and increased
exit in incumbent firms, consistent with a process of “creative destruction”.
18 See also Bania, Eberts and Fogarty (1993) and Zucker, Darby and Brewer (1998), who consider the impacts
of research spending and the presence of top scientists respectively on start-ups in specific manufacturing
sectors in the US.
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matters. In a study focused on eight product groups in manufacturing, Abramovsky and
Simpson (2011) study whether firms conducting R&D co-locate research activity near to
universities, finding positive effects in the pharmaceuticals sector, but less or no evidence
of co-location in other sectors.19
To date there are fewer papers that consider the general economic impact of univer-
sities on their local areas and across sectors. Over and above the human capital and
research channels, universities might impact upon local areas through other interactions
with business and the community, for example consultancy, sharing of facilities and
infrastructure or working with local or regional bodies on regeneration projects.20 More-
over, university-business interactions might generate innovation that is not picked up
via patenting measures, which tend to be a more relevant metric in manufacturing than
services. Some papers based on US data take a more general approach than the innovation
focused papers discussed previously. In older work, Beeson and Montgomery (1993)
find weak evidence that university quality affects the employment rate and the share of
high-tech employment in metropolitan areas. A recent study by Liu (2015) examines the
impact of land grant colleges in US counties on population density and the manufacturing
sector using synthetic controls and event study methods. He finds a positive effect of
university designation on population density, no impact on the size of the manufacturing
sector, and only long run effects on manufacturing productivity.21
A robust association between universities and regional GDP per capita is found by
Valero and Van Reenen (2018) using international data. As noted in that paper, the
university count measure cannot capture variation in size and quality over time and we
might expect economic impact to vary accordingly. Moreover, the analysis is based on
a regional panel and cannot rule out endogeneity due to time varying unobservables,
nor examine the extent to which results might be driven by particular industrial sectors
or types of firm. This paper fills some of the gaps, using granular data on firms and
universities which allows for a more detailed analysis, and employing a number of
strategies to address endogeneity concerns.
19 Papers that analyse the effect of university research activity on area or firm level performance include
Guerrero, Cunningham and Urbano (2015), who find positive relationships between university teaching,
research and entrepreneurial activities (spin-offs) and the productivity of 74 NUTS 3 regions in the UK, with
the entrepreneurial activity effects being particularly strong for Russell Group universities; and Harris, Li and
Moffat (2011) who find a positive relationship between establishment - university research collaboration and
TFP.
20 For more details of the different types of activity in which UK universities engage, see the Higher
Education – Business and Community Interaction Survey HEFCE (2017).
21 See also Cantoni and Yuchtman (2014) who highlight the role of the medieval universities during the
Commercial revolution using historical data on German cities.
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2.3 Data
I combine administrative data on UK universities sourced from the Higher Education
Statistical Authority (HESA), with data on UK firms, their location, employment and
financial performance sourced from the UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS).
2.3.1 University Data
I obtained administrative data on annual enrolments at higher education institutions
between the academic years 1994/1995 and 2015/16 from the Higher Education Statistics
Authority (HESA). For each institution, the annual number of students (as at 1st December)
are broken down by level of study, mode of study (full time or part time – which I use to
calculate full time equivalent, FTE, students), gender, subject area, and country of domicile.
Institutions are merged with a listing of UK universities from the World Higher Education
Database (WHED) (Valero and Van Reenen, 2018) which gives university postcodes and
hence allows them to be geocoded. For the purposes of this paper, institutions in Northern
Ireland are excluded, as firm level performance data are available for Great Britain only.
Data are provided for the institutions using their names in a given year, and in order to
create a panel it is necessary to correct for name changes and mergers.22 The final sample
of institutions is based on their form in the most recent year of data. So, for example,
Edinburgh College of Art merged into the University of Edinburgh in 2011/12. The
address of the merged institution will be the main address of the University of Edinburgh
throughout the panel, and data for these institutions pre-2011/12 are aggregated.
HESA data are collected for higher education institutions, which includes higher
education colleges in addition to universities, and there are a number of institutions that
enter the data during the period. The university sample used in this paper consists of
136 established and recognised university institutions for which data are available during
the entire sample period (Appendix 2.A details the institutions included and excluded
from the sample). Institutions that enter the HESA data in the period since the mid 1990s
are generally pre-existing institutions gaining recognition in the higher education sector,
rather than newly founded institutions on greenfield sites (which was the case with the
“plate glass” universities in the 1960s). Such institutions are dropped from the university
sample as they would create artificial jumps in the size of the university sector in local




Data on enrolments by subject group are used in heterogeneity analysis, and in con-
junction with information on country of domicile, for the construction of the overseas
instrument. Students within 19 JACS subject areas are aggregated into five groups,24 three
of which might be expected to have stronger impacts on local firms: these are STEM and
Medicine (and related courses) which are generally associated with university innovation
and collaboration with firms, and social science, law and business courses which might be
relevant for graduates working in industry or other types of business support that affects
local growth (for example, consultancy services or training).25
Student enrolments have risen over the study period. Splitting FTE students into UK
and overseas (Figure 2.3.1A) shows that there has been a rise for both UK and overseas
students, though there was a dip after 2012 for UK students. This has been attributed to
demographic decline in the young population and a fall in the number of people studying
part time (UUK, 2015). Recent analysis has shown that the rise in university fees in 2012 did
not have a large impact on student enrolments (Azmat and Simion, 2018). Splitting total
enrolments into undergraduate and postgraduate students shows that again both have
risen over the period and that the dip from 2012 is more pronounced for undergraduates
(Figure 2.3.1B).26 In fact, the vast majority of institutions in the sample (128 out of 136)
have seen positive average annual growth on an FTE basis during the period (result not
shown).
2.3.2 Firm Level Data
ONS micro-data relate to different levels of the firm. The“local unit” is the business site,
and the “enterprise” is the overall firm. While these are the same in many cases, they
differ for firms that are multi-unit (for example a supermarket chain). Administrative
data on employment are available for both of these units, and since this paper examines
spatial relationships between firms and universities, the local unit (which I refer to as the
establishment) is the relevant unit of analysis.
23 Enrolments of the institutions entering HESA data over the period represent 1% of total enrolments
of the university sample in 2016. To the extent that there are persistent differences for particular areas due
to exclusion of such institutions, these will be absorbed by area or establishment level fixed effects in the
regressions.
24 See Appendix 2.A for further details.
25 Britton et al. (2016) have shown that medicine, economics, law, mathematics and business courses attract
significant wage premia, reflecting their economic value.
26 In fact it is “other undergraduate” courses (such as diplomas and foundation courses) that drive this
trend, rather than first degrees (UUK, 2015).
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Figure 2.3.1: University Enrolments over Time
A: UK and Overseas Students 
 







NOTES: Analysis based on HESA data, university sample refers to 136 established universities observed
throughout the period.
Data on the population of establishments, and their employment is based on the Inter -
Departmental Business Register (IDBR), a live record of VAT or PAYE registered businesses
which is available over the period 1997-2016. These data are accessed via the Business
Structure Database (BSD) which provides an annual snapshot of the register.27 Using the
ONS Postcode Directory (2015), establishment postcodes are mapped to 2015 electoral
wards, of which there are 8,734 in the main sample.28 The count of establishments and
27 Office for National Statistics. (2017). Business Structure Database, 1997-2017: Secure Access. [data
collection]. 9th Edition. UK Data Service. SN: 6697, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6697-9
28 There are 9,198 electoral wards across the UK in the ONSPD 2015 (variable osward). The analysis in this
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their employment are then aggregated to the ward level in each year. Information on
establishment birth and death dates are used to calculate entrants and exits, and details on
whether or not the establishment is part of a single-unit or multi-unit enterprise are used
to identify start-ups which I define as single-unit entrants. Industry codes are also used to
allocate establishments to aggregate sectors. All sectors (including the public sector) are
included in the initial analysis, but the main focus is on the high-tech sectors which are
mapped across manufacturing and services (see below).
Financial data are available for a sample of firms in the IDBR from the Annual Busi-
ness Survey (ABS), which covers the production, construction, distribution and service
industries, and represents approximately two thirds of the UK economy. The ABS sample
consists of the population of larger businesses (defined based on employment), and a ran-
dom sample of smaller businesses. I access these data using the newly available “ARDx”,29
which combines and harmonises variables in the ABS and its predecessor survey over the
period 1998-2015.
The key performance measure used in this analysis is Gross Value Added (GVA) per
worker, in basic prices and deflated using ONS sectoral deflators. GVA is available for the
“reporting unit” of the firm. The reporting unit tends to be the same as the enterprise in
most cases, but might differ in large companies with different reporting divisions. As is
standard in the literature, I apportion reporting unit financial variables to the establishment
level using the its share in total reporting unit employment (see for example, Gibbons et al.
(2017)), a method which implicitly assumes that productivity is equal in all parts of the
firm. I aggregate GVA and employment to the ward level based on this sample, and then
calculate GVA/employment.30 I also obtain data on capital investment, wages, turnover,
output and profitability31 and capital stock estimates based on the ARDx methodology.32
Across both the BSD and ARDx datasets, high-tech sectors are allocated according to
classifications given by NESTA (Bakhshi et al., 2015) which build on Eurostat methodology
(based on R&D and knowledge intensity), but use also information of the STEM intensity
paper excludes Northern Ireland (462 wards), the Isle of Man (1) and the Channel Islands (1), leaving 8,734.
29 Office for National Statistics. Virtual Microdata Laboratory (VML), University of the West of England, Bris-
tol. (2017). Annual Respondents Database X, 1998-2014: Secure Access. [data collection]. 4th Edition. Office
for National Statistics, [original data producer(s)]. UK Data Service. SN: 7989, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-
SN-7989-4
30 Normalising by employment helps to avoid issues regarding the representativeness of ward level
aggregates based on the establishments covered by the ABS sample (either because they are reporting
units themselves, or because they are part of multi-establishment reporting units that have financial data
apportioned to them).
31 Profitability is normalised by turnover to calculate a profit margin.
32 These estimates, sourced from the ARDx, are still in development. Future work will use the updated
methodology when it becomes available, and conduct more in depth analysis of TFP.
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of occupations within sectors. Further details of data cleaning and assumptions are in the
Data Appendix 2.A.
2.3.3 Measures of University Presence
The main measure of university presence is enrolments at universities located within
30km of the centroid of a ward. I also examine sensitivity of the main results by using
different radii (10km and 50km). This range is consistent with related UK literature, for
example Abramovsky and Simpson (2011). Given that the analysis is in a panel set-up,
this is the most appropriate time varying measure of university presence over the time
period analysed. University size is used as a proxy for university activity, since in general,
a larger university can potentially have a higher impact through graduates entering the
labour market, and allowing for differing student-staff ratios33, more students should
imply more staff and resource for research or other activities relevant for local industry.
These measures are constructed using Stata’s “geonear”34 function, which calculates
geodetic distances between two points based on their co-ordinates (the length of the
shortest curve between two points along the surface of a mathematical model of the Earth).
This allows the identification of the nearest university for each ward35, and also all the
universities within a given radius. By merging in enrolments data, it is therefore possible
to calculate the number of students currently studying within a given radius of the ward
or establishment in a given year.
Figure 2.3.2 summarises the main university presence measure. Panel A gives a
snapshot of the data in the most recent year (2016), which shows that there is variation
across Great Britain, with a concentration of students around London and some other
metropolitan areas. Panel B shows a long difference from 1995-2016, and reveals that
there is variation in the growth of enrolments, and that growth has not necessarily been
concentrated in economically more successful areas (for example, there is a large increase
in Cornwall which is driven by the expansion of the University of Falmouth). There are
1,484 wards (17% of the total sample) that do not have any university presence according
to my definition during the sample period.
In order to capture heterogeneity, I calculate the share of students of different types
33 These vary between around 10:1 and 20:1 in the UK (https://www.thecompleteuniversityguide.co.uk/league-
tables/rankings?o=Student-Staff+Ratio& y=2016), with lower ratios at the more prestigious universities.
34 http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/g/geonear.html
35 Latitude and longitude for each postcode are given in the ONSPD. The co-ordinates of the ward centroid
is calculated as the average latitude and longitude of postcodes within a ward.
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Figure 2.3.2: Maps of Ward Level Enrolments Within 30km
A. Enrolments within 30km (1000s), 2016 B. Enrolments within 30km, % change 
1995-2016 
 
NOTES: Analysis based on HESA data, university sample refers to 136 established universities observed
throughout the period.
within a 30km radius. Research intensity is proxied by the share of postgraduate students,
and specialisms reflected by the share of postgraduates enrolled in scientific (STEM or
medical sciences) or business related degrees (business, law or social science). As a simple
measure of quality, I calculate the share of students enrolled at the higher ranking Russell
Group36 universities, which have higher resource and performance compared to other
universities (McCormack, Propper and Smith, 2013).37 Since these measures are based on
36 There are 24 universities in the Russell Group, which are the group of research intensive institu-
tions collectively responsible for over two thirds of world leading research produced in UK universities
(https://russellgroup.ac.uk/about/). Of these, 23 are included in my sample: Queen’s University Belfast is
excluded because it is in Northern Ireland. In 2015/16 Russell Group universities generated nearly 50% of the
total IP income generated by UK universities.
37 Moreover, Russell Group universities also see themselves competing in national and international
markets for staff and students – a feature that has been found to be correlated with university quality (Aghion
et al., 2010), compared to newer universities that focus more on local markets (McCormack, Propper and
Smith, 2013).
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student numbers, they vary over time and can be calculated for the entire sample period.38
2.3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.3.1 summarises the data used in the ward level analysis based on the BSD (Panel
A) and ARDx (Panel B). The BSD ward sample contains 165,946 ward-year observations,
relating to 8,734 wards. Since I lag the university enrolments three years, and the university
data are available from 1995, the BSD analysis sample covers the period 1998-2016. The
average ward over the sample period has 275 establishments, employment of 2,865, and
the average establishment has around 9 employees. There are 31 entrants, on average,
in a given year, of which 26 are single-unit establishments. There are also 26 exits in the
average ward – year. There are 37 establishments in the high-tech sectors, representing
13% of total establishments, and together they employ 297. There are 5 single-unit entrants
in these sectors, which I refer to as high-tech start-ups, the outcome variable of focus in the
ward level analysis which uses BSD data. Overall, 60% of wards can be considered urban.
The average numbers of students, universities and population within 30km from the
centroid of the ward are also given. I focus on the FTE measure of students (full time
students plus half of part time students), of which there are on average just over 54,000
within 30km of the average ward during the sample period. There are 5 universities
within 30km of the average ward, and the nearest university is 18km away. The key area
level control used in the analysis is population within the same radius as the enrolments
measure, based on census data (for more detail see Data Appendix 2.A). The average
population within 30km is just over 2 million.
I also provide summary statistics of the key measures of university heterogeneity: over
the period, on average 18% of the students within 30km of the average ward are enrolled
at Russell Group universities and 15% are postgraduate. Of total students, on average
5% are studying STEM and medicine related subjects at the postgraduate level, and a
similar proportion are studying social science and business courses. 12% of students are
domiciled overseas.
The key variables used in the productivity analysis based on the ARDx sample are
38 Other available measures of quality include Research Excellence Framework (REF) scores (and their
predecessor the RAE) which are only available three times over the sample period (2001, 2008 and 2014) and
have changed in methodology over time, or university rankings which tend to be published every year (the
Complete University Guide (CUG), for example, is available annually from 2008). The share of students in
Russell Group universities is a more straightforward way to account for quality in this set-up rather than
trying to combine individual university rankings with the enrolments data over time, but measures extracted
from the REF and CUG are used in the cross-sectional analysis.
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Table 2.3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD
A: BSD wards sample (N=165,946 and 8,734 wards)
Establishments 275 420
Employment 2,865 5,910
Employment per establishment 9 7
Entrants 31 91
Single-unit entrants 26 86
Exits 26 108
Establishments in high-tech sectors 37 59
Employment in high-tech sectors 297 796
Single-unit entrants in high-tech sectors 5 22
Ward share of urban postcodes 0.60 0.50
Students within 30km (FTE) 54,436 76,535
Students within 30km (FT+PT) 63,461 89,902
Universities within 30km 5 9
Km to nearest university 18 20
Population within 30km 2,092,577 2,272,322
% Russell Group students 17.7 22.2
% Postgraduate students 14.9 8.7
% Postgraduate STEM, med. students 5.1 4.1
% Postgraduate soc sci, bus. students 4.8 3.0
% Overseas students 12.0 8.0
B: ARDx wards sample (N=139,891 and 8,726 wards)
GVA per worker 40,985 70,567
Capital per worker 33,187 75,515
Ward share of high-tech establishments (%) 7 6
Ward share of urban postcodes 0.65 0.45
Students within 30km (FTE) 54,202 75,619
Students within 30km (FT+PT) 63,483 89,325
Universities within 30km 5 9
Km to nearest university 18 20
Population within 30km 2,105,692 2,261,299
NOTES: Panel A summarises the BSD ward sample and relates to the years 1998-
2016 (1997 is dropped from the sample as there are no 3 year lagged students in the
HESA data which start at 1995). Panel B summarises the ward sample based on
ARDx data and relates to the year 1998-2014 (2015 is dropped because capital stock is
not available for that year). Observations with missing employment or financial data
which reappear later in the sample are interpolated for the purposes of calculating
ward level variables. “High-tech” sectors are allocated according to NESTA(2015).
The university measures are based on distances of universities from the centroid of
the ward.
summarised in Panel B. This consists of 139,891 ward-year observations, relating to 8,726
wards where financial data on reporting units and their corresponding local units were
available – nearly all the wards in the BSD sample. The average ward has GVA per worker
of £40,985 during the sample period (in 2013 prices). The core sample is for the years
1998-2014, as those are the years where capital stock estimates are available. Average
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capital per worker is £33,187 over the period. The average share of high-tech employment
within a ward is 7% in this sample. The urban share, university presence variables and
population are similar to the BSD sample.
An analogue table for the establishment level analysis is given in the Appendix (Table
2.B.1), based on unbalanced panels of live establishments which are observed repeatedly
over the sample period. These descriptives give some more detail on the types of estab-
lishment in the data: the average establishment in the BSD sample is small, employing 11,
and in fact only 3% of the sample is classified as a large establishment (employees greater
than or equal to 50 in its first observation in the sample period). 38% of the sample are
classified as “young” (under 5 years since birth), 14% operate in the high-tech sectors, and
nearly 50% are part of multi-unit enterprises. A higher share of this sample is urban (72%),
and accordingly, the average establishment has nearly 80,000 students within 30km, and a
population of nearly 3 million within that radius. Establishments in the ARDx sample are
slightly larger on average due to survey design (and these also tend to be more urban).
The average establishment has 41 employees, and this sample has a higher fraction of
large establishments (16% versus 3% in the BSD sample). The university presence measure
is similar to the BSD sample.
2.3.5 Basic Correlations
Table 2.3.2 reports the cross sectional univariate correlations between ward level, estab-
lishments, employment, employment per establishment, and GVA per worker against
different measures of university presence using the data in the latest available year only
(2016 in the BSD, 2015 in the ARDx). The natural log of outcomes and university presence
variables are taken (+1 to retain zeroes in the sample). Each cell represents a different
regression of the dependent variable (column) on a university measure (row), with no
other controls, and robust standard errors are in parentheses. Columns (1) - (3) give the
results for the number of establishments and employment based on BSD data. These
correlations are all significant at the 1% level and of the expected sign: positive for the
measures based on enrolments and numbers of universities, and negative for the distance
measure in row J, i.e. ward employment and establishments are lower the further away the
closest university is from the ward. Rows G to I regress employment and establishments
on students normalised by population. The relationships remain positive and significant
relationships but are smaller in magnitude. The coefficients are broadly similar for the
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10km, 30km and 50km radius. The correlations in column (3), for average employment,
are smaller than the coefficients for total employment, suggesting that much of the in-
creased employment associated with universities could be related to entry of new, smaller
establishments.
Table 2.3.2: Basic Correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable:
University Presence measure: ln(estab.) ln(emp) ln(ave emp) ln(gva/emp)
A ln(students, 10km) 0.0517*** 0.0665*** 0.0130*** 0.0105***
(0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0011) (0.0015)
B ln(students, 30km) 0.0450*** 0.0567*** 0.0101*** 0.0128***
(0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0012) (0.0021)
C ln(students, 50km) 0.0708*** 0.0822*** 0.00952*** 0.0190***
(0.0042) (0.0053) (0.0023) (0.0035)
D ln(unis, 10km) 0.470*** 0.541*** 0.0628*** 0.0977***
(0.0106) (0.0156) (0.0085) (0.0105)
E ln(unis, 30km) 0.336*** 0.356*** 0.0171*** 0.0833***
(0.0076) (0.0107) (0.0055) (0.0082)
F ln(unis, 50km) 0.311*** 0.316*** 0.0029 0.0792***
(0.0081) (0.0112) (0.0056) (0.0085)
G % students/population, 10km 0.0304*** 0.0464*** 0.0142*** 0.00730***
(0.0030) (0.0038) (0.0016) (0.0020)
H % students/population, 30km 0.0349*** 0.0495*** 0.0130*** 0.0114**
(0.0057) (0.0076) (0.0033) (0.0052)
I % students/population, 50km 0.0405*** 0.0598*** 0.0173*** 0.0154*
(0.0099) (0.0132) (0.0058) (0.0089)
J ln(distance to closest uni) -0.303*** -0.405*** -0.0899*** -0.0598***
(0.0106) (0.0136) (0.0062) (0.0089)
Observations 8,734 8,734 8,734 8,480
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. Each row is a separate
regression of the dependent variable on different measures of university presence in turn (rows
A-J). Note that students and population measures are lagged three years for consistency with
main analysis. Columns (1) to (3) are based on BSD data, and cross sectional regressions for 2016
only, N=8,734 ward level observations. Column (4) is based on ARDx data, and cross sectional
regressions for 2015, N=8480 ward level observations for all regressions. Regressions contain no
additional controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Column (4) reports the cross-sectional relationships between different measures of
university presence and GVA per worker. Again, Rows A-F show that there are positive
and significant relationships between student and university numbers within all radius
measures. Once students are normalised by population, the GVA per worker result
remains positive but becomes smaller and less significant at larger radius. Distance to
closest university is negatively and significantly correlated with labour productivity.39
39 This is consistent with the result based on international data in Feng and Valero (2018).
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Some other dimensions of these correlations are explored for descriptive purposes in
the Appendix. Table 2.B.2 looks at how the relationship between the distance to university
measure and number of establishments, employment and new entrants differ for closest
universities of higher quality (as measured by Russell Group status or REF scores), show-
ing that wards with a closest university of higher research quality tend to have higher
employment, establishments and new entrants, and distance matters more in these cases.
The same pattern is found when the dependent variable is single-unit establishments in
the high-tech sectors only (result not shown).40 These cross-sectional relationships accord
with the notion that clusters of economic activity surround universities in the UK and
motivate the analysis that follows.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
2.4.1 Ward Level Panel Regressions
The analysis seeks to estimate how the size of the university sector affects local economic
outcomes. The general estimating equation is:
lnpYr,tq “ α1lnpUPr,t´3q ` α2lnpPopr,t´3q ` ηr ` τt ` εr,t (2.4.1)
Where Yr,t is the outcome variable analysed for the ward r and time t. The key outcome
variables at the ward level are the number of establishments, employment and start-ups
in a given year (the natural log of 1 plus these values is used so that zeroes are retained
in the analysis). Based on the population of establishments in the BSD, these can also
be split into sector groupings, in particular, those in the high-tech sectors which are
across manufacturing and services. In the productivity analysis the outcome is labour
productivity (GVA/worker), and capital per worker is also controlled for.
The measure of university presence, UPr,t´3 , is the number of students enrolled within
a given radius of the ward (30km in the core specifications, but I also estimate effects
for 10km and 50km in the robustness), plus one so that areas with no universities are
retained. The university variable is lagged three years as most undergraduate university
programmes in the UK last for three years (and Masters programmes for less), so it is
reasonable to assume that the majority of students enrolled in a given year will have
40 There were similar results using the Complete University Guide research quality ratings (which them-
selves are based on REF scores). There were no systematic relationships in the cross section for other measures
in the Complete University Guide, such as overall university rank or student satisfaction.
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graduated three years later. In addition, lagging this measure allows us to eliminate the
effects of a contemporaneous demand shock that might have an impact on both firm
outcomes and university enrolments. I experiment with alternative lags in the robustness
and find that the three-year lag is a reasonable assumption. The coefficient of interest
therefore is α1 which, given the log-log specification provides an estimate of the elasticity
of the outcome variable with respect to student enrolments.
The main control is population, scaled consistently with the university variable (i.e.
population within wards that are within 30km of the centroid of economic unit), which
should reflect other time varying factors that may be related to economic growth and also
the growth student enrolments in a particular area, such as demand shocks. Including
population also should capture the direct demand effects of universities themselves – i.e.
the effects of universities on surrounding firms via staff and students consuming goods
and services. In other words, the university effect, controlling for population, should be
driven by human capital, innovation or other effects of universities on local areas.
The cross-sectional relationships between universities and economic outcomes are
likely to be subject to omitted variable bias as there are a number of unobservables
that might be correlated with both the size of the university sector in an area and firm
performance. Therefore, the main estimating equation controls for ward specific (ηr)
unobservables in a fixed effects framework. All regressions contain year specific (τt) fixed
effects to control for country-wide shocks. Finally, εr,t is an error term which is clustered
at the ward level (results are robust to alternative assumptions).
We might expect α1 to be positive in general across outcomes such as number of es-
tablishments, employment and productivity, based on previous literature that has linked
university research activity to local innovation and growth. But universities might also
have negative effects on some or all of these outcomes if they and their related activities
crowd out local industry. Universities themselves are large employers, and create addi-
tional demand for housing, land and other services which, with fixed supply, can lead to
rising factor costs such as wages or rent. Such forces could lead to existing establishments
exiting, moving away, employing fewer workers, or making fewer productivity enhancing
investments.41 Moreover, if universities stimulate increased start-up activity this will
add to local competitive pressure (possibly in product as well as factor markets) and less
41 In the UK there are concerns that restrictions on housing supply and inadequate infrastructure could hold
back the growth of the “Cambridge-Milton-Keynes-Oxford Corridor” (National Infrastructure Commission,
2017).
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productive incumbent firms might be expected to suffer, as found by Hausman (2017). In
addition, areas with higher numbers of start-ups might also have depressed measured
productivity on average due to lower mark-ups (Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson, 2008),
at least in the short run. For all these reasons, we might also expect differential effects for
different types of firm or area.
I analyse heterogeneity by university type to gain a better understanding of the mech-
anism through which universities affect their local economies. In these specifications,
I add a term representing the share of students of a particular type within the same
radius as overall students. Based on the existence of clusters such as Silicon Valley or
Cambridge, and academic evidence42 we might expect institutions of higher quality or
research intensity to have a larger impact on their local areas, but it is also possible that
their impacts are felt at a wider spatial scale – for example if higher quality graduates are
more mobile, or if world leading research is disseminated further afield. In contrast, lower
quality universities might be more focused on impact in their local areas. Evidence from
graduate wages also suggests that that there are large differences in the extent to which
different universities and courses provide economic value to their students (Britton et al.,
2016), and we might expect similar patterns with respect to industry.
While I use a number of measures to get at heterogeneity in focus and quality of the
institutions, these data do not allow me to disentangle the mechanisms at work or capture
heterogeneity in terms of engagement with local industry or policymakers. On this basis,
and in common with Valero and Van Reenen (2018), I seek to estimate a general impact of
universities on local areas, in contrast with papers that look specifically at research activity
of universities (for example Kantor and Whalley (2014), Hausman (2017) or Aghion et al.
(2009)). I also examine heterogeneity by area type, splitting the sample into rural and
urban wards, those with higher initial human capital, and dropping well known high-tech
clusters (London, Cambridge and Oxford).
Concerns remain that changes in university enrolments are correlated with time vary-
ing unobservables in an area. One example could be that a local government begins a
programme of development which makes the area more attractive to university students
and also businesses, for example infrastructure investments or urban regeneration projects.
In such cases, an observed positive relationship between universities and entry of new
42 For example, Abramovsky and Simpson (2011) show that research quality affects the location of firm
R&D in the UK. Helmers and Rogers (2015) find that university quality affects the patenting of small firms
(but has no effect on large firms).
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businesses might not be driven by the university sector at all. To address these concerns,
in the robustness I add region-year fixed effects and show that results are largely robust to
these.43 Second, I develop an instrumental variables strategy based on overseas students.
2.4.2 Overseas Students Instrument
The purpose of this analysis is to try to generate a source of variation in student enrolments
that is exogenous to local conditions. I focus on changes in overseas students, developing
a “shift-share” type instrument to generate predicted values of overseas students at each
university over time (Machin and Murphy, 2017). The idea is that students originally from
a particular country are more likely to attend universities and study subjects in common
with previous students from that country. The instrumental variable used to predict the





OScst ˆ OSucs0OScs0 (2.4.2)
Where s represents the subject area, and c country of domicile. I use information
on specific country of domicile44 and subject areas, split broadly into six groups (STEM,
medicine and related subjects, social sciences, humanities, arts and combined courses).45
For each university u, its share of total students from a particular country c into a subject
area s (in the base period t “ 0, academic years 1994/5 to 1996/7) is applied to the national
enrolments of students from that country and subject in subsequent years. The overseas
instrument in a given year is then the sum of predicted enrolments across subjects and
non-UK countries of domicile for each university. Undergraduates and postgraduates
are accounted for separately. In robustness, I also calculate an instrument at the more
aggregate level for EU and non-EU students and where all subjects are aggregated.46
A key assumption underlying this IV strategy is the exogeneity of national inflow rates
43 I also experiment with controlling for more granular area-year fixed effects (for example at the local
authority level) which have more of an impact on the coefficient. I exclude these from my main analysis as
they are likely to be highly co-linear with the changes in enrolments within a 30km radius of a ward (which
will be positively correlated with the changes in other wards nearby and therefore wider geographical areas).
44 Taking 82 countries where the number of students over the entire period exceeded 10,000, and grouping
remaining countries into “other”.
45 For more detail of the specific subject areas included within these categories see Appendix 2.A.
46 The advantage of the first instrument is that it allows for specific subject-country of domicile relationships
at different universities and therefore might be expected to generate more accurate fitted values for overseas
students. However, this method might fail to capture country-subject-university relationships that became
more important after the initial period. For example, as shown in Machin and Murphy (2017), following policy
changes in China, enrolments of Chinese students in business and economics courses in the UK increased
rapidly after 1998/99. Therefore there second instrument, which picks up on the general international nature
of the student body across subjects, is a useful check.
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from each source country to local economic conditions. The other key assumption is the
exogeneity of the initial shares of students at particular universities, which might not hold
where demand shocks are serially correlated (see for example, Jaeger, Ruist and Stuhler
(2018)) and can lead to a violation of the exclusion restriction. In this setting, the exclusion
restriction also requires that overseas students impact on local firms only via their impact
on total enrolments. There might be reason to doubt this should overseas students have
a differential impact on firms – for example if the higher fee income associated with
overseas students subsidises more research activity, or if overseas students are more or
less likely to become local entrepreneurs. Given these doubts, I highlight the reduced
form and IV estimates of the impact of overseas students. As an additional robustness
check of the main high-tech start-ups result, I also instrument for total students using
the predicted overseas students. This is appropriate since during most of the period
analysed, UK universities faced caps on domestic student enrolments, and as Machin
and Murphy (2017) show, international students did not “crowd-out” domestic students
(or home students defined as domestic and EU students who have been of the same fee
paying status).47
2.4.3 Establishment Level Analysis
Ward level analysis captures effects of universities operating at the extensive and intensive
margin, reflecting the impacts of establishment entry and exit, and also changes in the
performance of existing firms. This is complemented by analysis at the establishment level
which provides more of an insight at the intensive margin. Here I analyse how changes in
university presence affect establishment size and productivity, and whether there is any
evidence of heterogeneity in effects by firm type. The establishment level regression takes
the form:
lnpYij,tq “ β1lnpUPij,t´3q ` β2lnpPopij,t´3q ` ηi ` γj,t ` υij,t (2.4.3)
The key outcomes Y for establishment i, in sector j at time t in this analysis are
47 I explored other potential instrumental variables strategies based on changes in the policy environment. In
recent years there have been a number of policy changes that might affect university enrolments differentially
for different universities, in particular increases in university fees (in 2006 and 2012) and the lifting of student
caps (over the period 2012-2015). However, analysis of the impacts of fees on student participation has
found very small effects (Azmat and Simion, 2018), and the lifting of student caps occurred too late in the
sample period for analysis in this paper, given the three year lag structure I employ between enrolments and
outcomes. Exploring instruments based on these policy changes is left for future work when additional years
of data become available.
116
employment and labour productivity. The university presence and population variables
are now calculated based on the postcode of the establishment. Establishment level
fixed effects (ηi), together with sector-year fixed effects (γj,t) are controlled for. Again,
the error term υij,t is clustered at the ward level to allow for serial correlation between
establishments in the same local areas over time. In this analysis, establishments are
considered to be local unit-postcode pairs, so that we do not capture changes in university
presence resulting from relocation. Therefore, each establishment is uniquely located
within a ward r (subscript not included above for ease of notation).
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Universities, Number of Establishments and Employment
I begin with panel regressions of ward level establishments and employment across all
sectors on the core university measure: enrolments of FTE students within 30km (Table
2.5.1). Here, all regressions contain year and ward fixed effects, and control for population
within the same radius, with standard errors clustered at the ward level. Column (1) shows
that the correlation that we saw in the cross section between the number of establishments
and students within 30km (Table 2.3.2, row B, column (1)) survives in a panel set-up: the
coefficient of 0.0539 is significant at the 1% level. Since the number of establishments
is affected by both entry and exit, column (2) and (3) examine the effects of universities
on each of these outcomes. While both entry and exit appear to increase as universities
grow, the effect for entrants is more than double that for exits (at 0.158 compared to
0.0629). Indeed, the share of entrants to total establishments - or birth rate - increases as
universities grow though the effect is small. The coefficient in column (4) implies that a
1% rise in students within 30km leads to a 0.009 percentage point increase in the birth rate.
Meanwhile, the effects of universities on total employment are positive and insignificant
(column (5)) and actually negative for employment per establishment (column (6)). This
could be a composition effect due to the increased share of entrants that tend to be smaller
than incumbents. But could also be due to changes at the intensive margin, i.e. negative
employment effects for incumbent firms. The establishment level analysis in Section 2.5.3
returns to this question.48 In further analysis I also run these regressions in a simple
48 The coefficients on population are also informative, suggesting that establishment entry is higher in wards
surrounded by a higher population, and exit is lower. While employment is also higher in more populous
regions, the average employment is lower since the effect on entrants dominates. The case where population
works in the opposite direction to the university effect is with respect to exits. Excluding population altogether,
117
long difference form with one observation per ward (taking the natural log of the 18 year
difference in the variables, and dividing by 18 so that this difference is annualised) and
find the results are similar.49 In additional results (not reported here), I find that growth
in the university presence measure does not have a significant effect on ward population
suggesting that their impacts on this margin (university expansion) are not merely due to
bringing more people into an area.50
Table 2.5.1: Universities, Number of Establishments and Employment, Ward Level Re-
gressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent
variable:
ln(estab.) ln(entrants) ln(exits) birth rate ln(emp) ln(ave emp)
L3 ln(students,
30km)
0.0539*** 0.158*** 0.0629*** 0.941*** 0.0247 -0.0229*
(0.0094) (0.0144) (0.0138) (0.1230) (0.0159) (0.0119)
L3 ln(pop.,
30km)
1.035*** 1.924*** -0.374*** 12.35*** 0.550*** -0.423***
(0.0555) (0.0897) (0.0836) (0.8080) (0.0883) (0.0723)
Observations 165,946 165,946 165,946 165,946 165,946 165,946
Clusters 8,734 8,734 8,734 8,734 8,734 8,734
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. Panel regressions over
the period 1998-2016. All regressions contain ward and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered
at the ward level in parentheses. Birth rate = entrants/establishments*100.
2.5.2 Universities and Start-Ups
The analysis in Table 2.5.1 suggests that the impact of universities on their surrounding
areas, at least defined using a radius of 30km, is mainly at the extensive margin, through
stimulating entry.
Entrants can take two forms: they could be part of multi-establishment or multi-
national enterprises that are newly opened at a particular location – or they could be new
businesses set up by an entrepreneur. The latter is commonly thought of as a start-up.
In this section, I explore which types of entrant are driving the results. In addition, I
explore the extent to which universities to have differential effects on start-ups in different
the coefficients on plants, entrants and employment are slightly more positive, suggesting that in general,
students move into growing areas.
49 The only outcome where there is a difference is the exits result, where the result comparing snapshots of
exits and lagged university presence in 2016 and 1998 suggests a negative relationship. Given that exits are a
“flow”, the core panel estimates contain more information on their relationship with university growth.
50 Other studies considering the more discrete event of new university opening do find that universities
lead to increased population density, see for example Andrews (2017) or Andersson, Quiley and Wilhelmsson
(2009).
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sectors. The results of this exercise are in Table 2.5.2, where each cell represents a different
regression.
Column (1) reproduces the total entrants result (Panel A) and then proceeds to include
only single-unit entrants in the dependent variable (Panel B), and multi-unit entrants
(Panel C). This analysis shows that the effect of universities is largely driven by the
single-establishment entrants, though there is a smaller positive and significant effect on
multi-unit entrants overall. The regression in column (1), Panel B is depicted in Figure
2.5.1A. Dropping wards containing the 10 highest growth universities over the period
actually strengthens the result, but all data are retained in the core regressions.51
I then include entrants in particular sector groupings in the dependent variables
(columns (2) to (7)), and the share of employment of these groupings are given in the
bottom row of the table, based on 2016 data. Focusing on Panel B, single-unit entrants,
which appear to drive the overall results in most sectors, there are positive and significant
coefficients on universities across all broad sectors, apart from manufacturing. Some of
these are intuitive: the result for retail, hotels and food might be expected to the extent that
university students and staff might consume such services differentially to the general
population (which is controlled for in the regressions). In addition, the effect for the
education sector (which excludes the HE sector itself) is intuitive as a larger university
sector can be expected to increase demand for other education services.52 Similarly, finance,
business and real estate contains R&D activities; and the positive effect for “other” services
appears to be driven by community recreation and health services; both of which might
be expected to expand as the university sector grows. The larger coefficient in column
(5) is more surprising and on closer inspection this is driven by mainly by construction
activity (which has a coefficient of over 0.15). Effects for multi-unit entrants are significant
only in the education and “other services” sectors (driven by community, personal and
social services).
51 Given that these plots are conditional on ward and year fixed effects, and lagged population growth
within 30km, the x and y axis variables are residualised, and variation will come from changes within wards
over time. The universities experiencing the highest growth over the sample period will therefore contribute
to the outlier bin.
52 In addition to standard schools and colleges (private and public sector), this sector also includes tutor















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































While the impacts of universities on establishment entry across sectors are of interest,
a key hypothesis tested in this paper is whether universities have an effect on start-ups in
the high-tech sectors (as allocated across manufacturing and services) and these results
are reported in column (8). Panel B shows that there is a positive and significant effect of
university growth on high-tech start-ups, and this regression is depicted in Figure 2.5.1B.
The effect for non high-tech start-ups is also positive and significant (driven largely by the
construction sector).
The magnitudes of these average effects are rather small, and this is consistent with
findings elsewhere in the literature.53 The coefficient of 0.0882 for single-unit entrants
in the high-tech sectors implies that a 1% rise in students within 30km leads to around
0.09% more such start-ups three years later. The average ward has 54,000 students and 5
high-tech start-ups in a given year, so this implies that 540 students would lead to 0.0045
such start-ups. Perhaps a more illustrative experiment is to consider that a one standard
deviation rise in students (a large increase) for the average ward would imply nearly 8%
more high-tech start-ups in a given year.54
2.5.2.1 Robustness
The core results of high-tech start-ups are robust to altering various assumptions of the
baseline specification (Appendix Table 2.B.3), and I also show equivalent robustness tests
for total start-ups. First, I experiment with different measures of university presence.
Varying the radius for the calculation of total students surrounding a ward reveals that
universities appear to have a larger effect on start-ups within a smaller radius of 10km,
but there is no effect at a larger radius of 50km. The fact that there is a stronger effect at
a more localised level is consistent with findings in the literature.55 I then use different
measures of students, taking total students (giving equal weight to part time students and
full time students), normalising by population while still controlling for population, and
using unlogged students. The results are broadly unchanged. Alternative assumptions
53 Woodward, Figueiredo and Guimaraes (2006) estimate that a $1 million increase in university R&D
expenditures would increase the probability of high-tech manufacturing firm entry by less than 0.1%. Kantor
and Whalley (2014) estimate that a 1% increase in university R&D spending leads to an increase in county
labour income of 0.08%.
54 The average ward has 54,000 students, and the standard deviation in 75,000. Increasing the students
to 129,000 is an increase of around 88 log points. The implied increase in start-ups in the high-tech sector is
therefore 0.09˚ 88=8%.
55 I focus on the 30km radius in this paper for two reasons. First, I want to capture whether there are broader
spillovers from universities into local economies, rather than only start-ups which are directly connected to a
university (for example student/staff spin-offs). Second, the share of wards that have universities within
10km (36%) is much smaller than at a 30km radius (83%), and I want to retain variation a higher fraction of
the sample.
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Figure 2.5.1: Universities and Start-Ups
A: Single-unit entrants – all sectors
 
B: Single-unit entrants – high-tech sectors 
 
NOTES: Scatter plots depict ward level regressions of ln(1+start-ups) on 3 year lagged ln(1+students within
30km), controlling for lagged population within 30km, ward and year fixed effects (so variables are residu-
alised). Data are grouped into equal sized bins with the mean of the variables within each bin plotted in the
graphs.
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regarding the standard errors have little effect: results are still significant at the 1% level
clustering at the local authority level (of which there are 380), and allowing for spatial
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using Conley standard errors (Fetzer, 2014; Hsiang,
2010) reduces the significance of the high-tech result slightly.
In order to address concerns that these effects are driven by time varying unobservables
that changes in population do not capture, such as local government policies or other
shocks, I also estimate more demanding specifications including larger area-year fixed
effects: at the NUTS1 region, travel to work area and local authority level. With region-year
or local-authority-year fixed effects, the effect of universities on high-tech start-ups falls to
around 0.05, and is still significant; but including travel to work area – year fixed effects
wipes out the results all together. It is likely that variation captured by these dummies is
highly co-linear with the changes in enrolments within 30km.
I then consider the effects at different leads and lags of student enrolments, from a one
year lead to a five year lag (Appendix Table 2.B.4), and confirm the prior that the 3 year lag
is a sensible one to use as it takes time for growth in university size to have an impact. The
coefficient on the lead of enrolments is not significant, suggesting that reverse causality
is not driving the results. Including all lags together, noting that these measures will be
highly co-linear since many of the students enrolled in one year will also be enrolled in
the next year, reveals that in fact the fourth lag stands out as the most significant.
2.5.2.2 Heterogeneity
In order to gain more of an understanding about the mechanism underlying the relation-
ship between universities and high-tech start-ups, I examine whether there is any evidence
of heterogeneity in the effects by type of university and area. Table 2.5.3 begins with the
core result for high-tech start-ups, and then adds the lagged share of students of different
type within 30km in columns (2) to (6). Column (1) includes the share of students within
30km that are in Russell Group universities, institutions considered to be of higher quality
teaching and research in general. The coefficient on this term is 0.00804, and significant
at the 1% level. This suggests that while non Russell Group students have a positive
impact on start-ups, every percentage point increase in the share that are at Russell Group
universities leads to 0.8% more start-ups. Similarly, the share of postgraduates (a proxy for
research intensity) matters for total start-ups. I then consider whether it is postgraduate
students in particular disciplines that a driving results, and show that there are positive
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coefficients on both the share of STEM, medicine related students, and social science,
business students, though the STEM, medicine coefficient is not significant. There is also a
positive and significant effect of overseas students, which is consistent with evidence from
the US that shows that immigrants who enter the country on a student visa are more likely
to be entrepreneurs (Hunt, 2011). However, it could also reflect the fact that some overseas
students (those from outside the EU) pay higher fees which implies more resource for
teaching, research or other university activity - or even that overseas students consume
more local goods and services compared to UK students, and with these data, I am unable
to disentangle these effects. This last result has implications for the IV strategy, which uses
predicted overseas students as an instrument for total students. For exclusion to hold, the
instrument should affect the outcome variable (employment) only via its impact on the
endogenous variable (total enrolments). I return to this issue below.
Table 2.5.3: Universities and High-Tech Start-Ups, Differences by University Type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: ln(single-unit entrants, high-tech sectors)
L3 ln(students,
30km)
0.0882*** 0.0905*** 0.0879*** 0.0872*** 0.0834*** 0.0464**
(0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0184) (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0190)
L3 % Russell 0.00804***
(0.0013)
L3 % PG 0.00535***
(0.0009)








L3 % Overseas 0.00699***
(0.0008)
Observations 165,946 165,946 165,946 165,946 165,946 165,946
Clusters 8,734 8,734 8,734 8,734 8,734 8,734
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. Panel regressions
over the period 1998-2016. Column (1) replicates the core regression for high-tech sectors single-
unit entrants. Columns (2)-(6) add the lagged share of students within 30km of different types as
labelled. “PG” denotes postgraduate students.
The importance of quality and research intensity can also be illustrated by simply using
Russell Group students in the measure of university presence (Russell Group students
enrolled within 30km). Doing so, the coefficient rises to 0.376, significant at the 1% level,
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which is over four times the magnitude of the effect of students across all universities.
This stronger relationship is depicted in Figure 2.5.2.
Figure 2.5.2: Russell Group Universities and Start-Ups
 
NOTES: Scatter plots depict ward level regressions of ln(1+start-ups) on 3 year lagged ln(1+Russell Group
students within 30km), controlling for lagged population within 30km, ward and year fixed effects (so
variables are residualised). Data are grouped into equal sized bins with the mean of the variables within each
bin plotted in the graphs.
I also explore whether the results are stronger for particular types of area (urban
versus rural), and whether they are driven by a small number of top universities and
their associated clusters (Appendix Table 2.B.5). I find that the university effect on high-
tech start-ups is much stronger and more significant in urban areas compared to rural
areas, consistent with the existence of urban clusters of high-tech activity. Dropping
wards in London from the sample does weaken the coefficient slightly but it remains
highly significant. Conversely, dropping wards in Cambridge or Oxford does not change
the coefficient. Finally, I show that wards with higher initial human capital intensity
(measured as a dummy equal to one if the share of population with a degree is greater
than the median ward in the initial year56) seem to experience higher start-ups as the
university sector grows compared to low human capital intensity wards, consistent with
there being stronger agglomeration effects in areas that are more likely to pool labour with
56 There are 928 wards where a series of population with a degree is not available, because the underlying
data were missing in the 2001 census. To classify these as high or low human capital areas I compare the 2011
share of the population with a degree to the median in that year.
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universities.57
Overall, this analysis suggests that while there is a general impact of universities on
high-tech start-ups, this is increasing in university quality and research intensity, and
higher in high-skill, urban areas. Using these data, it is not possible to disentangle the
relative importance of formal collaborations, spin-offs/spin-out activities of university
students and staff and associated spillovers, or more informal interactions between the
university, its graduates and local industry. Supportive of these effects being at least in
part due to graduates staying in the area after their studies, I find that there is a positive
and significant relationship between lagged student enrolments and the population with
a degree in the same area, and this effect builds over time (Appendix Table 2.B.6).
2.5.2.3 Overseas Students Instrument
The most credible approach is to use the instrument to estimate the effect of overseas
students on economic outcomes via two stage least squares. There is little reason to
believe that this instrument is related to ward level economic outcomes other than via
its predictive power for actual overseas enrolments, so the exclusion restriction appears
reasonable in this context. It is harder to argue for exclusion when using this instrument
for total enrolments, since as we have seen, overseas students appear to have a differential
effect on start-ups. I therefore use the instrument for two purposes: first to estimate the
effect of overseas students on high-tech start-ups, and second as another robustness check
on the effect of total students. The results are reported in Table 2.5.4.
Panel A begins with the OLS regression of the lag of the natural log of overseas students
within 30km on high-tech start-ups and the coefficient is 0.0343, significant at the 1% level.
Columns (2) and (3) show that the reduced form and first stage are both strong, and
column (4) shows the IV estimate, which is slightly larger than OLS but not very different
in magnitude. I take similar steps, instrumenting for total students in Panel B.58 This time,
the IV estimate is over double the OLS estimate, which might seem counter-intuitive if
we imagine that more students might be attracted to universities in dynamic, growing
areas and therefore we might expect OLS to be biased upwards. However, there could be
a negative bias if in fact universities in less dynamic areas have differentially increased
57 While I focus on the high-tech sectors in this section, the results generally apply for total start-ups across
sectors. The main difference is that the start-up result is similar across urban and rural areas, and across high
and low human capital areas.
58 I also construct a placebo test for this instrument, in a long difference format. I split the sample into two
periods, and calculate average annual growth in the instrument and outcome for each period. I find that the
instrument in the second period does not predict the outcome in the first period.
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Table 2.5.4: Universities and High-Tech Start-Ups, IV Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method OLS Reduced Form First Stage IV
A: Overseas students
L3 ln(overseas students, 30km) 0.0343*** 0.0508***
(0.0071) (0.0094)
L3 ln(overseas instrument, 30km) 0.0458*** 0.901***
(0.0084) (0.0091)
B: All students
L3 ln(students, 30km) 0.0882*** 0.173***
(0.0185) (0.0317)
L3 ln(overseas instrument, 30km) 0.0458*** 0.265***
(0.0084) (0.0032)
Observations 165,946 165,946 165,946 165,946
Clusters 8,734 8,734 8,734 8,734
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. Panel regressions
over the period 1998-2016. The dependent variable in columns (1), (2) and (4) is ln(1+ single unit
entrants, high-tech sectors). The dependent variable in column (3) is L3 ln(1+overseas students
within 30km) in Panel A, and L3 ln(1+students within 30km) in Panel B. Column (1) reports OLS
regressions for overseas students within 30km (Panel A) and total students within 30km (Panel
B). Columns (2) to (4) show the first stage, reduced form and IV estimates using a shift-share
instrument for overseas students.
enrolments (Figure 2.3.2 suggests this could be so). Overall, this analysis suggests that the
effects of universities on start-ups are unlikely to be over-estimated.59
2.5.3 Universities and Employment, Establishment Level Analysis
We have seen that the effect of universities on ward level employment is positive but
not significant, and that the effect on the size of the average establishment is negative,
and significant at the 10% level (Table 2.5.1). These effects will in part be driven by
changes in composition - as new entrants tend to be smaller in size, but also by changes in
the employment of existing establishments at the intensive margin. Establishment level
analysis allows me to investigate effects at the intensive margin (changes in employment
in existing establishments). In addition, it allows me to examine whether effects differ
for different types of establishment. These results are reported in Table 2.5.5, where all
columns control for industry – year fixed effects, in addition to establishment level fixed
effects and lagged population within 30km.
59 Results using the alternative instrument calculated at a more aggregated level (EU, non-EU, across all







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Panel A, I examine how the employment of establishments that are observed at least
twice during the sample period are affected by increases in university enrolments within
30km. Column (1) shows that there is a negative (but small) impact on the employment of
the average firm. A 1% increase in students leads to a 0.009% fall in employment. This
type of effect could be driven by increased factor and/or product market competition due
to establishment entry which would have negative effects on existing, less productive
establishments. Column (2) shows that in fact, there is a slightly more negative effect for
high-tech establishments, and this is consistent with the evidence of creative destruction
in innovative sectors connected with university research in Hausman (2017).60 Also
consistent with this type of mechanism, I find that the effects are less negative for young
firms (those under 5 year-old) which have a positive and significant interaction term
(column (3)), and it seems that the negative employment effects are driven by larger
establishments61 (column (4)), or those that are part of multi-establishment firms (column
(5)).
In Panel B, I show that at a larger radius, where we saw previously the start-up
effects are less strong (Appendix Table 2.B.3), there are actually small positive effects on
employment for the average establishment. This could be due to the impact of universities
on the wider labour market, where the effects of increasing the supply of graduates might
counteract the increased demand and competition from start-ups in the immediate area.
The patterns of heterogeneity across establishment types however tell the same story as in
Panel A: larger, older establishments appear to lose out.
2.5.4 Universities and Productivity
So far, I have shown that universities appear to induce establishment entry in high-tech
and other sectors, and that there are small, negative employment effects for existing,
larger firms. Given these results, the expected impact of universities on productivity is
ambiguous. We might expect a positive impact on productivity for sectors that benefit
from innovation, human capital and associated spillovers which universities help generate,
but some of these effects might operate at longer lags. In particular, it has been shown
that measured revenue productivity of start-ups is often depressed due to lower mark-ups
(Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson, 2008), and start-ups operating in innovative, high-risk
60 Interestingly, using the same data on firms, Gibbons et al. (2017) find a similar pattern when assessing
the impacts on local establishments and employment of changes in road accessibility.
61Defined as establishments that have 50 or more employees in the first year in which they are observed in
the data.
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sectors might take time to start generating revenues and profits. University growth might
not affect productivity in sectors where graduates or innovation are less relevant, or there
could even be a negative effect if the university and the start-ups it induces create more
competition in product and factor markets.
2.5.4.1 Ward Level Productivity Analysis
In Table 2.5.6, ward level panel specifications are built up for GVA per worker and other
key measures of performance. Column (1) regresses the natural log of GVA per worker
on the university measure and population within the same radius, including also ward
and year fixed effects. There is a small positive but insignificant relationship between
students and productivity for the average ward. Column (2) includes also capital per
worker, which does not change the university coefficient.
Given the preceding analysis, it is interesting to explore whether there might be
differential effects for wards that are more high-tech intensive. Interacting the university
measure with the share of high-tech establishments in a given year would give rise to “bad
control” issues, since we have seen that university growth is associated with high-tech
start-ups. I therefore calculate a measure of initial high-tech intensity in a ward, which is
the deviation in the share of high-tech establishments in the ward from the median across
wards in over the first five years in the sample period.62 Column (3) interacts this with the
university measure, showing that wards with a higher initial high-tech intensity do appear
to experience an uplift in productivity as universities grow, though the result is significant
only at the 10% level. This result implies that a one per cent rise in university size leads to
a 0.06% increase in ward productivity for high-tech intensive wards.63 Columns (4) and
(5) contain other measures of performance as the dependent variable: average wages and
profit margin (profit/revenue), with the effect of universities on the average profit margin
being positive and significant at the 5% level for high-tech intensive wards.
62 I use the share of ward level employment in high-tech sectors according to the BSD, as this gives the
population of establishments in the ward.
63 In further analysis (not reported), I find that there are no employment effects based on the ARDx data,
which is consistent with the BSD ward level analysis (Table 2.5.1). The positive interaction term with high-tech



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I investigate further the drivers of the effects of universities on the productivity of their
local areas using heterogeneity analysis as before. In Table 2.5.7, I examine heterogeneity
in the effect on the productivity of the average ward (Table 2.5.6, panel A, column (2)) by
university type, and find that, consistent with the start-ups analysis, university quality
appears to matter. In fact the productivity of the average ward benefits from a higher
share of Russell Group students, and a higher share of postgraduate medical or STEM
students (there are no significant differences of the effects of these shares of different types
of students for high-tech intensive wards, so this table reports results for the average ward
only). Further analysis using the levels of different types of students (Appendix Table
2.B.7) shows that a 1% increase in Russell Group students leads to a 0.07% increase in the
productivity of the average ward.
Table 2.5.7: Universities and Ward Level Productivity, Heterogeneity by University
Type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: ln(GVA/emp)
L3 ln(students, 30km) 0.0123 0.0134 0.0122 0.0114 0.00986 0.00304
(0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0288)
L3 % Russell 0.00315*
(0.0017)
L3 % PG 0.00137
(0.0012)
L3 % PG STEM, med. 0.00442*
(0.0025)
L3 % PG soc sci, bus. 0.00397
(0.0026)
L3 % Overseas 0.00186
(0.0011)
Observations 139,891 139,891 139,891 139,891 139,891 139891
Clusters 8,726 8,726 8,726 8,726 8,726 8,726
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. Panel regressions
over the period 1998-2014. Standard errors clustered at the ward level in parentheses. Column
(1) replicates Table 2.5.6, column (2). Each column adds the lagged share of students within
30km of different types as labelled. “PG” denotes postgraduate.
Some tests of robustness and heterogeneity are reported in the Appendix, based on the
result that the core university presence measure has a positive relationship with high-tech
intensive ward productivity (Table 2.5.6, column (3)). In general, this result is less robust
than the start-up results in subsection 2.5.2, but it survives most alternative assumptions
on specification, and remains unchanged even when more granular region - year fixed
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effects are also included in regressions (Appendix Table 2.B.8).64 In further analysis I
find that in contrast to the start-up results, the productivity result is similar for different
lag assumptions, but regressions of the university presence measure on lagged ward
productivity, and its interaction with high-tech intensity (to test for evidence of reverse
causality) do not yield any significant positive relationships. I also instrument for overseas
students and total students using the overseas students instrument (instrumenting also
for the endogenous interaction term) and find that the results are of similar order of
magnitude (Appendix Table 2.B.9). Finally, consistent with the start-up analysis, the
productivity effects appear stronger in urban areas, and are not affected by dropping
London, Oxford and Cambridge (Appendix Table 2.B.10). High-tech intensive areas with
higher than average initial human capital also appear to have a larger, and more significant
university coefficient, again providing evidence that positive effects of universities on
high-tech sectors are higher in areas that we may expect to have higher absorptive capacity.
2.5.4.2 Establishment Level Productivity Analysis
Establishment level analysis is reported in the Appendix (Table 2.B.11). This follows a
similar structure to the ward level analysis, though now controlling for industry-year fixed
effects. The effect of universities on the average establishment is found to be negative,
which could be reflective of the mechanism discussed previously whereby incumbents
suffer from increased competition. This is unchanged adding capital per worker in column
(2). However, column (3) shows that the effect of universities on establishments in the
high-tech sectors is positive and significant, and of larger magnitude: a 1% increase in
students leads to a 0.17% increase in establishment level productivity. These results are
unchanged when the regression are weighted by ward level BSD employment/ward level
ARDx employment (Gibbons et al., 2017) which gives increased weight to establishments
in wards that are under-represented by sampling and local unit apportionment (result not
shown). Average wages and profit margin show a similar pattern to productivity though
the effect on wages is small and not significant.65
64 The core regressions employ the natural log of GVA per worker as the dependent variable, as is standard
in the literature. Using the inverse hyperbolic since (IHS) transformation, which retains negative GVA per
worker observations in the sample (these make up around 5% of all observations in the full sample) makes
the main university effect positive, of larger magnitude and significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on the
interaction term is now negative and insignificant. Given the large impact of including a small number of
observations, this estimate seems less reliable.
65 Further analysis of additional measures of financial performance also reveals similar results, with positive
effects of university growth on output, turnover and capital expenditure per worker measures. In addition,
separate regressions of establishment GVA and employment as dependent variables show that the positive
coefficient GVA per worker effect for high-tech firms comes from a significant increase in GVA accompanied
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The upshot of this analysis is that university presence as defined here does not affect
the productivity of surrounding areas on average, but positive effects are felt in areas
with higher initial high-tech intensity, and for universities of higher quality and research
intensity. At the intensive margin, the productivity of high-tech establishments increases
as universities grow.
2.6 Conclusions
In this paper I have shown that universities affect the make-up and performance of
industry in their surrounding areas. University growth appears to drive establishment
entry across sectors, including in the innovative high-tech sectors, widely considered a
key source of future growth. While the average effect is relatively small - a 1% increase in
university presence leads to a 0.09% increase in high-tech start-ups - the effect is much
larger for higher quality, research intensive institutions: a 1% increase in Russell Group
students within 30km leads to nearly a 0.4% increase in high-tech start-ups. A combination
of a composition effect (due to new establishment entry) and a small negative effect on
existing establishments (consistent with a process of creative destruction), implies that
there is little effect on overall employment in local areas.
Positive productivity effects are found only in areas with higher initial high-tech
intensity; though growth in higher quality institutions raise productivity even in the
average ward. Establishment level analysis also reveals that the productivity of high-tech
firms is positive related to university growth. Combined with the results on high-tech
start-ups, this analysis suggests that the effects of universities on their local economies are
likely to grow over time as industrial composition adjusts.
My findings are consistent with previous literature, which using different measures of
university activity and different methods to tackle endogeneity has found that spillovers
from universities tend to be felt by particular industries considered to be technologically
closer to universities, and are not broad based. In the context of the UK’s current industrial
strategy, the stronger impacts of higher quality, research intensive universities suggest
that the government approach of funding excellence, and stimulating university-business
linkages in relevant areas are likely to be fruitful avenues for maximising the impact of
universities in local growth strategies. But given the focus on “place” in the industrial
strategy, it might also be valuable to build excellence in areas with the industrial potential
by a small, insignificant effect on employment.
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to benefit from it. The government’s science and innovation audits66 could be a good
mechanism for finding out where this could be so, and for considering how to maximise
the benefits from university-firm interactions. Moreover, in addition the role that the
UK’s top universities play in creating hubs of innovation, other universities might be
well-placed to contribute to the diffusion of cutting edge technologies and practices for
firms (especially SMEs) that are lagging in their adoption (Haldane, 2018). Raising the
productivity of the “long tail” of underperforming firms is key to improving the UK’s
aggregate and regional productivity performance.
The approach in this paper has its limitations. The measure of university presence
based on enrolments is a proxy, and will not capture heterogeneity across universities
in terms of their links with local industry or policymakers. In addition, while the het-
erogeneity analysis suggests that human capital and innovation routes are important,
with these data I cannot disentangle these mechanisms and the extent to which they
complement each other. Future work will examine in more detail the mechanisms driving
these relationships, using data on patents, local labour markets and the extent and types
of university-business interaction together with institutional features which make these
more effective. It will also be interesting to consider whether there are differences in the
economic impact of further education colleges compared to universities, using equivalent
data on their enrolments.
As new versions of the financial microdata become available, I intend to refine the
capital stocks estimates, and therefore carry out some more rigorous analysis of TFP using
alternative estimation methods.
Finally, a number of recent policy changes might also form the basis of natural experi-
ments, generating plausibly exogenous variation in enrolments in different universities,
which could feed through to local firms over these coming years. Potential candidates
include the lifting of student caps in over the period 2012-2015 and changes in overseas
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I obtained administrative data on all students at higher education institutions between the
academic years 1994/1995 and 2015/16 from the Higher Education Statistics Authority
(HESA). For each institution and each year, the number of students (as at 1st December) are
broken down by level of study, gender, subject area, country of domicile and mode of study.
Institutions are merged with a listing of UK universities from the World Higher Education
Database (WHED) (Valero and Van Reenen, 2018) which gives university postcodes and
hence allows them to be geocoded. For the purposes of this paper, institutions in Northern
Ireland are excluded, as firm level data are available for Great Britain only.
Data are provided for the institutions using their names in a given year, and in order
to create a Panel it is necessary to correct for name changes and mergers. Analysis is based
on their form in the most recent year of data. HESA data are collected for higher education
institutions, which includes some specialist higher education colleges in addition to
universities, and there are a number of institutions that enter the data during the period.
Those institutions are excluded from the analysis. The university sample of 136 institutions
is given below, together with founding date (either the date that the institution was first
set up in its original form, or the date it joined the HE sector, based on availability in the
World Higher Education Database, and manual web searches).
University sample: The University of Oxford (1167), The University of Cambridge
(1209), The University of St Andrews (1413), The University of Glasgow (1451), The Uni-
versity of Aberdeen (1495), The University of Edinburgh (1583), St George’s, University of
London (1751), The Royal Veterinary College (1791), The University of Strathclyde (1796),
Heriot-Watt University (1821), Royal Academy of Music (1822), Liverpool John Moores
University (1823), Birkbeck College (1823), The University of Manchester (1824), Univer-
sity College London (1826), The University of Central Lancashire (1828), King’s College
London (1829), University of Durham (1832), Newcastle University (1834), University of
London (Institutes and activities) (1836), Royal College of Art (1837), The University of
Westminster (1838), University of Chester (1839), The University of Winchester (1840),
York St John University (1841), University of South Wales (1841), University of St Mark
and St John (1841), Roehampton University (1841), Liverpool Hope University (1844),
Royal Conservatoire of Scotland (1845), London Metropolitan University (1848), St Mary’s
University, Twickenham (1850), University of Derby (1851), University of Wales Trinity
Saint David (1853), Southampton Solent University (1856), Anglia Ruskin University
(1858), The University of West London (1860), The University of Lincoln (1861), Bishop
Grosseteste University (1862), The University of Southampton (1862), Cardiff Metropolitan
University (1865), University for the Creative Arts (1866), The University of Portsmouth
(1870), Aberystwyth University (1872), Trinity Laban Conservatoire of Music and Dance
(1872), The University of Birmingham (1875), Glasgow Caledonian University (1875), The
University of Bristol (1876), The University of Dundee (1881), The University of Liverpool
(1881), University of Nottingham (1881), Royal College of Music (1882), The University of
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Bradford (1882), Cardiff University (1883), Bangor University (1884), The University of
Leeds (1884), Queen Mary University of London (1885), Edge Hill University (1885), Royal
Holloway and Bedford New College (1886), Glyndwˆr University (1887), University of
Abertay Dundee (1888), The University of Greenwich (1890), The University of Brighton
(1890), Goldsmiths College (1891), The University of Surrey (1891), The University of
Reading (1892), London South Bank University (1892), The University of East London
(1893), Royal Northern College of Music (1893), Writtle University College (1893), Buck-
inghamshire New University (1893), The University of Bath (1894), City, University of
London (1894), London School of Economics and Political Science (1895), Aston University
(1895), De Montfort University (1896), The University of Salford (1896), The University of
Sheffield (1897), The University of the West of Scotland (1897), London School of Hygiene
and Tropical Medicine (1899), Harper Adams University (1901), Falmouth University
(1902), The Robert Gordon University (1903), The Royal Central School of Speech and
Drama (1906), Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine (1907), University of
Bedfordshire (1908), Loughborough University (1909), The School of Oriental and African
Studies (1916), Swansea University (1920), The University of Leicester (1921), The Univer-
sity of Exeter (1922), The University of Hull (1927), Teesside University (1929), University
of Worcester (1946), Cranfield University (1946), Keele University (1949), University of
Hertfordshire (1952), Brunel University London (1957), The University of Sussex (1961),
Canterbury Christ Church University (1962), The University of York (1963), The University
of East Anglia (1963), Edinburgh Napier University (1964), The University of Essex (1964),
University of Cumbria (1964), The University of Lancaster (1964), The University of Kent
(1964), The University of Warwick (1965), London Business School (1965), Leeds Trinity
University (1966), The University of Stirling (1967), Newman University (1968), Sheffield
Hallam University (1969), University of Northumbria at Newcastle (1969), University of
the West of England, Bristol (1969), The University of Wolverhampton (1969), The Univer-
sity of Sunderland (1969), Coventry University (1970), The Nottingham Trent University
(1970), Kingston University (1970), Staffordshire University (1970), University of Plymouth
(1970), The Manchester Metropolitan University (1970), Oxford Brookes University (1970),
Leeds Beckett University (1970), The University of Huddersfield (1970), Birmingham City
University (1971), Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh (1971), Middlesex University
(1973), Bath Spa University (1975), Bournemouth University (1976), The University of
Chichester (1976), The University of Northampton (1977), The University of Bolton (1982),
University of the Arts, London (1986), University of Gloucestershire (1990).
Institutions in HESA not included in the list include: Open University (not spatially
meaningful); Northern Ireland universities (because only Great Britain analysed in this
paper): The Queen’s University Belfast, University of Ulster, Stranmillis University Col-
lege, St Mary’s University College; specialist colleges which are not government recog-
nised, or only recently recognised (https://www.gov.uk/check-a-university-is-officially-
recognised): Bell College, Conservatoire for Dance and Drama, Leeds College of Music,
The Liverpool Institute for Performing Arts, The National Film and Television School,
Plymouth College of Art, Leeds College of Art; The Royal College of Nursing (because
it is multi-location and considered a nursing union), The University of Wales (central
functions) as data available only for 2 years and under 5 students.
The following recognised institutions are dropped because data are not available in
HESA for the full 22 years (as they joined the HE sector more recently) and their inclusion
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would create arbitrary jumps as they all grew out of pre-existing institutions: Royal
Agricultural University, University of the Highlands and Islands, The Arts University
Bournemouth, University of Suffolk, University College Birmingham, The University
of Buckingham, Guildhall School of Music and Drama, Norwich University of the Arts,
and Heythrop College. University Campus Suffolk and University of the Highlands and
Islands are slight exceptions, as their founding dates are 2001 and 2007 respectively. But
both relate to multi-site institutions so spatial analysis is less meaningful, and in both
cases many of the sites were pre-existing colleges.
Subjects of study are categorised into JACS subject codes, and these were aggregated
into 19 major subject groups in the data obtained for this study. I further aggregate these
into six subject groups (Table 2.B.12). There are two reasons for this: first to try to group
subjects that we might expect to have particular relevance for local firms for heterogeneity
analysis; and second in order to have sufficient overseas students in the early years when
there were fewer overseas students for the calculation of the overseas instrument (Machin
and Murphy, 2017).
2.A.2 Firm Level Data
Administrative data on establishments: Data for the analysis of ward level employment
and number of establishments, and establishment-level employment is based on the
Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR). The IDBR is a live record of VAT or PAYE
registered businesses, accessed via the Business Structure Database (BSD) which provides
an annual snapshot of the register.67 Data are divided into “local units” (the establishment)
and “enterprises” (the overall business organisation, some of which consist of more
than one establishment or business site). Since this paper examines spatial relationships
between firms and universities, the establishment is the relevant unit of analysis.
The basis of the analysis is a cleaned, unbalanced panel of live establishments over the
period 1997 to 2016. The key variables used in this paper are the establishment’s postcode,
industry, employment, birth and death dates, and whether or not the establishment
belongs to a multi-unit enterprise, or a multinational. The establishment birth and death
dates are used in the analysis of establishment entry or exit. An establishment is considered
to be a new entrant if it is the first year that it enters the Panel, and the birth-date is within
3 years previous to it entering the Panel. An establishment is considered to be exiting in
67 Office for National Statistics. (2017). Business Structure Database, 1997-2017: Secure Access. [data
collection]. 9th Edition. UK Data Service. SN: 6697, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6697-9
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its last year before its “death” date. A variable is constructed to indicate whether firms
are single-establishment or multi-establishment (defined as being part of multi-unit, or
foreign owned enterprises).
Establishment postcodes are mapped to 2015 electoral ward using the ONS postcode
directory. Where employment is missing for an establishment which re-enters the data in
subsequent years, employment is interpolated. For the ward level analysis, the number of
live local units, entrants, and their employment are collapsed by ward each year to create
a ward level Panel. Industry codes are also used here to calculate the ward’s employment
or establishments by sector for each year. For consistency the analysis based on the IDBR
uses 2003 SIC codes throughout.
In the establishment level analysis, local units that change address are considered to
be new local units. Therefore all variation in the university presence measure comes from
expansion of universities, rather than establishments moving location. In addition, only
non-interpolated data are used in this analysis.
Financial survey data: Financial data are available for a sample of firms in the IDBR
from the “Annual Business Survey” (ABS), which covers the production, construction,
distribution and service industries representing approximately two thirds of the UK
economy. Parts of the agricultural sector, the financial sector; and public administration
and defence, activities of households as employers and extra-terrestrial organisations are
excluded by the ABS. The ABS also excludes public sector activities in the education and
health sectors. The ABS contains the population of larger businesses, and a random sample
of smaller businesses. The ABS has been carried out since 2009, and is combined with
employment data from the UK business and employment survey (BRES). Its predecessor
the “Annual Business Inquiry” (ABI) included an employment survey and was used to
create the “Annual Respondents Database” (ARD). In this paper, I use the “ARDx”68,
which combines and harmonises variables in the ABS and ABI over the period 1998-2015.69
Data for Northern Ireland are not available in the UK Data Archive.
Financial data are collected for the “reporting unit” of the firm, and needs to be
apportioned to the local unit level. As is standard in the literature (for example, Gibbons
et al. (2017)) this is done using an establishment’s share of total enterprise employment.
68 Office for National Statistics. Virtual Microdata Laboratory (VML), University of the West of England, Bris-
tol. (2017). Annual Respondents Database X, 1998-2015: Secure Access. [data collection]. 4th Edition. Office
for National Statistics, [original data producer(s)]. UK Data Service. SN: 7989, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-
SN-7989-4
69 For a description of the ARDx, see http://doc.ukdataservice.ac.uk/doc/7989/mrdoc/pdf/7989_ardx_userguide.pdf
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Note that in about 80% of reporting units, the reporting unit is a single establishment
and located entirely at a single address, so the financial data corresponds exactly to the
local unit and no apportionment is necessary. However, the share of local units that are
part of single-unit reporting units is smaller, because of the fact that larger businesses are
over-represented in the sample, and also the effects of large firms with high numbers of
plants.
The key financial variable used in this paper is labour productivity, defined as GVA (in
basic prices) per worker, but I also obtain information on investment, wages, turnover,
output and profitability. In addition, I estimate capital stocks using the ARDx methodology,
which is still under development.70 Financial variables are converted into real terms using
ONS sectoral deflators (Experimental Industry (Division) Level Deflators, ONS, 2010=100),
and capital is deflated using deflators by asset class and sector (Volume Index of UK
Capital Services (experimental): Estimates to 2015, ONS; 2013=100). The ARDx provides
industry codes using SIC2007 throughout the sample period 1998-2015. For the ward level
analysis, missing values of surviving establishments are interpolated, and ward totals of
financial variables and employment based on local units with financial data (surveyed
or apportioned) are calculated and then variables are normalised by employment (apart
from profits which are normalised by turnover to calculate a standard profit margin).
In the establishment level analysis, only non-missing values are used, and as with
the BSD, local units that change address are considered to be new local units so that all
variation in the university presence measure comes from expansion of universities, rather
than establishments moving location. In addition, GVA/worker and wages/worker are
winsorised for the the top and bottom 1% observations in each year.
2.A.3 Mapping High-Tech Sectors
High-tech sectors are mapped according to classifications given by NESTA (Bakhshi et al.,
2015). These build on Eurostat classifications (based on R&D spend in manufacturing, and
knowledge intensity – as measured by the qualifications of the workforce – for services),
but use also the STEM intensity of occupations within different sectors to build a more
holistic picture of the UK’s high-tech industries. These mappings are provided using
SIC2007 3 and 4 digit codes, and therefore can be mapped directly in the ARDx where
these codes are available throughout the sample period. I manually map the sectors at the
70 For a description, see http://doc.ukdataservice.ac.uk/doc/7989/mrdoc/pdf/7989_ardx_capital_stock_userguide.pdf
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equivalent level to their SIC2003 counterparts in order to obtain an equivalent high-tech
classification for the BSD. The exact mappings are shown in Table 2.B.13. The only areas
of inconsistency are that it is not possible to split out “Engineering activities and related
technical consultancy” and “Other professional, scientific and technical activities n.e.c.”
from “Architectural and engineering activities and related technical consultancy”; and
reinsurance from “Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security” in
the SIC2003 mapping.
2.A.4 Population Data
The key area level control in this analysis is population within the same radius as the
university measure (a given radius from the centroid of the ward). In obtain population
data from the census in 2001 and 2011, at the Lower Super Output Area (LSOA) level for
England and Wales (these are referred to as Data Zones (DZ) in Scotland). In some cases,
these areas differ between the two census years. When merging LSOA 2001 with LSOA
2011, I have to deal with cases where one LSOA 2001 is split into many LSOA2011. I do
this by splitting population equally into all the new LSOA. The reverse is easier to deal
with. If many LSOA 2001 are aggregated into one LSOA 2011, I simply collapse to the new
area. Finally, I map the data in LSOA 2011 terms to electoral ward using the NSPD 2015.





Table 2.B.1: Establishment Level Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD
A: BSD plants sample (N=41,803,029)
Employment 11 71
Postcode urban 0.72 0.45
London 0.16 0.36
Plant is high-tech 0.15 0.35
Plant is young (<=5 years) 0.37 0.48
Plant is large (>=50 employees) 0.03 0.17
Plant is multi-unit 0.47 0.5
Students within 30km 79,687 98,637
Population within 30km 2,960,642 2,992,696
B: ARDx plants sample (N=3,241,842)
GVA per worker 38,543 42,224
Employment 41 147
Postcode urban 0.87 0.34
London 0.14 0.34
Plant is high-tech 0.06 0.24
Plant is young (<=5 years) 0.23 0.42
Plant is large (>=50 employees) 0.16 0.36
Students within 30km 75,004 90,316
Population within 30km 2,849,935 2,770,761
NOTES: Panel A summarises the BSD sample, based on an unbal-
anced panel of live establishments over the years 1998-2016. Panel
B summarises the ARDx sample, based on an unbalanced panel
of establishments over the years 1998-2014 (for which capital stock
is available). “Establishments” are defined as local unit (luref)-
postcode pairs. So if a local unit moves location it is considered
to be a new establishment. Panel A relates to observations on 7.4
million “establishments”, and Panel B relates to observations on
644,430 “establishments”. Singletons (establishments that are only
observed for one year) are excluded from the establishments sam-
ples. Observations with missing employment or financial data are
excluded from the establishments samples. The university mea-
sures are based on the co-ordinates of the establishment postcode.
“High-tech” is a dummy=1 if an establishment has been classified
as operating in the high tech sectors at least once in the sample pe-
riod. “Young” is a dummy=1 if an establishment is 5 years old or
younger in a given year. “med/large” is a dummy=1 if the establish-
ment has employment of 50 or more in its first observation. “multi”
is a dummy = 1 if an establishment has been part of a multi-unit








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.B.3: Universities and Start-Ups, Summary of Robustness Tests
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: ln(HT start-ups) ln(all start-ups) N Clusters
Specification
A L3 ln(students, 30km) 0.0882*** 0.160*** 165,946 8,734
(0.0185) (0.0152)
B L3 ln(students, 10km) 0.274*** 0.271*** 165,946 8,734
(0.0196) (0.0159)
C L3 ln(students, 50km) -0.104*** -0.0143 165,946 8,734
(0.0257) (0.0208)
D L3 ln(FT+PT students, 30km) 0.0910*** 0.160*** 165,946 8,734
(0.0179) (0.0145)
E L3 students/pop, 30km 0.0298*** 0.0402*** 165,946 8,734
(0.0078) (0.0064)
F L3 students, 30km (000) 0.0492*** 0.263*** 165,946 8,734
(0.0060) (0.0230)
Standard Errors
G L3 ln(students, 30km) 0.0882*** 0.160*** 165,946 380
(0.0199) (0.0151)
H L3 ln(students, 30km) 0.0882** 0.160*** 165,946
(0.0401) (0.0390)
Fixed Effects
I L3 ln(students, 30km) 0.0535*** 0.124*** 165,946 8,734
(0.0179) (0.0147)
J L3 ln(students, 30km) -0.0319 0.0232 165,737 8,723
(0.0267) (0.0214)
K L3 ln(students, 30km) 0.0516* 0.0871*** 165,946 8,734
(0.0276) (0.0213)
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. Panel regressions over
the period 1998-2016. Row A repeats the core specification as per Table 2.5.2 for high-tech start-ups
and those across sectors. Rows B and C replicate the core regressions using different radius for the
calculation of total students. Row D uses total students, rather than FTE students. Row E normalises
students by population, as well as controlling for population. Row F uses unlogged students (in
1000s). Row G clusters standard errors at the local authority level (of which there are 380). Row H
estimates Conley standard errors to allow for spatial heteroskedastity and autocorrelation (Fetzer
(2014) and Hsiang (2010)), with a distance cut-off of 30km. Row I includes region-year fixed effects.
Row J includes travel to work area–year fixed effects (209 singleton observations are dropped). Row






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.B.6: Universities and Graduate Population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: ln(population with a degree within 30km)
L1 ln(students, 30km) 0.100*** -0.207***
(0.0185) (0.0439)
L2 ln(students, 30km) 0.123*** -0.0406
(0.0182) (0.0567)
L3 ln(students, 30km) 0.167*** 0.688***
(0.0176) (0.0673)
L4 ln(students, 30km) 0.0998*** -1.491***
(0.0185) (0.0774)
L5 ln(students, 30km) 0.317*** 1.251***
(0.0261) (0.0703)
Observations 157,212 148,478 139,744 131,010 122,276 122,276
Clusters 8,734 8,734 8,734 8,734 8,734 8,734
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level.
Table 2.B.7: Universities and Ward Level Productivity, Heterogeneity by Student Type
in Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: ln(GVA/emp)
L3 ln(students, 30km) 0.0123
(0.0284)
L3 ln(Russell, 30km) 0.0689**
(0.0296)
L3 ln(PG, 30km) 0.0242***
(0.0091)
L3 ln(PG STEM, med., 30km) 0.0202**
(0.0081)
L3 ln(PG soc. sci, bus., 30km) 0.00821
(0.0070)
L3 ln(Overseas, 30km) 0.0182*
(0.0106)
Observations 139,891 139,891 139,891 139,891 139,891 139,891
Clusters 8,726 8,726 8,726 8,726 8,726 8,726
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. Panel regressions over the
period 1998-2014. Standard errors clustered at the ward level in parentheses. Column (1) replicates
Table 2.5.6, column (2). In the remaining columns, different populations of students are included in the
university presence variable are as labelled. “PG” denotes postgraduate students.
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Table 2.B.8: Universities and Ward Level Productivity, Summary of Robustness Tests
(1) (2)
Coefficient on:
University variable Uni var Uni var x HT N Clusters
Specification
A L3 ln(students, 30km) -0.0184 0.0603* 139,891 8726
(0.0331) (0.0341)
B L3 ln(students, 10km) -0.000893 0.00752 139,891 8726
(0.0392) (0.0470)
C L3 ln(students, 50km) -0.0353 0.0577* 139,891 8726
(0.0433) (0.0349)
D L3 ln(FT+PT students, 30km) -0.0298 0.0651* 139,891 8726
(0.0316) (0.0338)
E L3 students/pop., 30km -0.0179 0.0234 139,891 8726
(0.0147) (0.0180)
F L3 students, 30km (000) 0.000242 -0.0000813 139,891 8726
(0.0004) (0.0004)
G L3 ln(students, 30km) -0.0353 0.0966* 139,891 8,726
(0.0362) (0.0495)
H L3 ln(students, 30km) 0.298** -0.111 141,647 8,728
(0.1460) (0.1460)
Standard Errors
I L3 ln(students, 30km) -0.0184 0.0603* 139,891 380
(0.0336) (0.0352)
J L3 ln(students, 30km) -0.0184 0.0603*** 139,891
(0.0134) (0.0124)
Fixed Effects
K L3 ln(students, 30km) -0.0286 0.0658* 139,891 8,726
(0.0341) (0.0345)
L L3 ln(students, 30km) -0.049 0.0559 139,698 8,715
(0.0495) (0.0357)
M L3 ln(students, 30km) -0.015 0.0698* 139,891 8,726
(0.0536) (0.0365)
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. Panel regres-
sions over the period 1998-2014. Standard errors clustered at the ward level in parentheses.
Row A replicates Table 2.5.6, column (3). Rows B and C do the same using different radius
for universities. Row D uses total students rather than FTE. Row E normalises students by
population, and also controls for population separately. Row F uses unlogged students in
1000s. Row G includes also an interaction term between population and ST share. Row H
uses the IHS transformation to retain negative GVA values of GVA/worker. Row I clusters
standard errors at the local authority level. Row J uses Conley standard errors. Row K
includes region-year fixed effects. Row M includes travel to work area–year fixed effects.
Row M includes local authority–year fixed effects. “HT” denotes the initial high-tech inten-
sity of the ward, which is a dummy equal to 1 when a ward has higher than median share
of high-tech employment in the first 5 years of the data, according to the BSD (which gives
the business population).
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Table 2.B.9: Universities and Ward Level Productivity, IV Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Method OLS Reduced Form IV
A: Overseas students
L3 ln(overseas students, 30km) 0.00426 -0.00103
(0.0125) (0.0163)
L3 ln(overseas students, 30km) X HT 0.0283** 0.0344**
(0.0131) (0.0147)
L3 ln(overseas instrument, 30km) 0.00015
(0.0146)
L3 ln(overseas instrument, 30km) X HT 0.0299**
(0.0127)
B: Total students
L3 ln(students, 30km) -0.0184 0.0114
(0.0331) (0.0554)
L3 ln(students, 30km) X HT 0.0603* 0.0955**
(0.0341) (0.0404)
L3 ln(overseas instrument, 30km) 0.00015
(0.0146)
L3 ln(overseas instrument, 30km) X HT 0.0299**
(0.0127)
Observations 139,891 139,891 139,891
Clusters 8,726 8,726 8,726
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. “HT” de-
notes the initial high-tech intensity of the ward, which is a dummy equal to 1 when a
ward has higher than median share of high-tech employment in the first 5 years of the















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.B.12: Subject Groups
JACS subject area Five subject groups
(1) Medicine & dentistry Medicine, dentistry and allied subjects
(2) Subjects allied to medicine Medicine, dentistry and allied subjects
(3) Biological sciences STEM
(4) Veterinary science Medicine, dentistry and allied subjects
(5) Agriculture & related subjects Medicine, dentistry and allied subjects
(6) Physical sciences STEM
(7) Mathematical sciences STEM
(8) Computer science STEM
(9) Engineering & technology STEM
(A) Architecture, building & planning Creative arts, design, education and other
(B) Social studies Social sciences, law and business
(C) Law Social sciences, law and business
(D) Business & administrative studies Social sciences, law and business
(E) Mass communications & documentation English, language, history
(F) Languages English, language, history
(G) Historical & philosophical studies English, language, history
(H) Creative arts & design Creative arts, design, education and other
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3.1 Introduction
There have been major advances in the measurement and analysis of management prac-
tices in recent years. Survey data have established the importance of management prac-
tices in explaining differentials in productivity between and within countries and sectors
(Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom et al., 2014b). Recent analysis has estimated that
across countries, management explains on average around 30 per cent of the gap in total
factor productivity with the United States (Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2017), and ex-
perimental evidence from Indian textile plants has shown that management plays a causal
role in this regard (Bloom et al., 2013).2 However, less is known about why firms adopt
different management practices (Bloom et al., 2017a). Given that management practices are
so important for firm performance, and can be measured and benchmarked across firms,
why do we not see all firms adopting “best practice”? This paper explores the hypothesis
that the local supply of skilled labour shapes the quality of a firm’s management practices
because it determines the quality of its workforce, including its managers.
Motivated by previously documented associations between management practices and
firm skills (see for example, Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and Bloom et al. (2014b)), this
paper uses data from the World Management Survey (WMS) to explore the relationship
between management practices and measures of local skill availability. We construct a
new dataset across 19 countries related to region-level skill availability, and find robust
evidence that firms facing more abundant (and hence cheaper) skills have higher man-
agement scores (which we refer to as “better managed”), ceteris paribus. This supports
the hypothesis that modern management practices and a skilled workforce are comple-
mentary, consistent with a skilled workforce increasing the marginal benefit or lowering
the marginal cost associated with good management practices, so that firms facing a skill-
abundant workforce employ more skilled labour and have better management practices
in equilibrium. In this sense, good management practices - adopted as a consequence of
the channel studied here - are examples of “skill biased management”.
Our approach relies on the assumption that labour markets are local in nature (Moretti,
2011). Our first measure of skill supply is the distance to the nearest university for each
plant, which we calculate as a drive time using geocoded information on the surveyed
2 Much of this literature is focused on interviewing middle managers to understand organisational
structures and day to day processes within firms. There have also been major advances in the measurement
of CEO behaviour (Bandiera et al., 2017). While CEO behaviour and management practices are correlated
with each other, they also appear to be independently correlated with firm performance.
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plants in across regions in each of the 19 countries, and universities from the World Higher
Education Database (WHED, an international listing of higher education institutions). We
find a robust relationship between drive time, firm level human capital and management
practices: firms closer to universities have more skilled workers and managers, and are on
average better managed. Our results are robust to including firm and geographic controls,
and country, time and industry fixed effects. We use region fixed effects to control for
unobservable characteristics at the subnational level that are related to university presence
and the management of firms.
In the absence of an instrument for university location using international data, we
cannot rule out the possibility that the results are driven by better managed firms choosing
locations close to universities, though we partially address this concern by showing that
there is no differential effect for firms which are founded after their nearest university, and
by considering within firm variation in the skill premium analysis. We note however, that
if our results are driven by better managed firms making such locational decisions, they
are still supportive of a complementarity between better management and skills.
We hypothesise that the mechanism through which universities affect firm human
capital and management practices is via increasing the supply of skills, and hence reducing
the price of skills. We obtain labour force micro data in 13 countries, which allows us
to run wage regressions and estimate the wage premium for university graduates at
the subnational region level. Two pieces of evidence support our proposed mechanism.
First we show that the skill premium is inversely related to regional university presence
(universities per million people). This is a new finding that suggests that skill is expensive
when it is relatively scarce in a location and cheap when it is abundant. Second, we
replace distance to nearest university with the regional skill premium in our regressions
and show that firms facing higher skill premia in the region in which they are located
employ significantly less skilled workers and are significantly worse managed. Again
these results are robust to the inclusion of the full set of firm and geographic controls
(though we are unable to include region fixed effects since our skill price varies at that
level). We find that these results are stronger when we exclude capital regions, where
we expect demand shocks or other unobservables that raise both the skill premium and
management practices are more prevalent.3
We explore whether our results are heterogeneous by observable firm characteristics,
3 Moreover, firms in capital cities are more likely to be able to recruit from wider areas due to other
attributes of capital cities which are related to higher labour mobility.
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noting that the assumption that labour markets are local may depend on firm type. We
find that the relationships between management practices and both university distance
and regional skill premia are stronger for single-plant firms compared to plants that are
part of multinationals or multi-plant domestic firms. This is intuitive, since these types of
firms are likely to be less reliant on the local environment when recruiting staff and setting
management practices. Larger multinational firms may be able to attract workers from
other regions or countries due to their stronger brand, and might also move staff between
locations (Choudhury, 2017). Moreover, management practices in such firms might be set
centrally at the company headquarters, which may be in a different region or even country.
In contrast, in the distance analysis there is no evidence of heterogeneity with respect to
observable university characteristics. Moreoever, there is no evidence of heterogeneity by
subject mix. In particular, the results are not driven by universities offering business type
courses. This suggests that the university effect is more likely to operate via their role as
producers of general human capital, rather than as providers of consultancy services or
training for local firms which we might expect to be more prevalent in business schools.
This analysis motivates our use of the distance measure as an instrument to estimate
the impact of firm level human capital on management practices. While these results
should be treated with caution, it is useful to gauge the size of the effect and the direction
in which OLS results are likely to be biased. These results imply that a doubling of
the degree share in the average firm could lead to a 0.3 standard deviation increase in
management practices. This is economically meaningful as it represents over half the
difference between the management practices of the average firm in the United States and
United Kingdom.
Our main regressions are estimated using surveyed firms as a cross section. A subset
of firms in the WMS were re-interviewed during the sample period which allows us to
estimate how changes in firm level human capital and skill prices affect management
practices (there is not enough variation in the number of universities to use the distance
measure in the panel). This is a demanding specification given the relatively short time
frame available in the data, but we show that there remains a robust firm level relation-
ship between human capital and management practices, and a negative but less precise
relationship between skill premia and management practices.
The focus in this paper is on testing for complementarities by examining whether firms
facing cheaper or more access to skills tend to have better management practices. This is
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referred to as estimating “demand” equations by Brynjolfsson and Milgrom (2013). We
next turn to examine whether there is evidence that a skilled workforce is associated with
good management practices because skill increases the marginal benefit of their adoption.
Skill biased management would imply that the returns from management practices are
higher in the presence of skilled workers. This can be tested using interactions between
measures of skills and management practices in “performance equations” (Brynjolfsson
and Milgrom, 2013). Financial data are available for a reduced sample of plants, and we
estimate simple production functions including distance to university and its interaction
with management on this sample. We find that the association between management
practices and productivity is lower for plants that are further away from universities, but
results are only significant for the sub-sample of single-plant firms, consistent with the
finding that locational measures of skill supply appear more important for single-plant
firms.
A complementarity between worker skills and management practices may seem in-
tuitive. The surveyed management practices closely resemble the complementary char-
acteristics of “modern manufacturing” discussed by Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and
Roberts (1995). Highly skilled, cross trained workers are listed alongside (among other
things) lean production techniques, performance tracking and communications as features
of the modern firm (Roberts, 1995). A more educated workforce is more likely to show
initiative and be able to effectively implement complex, flexible and more decentralised
production practices. On the other hand, one could also argue that certain management
practices and skilled workers could be substitutes. In the presence of a highly skilled
workforce, there may be less need for constant performance tracking and communicating
- more able workers could just be left to get on with their jobs. Of course, there may
be heterogeneity in these relationships for different types of management practices but
our results show that skills and management are, on average, not substitute inputs to
production. Shedding light on this issue empirically is therefore valuable for helping
managers and policy makers understand best how to improve management practices and
hence productivity.
This paper links to four main literatures. First, in the use of the WMS to try to
understand differences in management practices, this paper draws on the papers by
Bloom, Sadun, Van Reenen and co-authors (for example, Bloom and Van Reenen (2007,
2010); Bloom et al. (2014b)). They have shown that education of both managers and
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workers are strongly correlated with management scores. Using Census Bureau survey
data on plants in the US, Bloom et al. (2017a) show that plants within counties with
“quasi-random” land grant colleges (Moretti, 2004a) have significantly higher management
scores, and the same can be said for counties with a higher college share in the working
age population.4 Bender et al. (2016) use matched employer-employee data in Germany
to show that better managed firms recruit and retain skilled workers.5 We contribute to
this literature by using newly collated international measures of skills which are external
to the firm.
Second, we contribute to the evidence on organisational complementarities and skill
biased technology. A theoretical framework for thinking about organisational complemen-
tarities is set out by Milgrom and Roberts (1990). Brynjolfsson and Milgrom (2013) gives
an overview of the theory and empirics of organisational complementarities.6 Much of
the empirical literature has focused on testing whether different types of organisational
practices are optimally implemented together (for example Ichniowski, Shaw and Pren-
nushi (1997), Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002), or Black and Lynch (2001, 2004)).
Our work using regional skill premia uses a similar approach to Caroli and Van Reenen
(2001) who find evidence of skill-biased “organisational change”. There is compelling
evidence that management can be thought of as an organisational “technology” (Bloom,
Sadun and Van Reenen, 2017), creating a link to the skill-biased technical change literature.
In models of endogenous technology adoption (Basu and Weil (1998), Zeira (1998), Caselli
(1999) and tested using time series data in Beaudry and Green (2003, 2005)), when a major
technology becomes available, it is not adopted immediately by all agents. Instead it is
adopted in environments where complementary factors plentiful and cheap. Beaudry,
Doms and Lewis (2010) find that US cities with low skill premia adopted computers more
intensively, and Garicano and Heaton (2010) find evidence of complementarity between
IT and skilled workers in US police departments. Our core argument is that managerial
technology will be adopted in environments where skills are abundant.
Third, our empirical strategy of using distance to universities has been used widely
in the labour economics and innovation literatures. Inspired by Card (1995), a number
4 Together with human capital, this paper explores three other drivers of management practices - competi-
tion, business environment and learning spillovers - and finds that together they account for about a third of
the variation in management practices.
5 Using administrative data from Portugal Queiro (2016) finds that firms with educated managers have
better performance, and suggests that the mechanism for this involves educated managers being more likely
to introduce new technologies.
6 Ennen and Richter (2010) also give review of the management, economics and other related literatures.
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of labour papers have used distance to universities as an instrument for individual level
enrollment at university. Distance to universities has also been shown to matter for
innovation spillovers.7 Hausman (2017) analyses the impacts of increases in university
patenting on local firms, and finds that establishments technologically or geographically
closer to universities experience larger increases in employment and wages. This paper is
the first, to our knowledge, that relates distance to universities to firm management.8
Finally, and more generally, our paper links to the literature on the regional produc-
tivity effects of human capital. Moretti (2004a) identifies that the graduates in a regional
labour force give rise to spillovers via high wages for other graduates and non-graduates.
Gennaioli et al. (2013) highlight the importance of human capital in regional development,
and the likely presence of spillovers: in firm level regressions that include firm human
capital, regional human capital is also positively related to productivity (see also Moretti
(2004b)). One mechanism through which this may be operating could be management.
Complementarity between skills and management practices would imply that coupled
with modern management practices, human capital raises productivity over and above its
direct effect on the worker’s own productivity. Analyses of regional growth highlight the
importance of human capital (Gennaioli et al., 2014) and universities themselves (Valero
and Van Reenen, 2018).
3.2 Theoretical Framework
Central to the skill biased management hypothesis is the notion that human capital
and modern management practices are complements. In the context of organisational
features, these types of idea were developed by Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Roberts
(1995) who analysed “modern manufacturing” and argued that, given that there are
complementarities among organisational practices, a range of practices may need to
be implemented together for a particular technological advance to raise efficiency. A
highly skilled workforce with transferrable skills is listed as one of the features of modern
manufacturing.
The management practices scores in the WMS closely resemble Roberts’ modern
manufacturing. A well-managed firm is defined as one that has successfully implemented
7 See for example Anselin, Varga and Acs (1997), Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1998) and Belenzon
and Schankerman (2013).
8Using the WHED data on universities, Bloom et al. (2017b) show that hospitals closer to universities with
both business and medical schools are better managed.
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modern manufacturing techniques; and one that is “continuously monitoring and trying
to improve its processes, setting comprehensive and stretching targets, and promoting
high-performing employees and fixing (by training or exit) underperforming employees”
(Bloom et al., 2012).
A simple model helps illustrate one path to our empirical strategy. We assume a
neoclassical production function in a static environment. Y “ FpA, M, Hqwhere output
Y is some function of technology and human capital inputs H with BY{BH ą 0 and
BY2{BH2 ă 0.9 We distinguish between production technology A and management
technology M (Lucas, 1978). It is assumed that performance is increasing continuously
in the level of management quality10, so BY{BM ą 0 and BY2{BM2 ă 0. We model the
human capital-management complementarity which we call “skill biased management”,
BY2{BMBH ą 0, as:
M “ GpH, A, ηq (3.2.1)
In a complementarity framework we interpret equation 3.2.1 as a demand equation:
demand for managerial technology is increasing in complementary human capital (see, for
example Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002)), but other interpretations are possible.11
This framework captures the fact that conditioning on firm level human capital, there
is variation across firms in management practices due to other technologies, information
frictions, optimisation errors or other idiosyncratic factors (η). In this simple setup we
abstract from modelling A. A dynamic model would treat technology as draws from a
known distribution, see for example Hopenhayn (1992) or Melitz (2003). We also abstract
from entry and exit decisions by assuming that A is large enough to cover fixed costs.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
The simple model forms the basis of an empirical strategy for estimating the effects of
human capital on management practices. Suppose we estimated the following using OLS:
Mi “ β0 ` β1Hi ` ui (3.3.1)
9 We abstract from standard capital and labour for ease of notation.
10 See Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2017) for a full description of management as a technology, which is
modelled as an intangible capital stock, and evidence to support this view.
11 If we interpret equation 3.2.1 as a production function, better management is “produced” by higher
skilled managers or workers. An alternative interpretation (Nelson and Phelps, 1966) is that managers and
workers of higher skill are able to draw and adapt random management technology from a better distribution.
An interpretation closer to Lucas (1978) is that skilled managers are matched with better workers.
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Where for firm i, M is the management score and H is the level of human capital and
u is an idiosyncratic error term. Depending on the nature of the omitted technologies
A, the bias in OLS estimates could be positive or negative. For example, if information
technologies that facilitate better management practices are positively correlated with
skills, the bias would be positive. But if communication technologies that facilitate better
management practices lead to a reduction in worker skills, the bias would be negative.12
Intangible assets such as brand or firm culture may also be embodied in this unobserved
technology, and such assets are also likely to be correlated with both management practices
and worker skills. Moreover, observed correlations between management practices and
skills might reflect reverse causality, if workers with higher human capital choose to work
in better managed firms. We therefore need to find exogenous variation in workforce skills
to be able to make a causal claim about the relationship between skills and management
practices.
Our identification strategy uses variation in the skill environments faced by firms,
in a world with frictions that prevent the skill price equalising across space.13 It can be
described schematically as follows:
Universitiesk Ñ Skill Supplyk Ñ Skill Pricek Ñ Hik Ñ Mik
The first arrow represents the relationship between the spatial presence of universities
and supply of human capital (measured as the share of the workforce with a degree in a
region k), which we hypothesise will be positive. This rests on the assumption that student
mobility is imperfect after graduation, so that at least some graduates stay and contribute
to the local labour market. This seems reasonable based on observations in the US and the
UK.14 The share of skilled labour in the region can be expected to affect the relative skill
price (or “skill premium”), which we hypothesise will affect the hiring decisions of firms.
All else equal, we would expect that a higher skill premium would result in a lower degree
share in the firm (Hik) since skilled labour is more expensive relative to unskilled labour.
12 Bloom et al. (2014a) find that improvements in information technologies lead to decentralisation, while
improvements in communication technologies have the opposite effect.
13 In the absence of frictions, the price of skill would equalise (via the law of one price). In such a world,
university presence should have no effect on skill shares in a local area. In reality, frictions and the inelastic
supply of non-tradables such as land limit the extent of price equalisation - see for example, Roback (1988)
and Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009).
14 For example, Kodrzycki (2001) looks at NSLY data in the US and finds that over two-thirds of college
graduates remain in the same state post graduation. Data from the UK Higher Education Statistics Authority
shows that a high fraction of first degree graduates in a region remain in the same region for work. In 2004-05,
this fraction was 61 per cent.
171
Finally, skill biased management would imply that there is a positive relationship between
firm level human capital and the adoption of complementary management practices.
Our empirical approach to estimating these relationships is largely dictated by data
availability and issues of aggregation. We begin with the reduced form relationship be-
tween university presence and firm skills and management practices (Universitiesik Ñ
Hik, Mik), calculating a firm specific distance measure between each firm and its closest
university. In this analysis we are able to examine within region variation, so that unob-
servable factors that affect regional skills and firm outcomes are controlled for. To get
more information on the mechanism and explore the effects of relative skill prices, we
aggregate to the region level (equivalent to a US state). We explore the associations be-
tween regional skill prices, firm skills and management practices (Skill Pricek Ñ Hik, Mik),
and link university presence in a region with regional skills and prices (Universitiesk Ñ
Skill Supplyk, Skill Pricek). Finally, we use distance to closest university as an instrument to
estimate the relationship between firm skills and management practices (Universitiesik Ñ
Hik Ñ Mik), this piece of analysis allows us to understand better the likely bias in the
OLS regressions of management practices on firm-level human capital. Our empirical
specifications are outlined in more detail in the next section.
3.3.1 Distance to University, Firm Skills and Management Practices
Our reduced form analysis examines the relationships between firm skills and manage-
ment practices and distance to closest university. We estimate:
Yijkct “ α1Distijkct ` X1ijkctα2 ` φj ` ξk ` τt ` ε ijkct (3.3.2)
We observe firm i in sector j, region k, country c and survey year t. The outcome variable
Y P tM, Hu. The distance variable, Dist, is measured as the drive time to the nearest
university in hours. We expect α1 to be negative, firms closer to universities should have a
higher degree share and be better managed, due to their improved access to skills.
We include a number of firm controls (X) that have been shown to matter for man-
agement practices (see for example Bloom and Van Reenen (2007); Bloom, Sadun and
Van Reenen (2017)), and are likely to be related to skill share in the firm too (such as
size, age and ownership status - we also include industry fixed effects φj). To pick up
any differences over the years in which the WMS surveys are conducted, we include
year dummies τt. ε ijkct is the error term, which we cluster at the region level to allow for
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heteroskedasticity and correlation between firms in the same region.
To address concerns regarding location specific factors which may confound our
estimates we do several things. First, we include regional fixed effects (ξk). We also
control for geographic characteristics which may be correlated with both skills and the
management of firms: in particular population density within 100km of the plant (also,
longitude and latitude).
There are two main concerns around this estimation strategy. First, we may worry
that well managed firms are endogenously located close to universities. To partially
address this we examine universities founded after the firms were founded and show our
results are similar. It seems less likely that there would be issues of reverse causality (that
universities choose locations close to medium sized manufacturing firms - those surveyed
in the WMS - with higher management scores), or firms endogenously choosing locations
on the basis of future university openings.
Second, we may worry about the interpretation of a relationship between distance to
universities and management practices. Such a relationship could be due to the diffusion of
information or advice from universities to surrounding firms, for example via consultancy
services, managerial training or access to more specialised inputs - rather than through
an effect on the supply of skills as our diagram suggests. If this were the case, we would
expect that universities with certain subject mixes may have more of an effect - in particular,
business, economics, finance, or even engineering and sciences. We are able to filter such
universities, and show that they do not drive our results.
Under the caveats above and the (strong) assumption that the exclusion restriction
holds, i.e. that universities affect management only via their impact on the supply of
skills, we estimate the relationship between firm skills and management using the distance
measure as an instrument for firm skills. This allows us to assess the likely direction of
bias in the OLS relationship, and gain a better understanding of the order of magnitude of
the relationship between firm skills and management.
3.3.2 Regional Skill Premia, Firm Skills and Management Practices
We now turn to our analysis of how firm human capital and management practices
respond to the relative price of skills they face. The purpose of this part of the analysis is
to provide evidence that firms respond to regional skill prices and show that those skill
prices appear to be related to university presence in a region.
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Skill premia (the log ratio of skilled wages to unskilled wages) need to be calculated
based on some type of locational unit - and in line with the literature (for example
Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) or Gennaioli et al. (2013)) and what is feasible from a data
perspective (see next section) we choose the subnational region, equivalent to a US state.
The estimating equation is as follows:
Yijkct “ γ1SPk ` X1ijkctγ2 ` φj ` ζc ` τt ` υijkct (3.3.3)
SPk is the average skill premium (most commonly defined as the log ratio of average
skilled and unskilled wages) for region k over the period 2005-2010. Our main measure is
the coefficient on a degree dummy from wage regressions, which is an estimate of the skill
premium having controlled for other factors (such as worker experience). The controls (X)
are consistent with equation 3.3.2. Since the skill premium varies at the regional level, we
are unable to include region fixed effects in these regressions, but we do include country
dummies (ζc), together with sector and year dummies as before (φj and τt). Our coefficient
of interest is γ1, which we expect to be negative: firms facing a higher skill premium will
have lower human capital and be worse managed if skill biased management holds.
These regressions are weighted using the population in a region divided by the popu-
lation in the country to reduce the effects of outliers in low population regions (for which
labour force data is likely to be less reliable), and standard errors are clustered at the
region level as before.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Overview of Data Sources
We use data from three main sources. Here we describe the key features of the data,
and further details are in the Data Appendix 3.A. Survey data on management practices
and skills in manufacturing plants are obtained from the World Management Survey
(WMS). The unit of observation is the manufacturing plant (referred to interchangeably
as the firm in this paper). The WMS specifically asks questions about the management
practices in the particular plant surveyed (rather than the head office, which might differ
in the case of multi-plant firms). Therefore the WMS gives a measure of managerial
quality at a particular location, implying that the spatial approach taken in this paper is
appropriate. The measure of management practices is the standardised WMS management
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score, which is based on the average score that a plant achieves across 18 practices (broadly
relating to operations, monitoring, targets and people management) (see Appendix Table
3.D.7). It has been shown that management scores are positively and robustly correlated
with performance (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom et al., 2014b; Bloom, Sadun and
Van Reenen, 2017), a relationship that holds across countries, sectors and types of firm. We
therefore interpret a higher management score as “better” management. The share of the
workforce with a university degree is our measure of human capital - this is available for
the total workforce, and managers/non-managers separately. In the distance analysis, we
use data from surveys conducted between 2004 and 2010 across 19 countries, as a pooled
cross section.
Information on universities across countries is sourced from the World Higher Ed-
ucation Database (WHED), which provides data on the location and other university
characteristics (such as subjects or level of study offered, and founding date). See Valero
and Van Reenen (2018) for a full description of the data. We geocode universities and
plants, by mapping their postcodes to geographic coordinates. This enables us to calculate
the main distance measure by estimating drive times between each plant and its nearest
university (based on google maps). We favour drive time instead of a straight line distance
because it accounts for natural geographic features. Given that the analysis in this paper
is based on an international sample with differing geographies across countries, this helps
to account for distance in a consistent manner. Alternative distance measures are explored
in the robustness.
Analysis of the relationships between regional skill premia, firm human capital and
management practices is conducted on a subsample of 13 countries where we were able
to access international labour force survey (or equivalent) data sources (for more details
on the data sources see Table 3.D.9 in the Appendix). Skill premia are estimated using
wage regressions, where log wages are regressed on education, experience, experience
squared and gender, by region. Instead of the standard years of education, our preferred
specification includes a dummy variable to indicate whether or not an individual has
a degree, and the estimated skill premium is the coefficient on this dummy. Available
observations in regions are pooled over the years data were available, and year fixed
effects included in the regressions. We also compute the regional degree share and a raw
wage ratio (the log ratio of skilled wages to unskilled wages), measures that were available
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for additional countries as ready-made regional aggregates.15
The key geographic control is population density at the location of the plant (within
100km), which is based on data from the Center for International Earth Science (CIESIN)
data. Other regional data were obtained from Gennaioli et al. (2013). In addition to average
years of education, and college share which is used to sense check the supply of skills
data collected from surveys, there are also other covariates such as as temperature, inverse
distance to coast and oil per capita and population.
3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
A summary of the key variables used in our analysis is at Table 3.4.1. The mean manage-
ment score in our sample is just under 3. In the average plant, 15 per cent of the total
workforce in the average plant have a degree. This is closer to 60 per cent looking only at
managers, and 10 per cent for non-managers. In our regressions we take the natural log of
the degree share, and add one so that zero observations are kept in the sample. We control
for plant and firm employment, plant age and MNE status.16 Just under half of plants
are part of a multinational enterprise, and 59 per cent have more than one production
site (multi-unit production). In our analysis, we consider multi-plant firms those that are
either part of a multinational, or have multi-unit domestic production. 50 per cent of the
plants are part of a large firm (which we define as having over 300 employees), and 28 per
cent are listed. 40 per cent of the workforce of the average plant is in a union.
The average distance (drive time) to the nearest university is 0.45 hours. Figure 3.4.1
plots the histogram of driving times in 10 minute bins which is clearly skewed to the right.
In the robustness, we experiment with using the natural log of the drive time, and exclude
observations that are in the same postcode as universities (and hence have a drive time of
zero). Locational features are controlled for by including longitude, latitude and average
population density within a 100km radius of the plant. The average plant in our sample is
in a region where the skill premium is 0.57, 19 per cent of the workforce have a degree
and there are 3.66 universities per million people.
Country-level descriptive statistics on the sample on which we conduct our analysis
are reported in Appendix Table 3.D.1. The United States has the highest management
scores on average, though there is also substantial within-country variation. The highest
15 Microdata were obtained for 14 countries, and ready-made regional aggregates for an additional 4
countries. Our main analysis sample is based on 13 countries where reliable wage data were available, and
the wider samples are included in robustness.
16 Missing values are imputed and a dummy to indicate missing status is included in regressions.
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Table 3.4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean S.D Min Max Count
WMS variables
Management Score 2.93 0.67 1 4.89 6363
Management Z-Score 0 1.00 -2.89 2.94 6363
Degree share 14.8 16.7 0 100 6363
Degree share, managers 58.2 34.0 0 100 6363
Degree share, non managers 10.4 16.3 0 100 6363
Ln(1+degree share) 2.25 1.05 0 4.62 6363
Ln(employment, plant) 5.10 0.96 0 8.99 6363
Missing Ln(employment, plant) 0.017 0.13 0 1 6363
Ln(employment, firm) 5.83 1.11 0 11.1 6363
Missing Ln(employment, firm) 0.0016 0.040 0 1 6363
Ln(plant age) 3.40 0.79 0 6.28 6363
Missing Ln(plant age) 0.44 0.50 0 1 6363
MNE 0.46 0.50 0 1 6363
Multi-unit production 0.59 0.49 0 1 6363
Large Firm (>300 employees) 0.50 0.50 0 1 6363
Public listed 0.28 0.45 0 1 6363
Union (percent) 39.8 39.4 0 100 6363
Google Maps and GIS variables
Distance 0.45 0.54 0 7.55 6363
Latitude 23.3 32.7 -54.8 65.7 6363
Longitude 8.01 78.1 -127.5 176.9 6363
Avg pop density 1.34 1.88 0 16.0 6363
Regional skills variables
Skill Premium 0.57 0.22 0.26 1.25 4559
Regional Degree Share 18.6 8.01 0.11 52.7 6189
Universities per million people 3.66 3.74 0 129.7 6363
NOTES: Management score is the average of all 18 WMS management scores. Manage-
ment Z-score is the standardised score. Degree share, degree share (managers) and degree
share (non managers) are the plant-level percentages of total workforce, managers
and non-managers with degrees, respectively. Ln(1+degree share) is the natural log
of 1+ the total workforce degree share. Missing values of firm, plant employment
and plant age are mean coded and an indicator shown. Union is the percentage of
the workforce that is unionised. Distance is the google driving time in hours from
the plant to the nearest university (full description in the Data Appendix). Longi-
tude and Latitude are geographic coordinates of the plant location corresponding to
its postal code. Avg pop density is the average population density within a 100km
radius of the plant calculated using GIS software. Skill premium is the coefficient on
a degree dummy, recovered from regional wage regressions. Regional degree share is
the percentage of regional population with a degree. Universities per million people is
the number of universities in a region, divided by the population. Appendix Table
3.D.2 summarises additional variables used in our analysis and robustness checks.
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NOTES: N=6,363, observations split into 10 minute bins. Distance is measured as the drive time (in hours)
between a plant and its nearest university.
degree share is in Japan, where 32 per cent of the workforce of the average plant are
university graduates. The skill premia appear of reasonable magnitude compared to
estimates from the literature.17 There is also variation in the mean distances and skill
premia across countries.
In this paper our focus is on finer grained analysis based on variation within countries
or regions. The region in this analysis is equivalent to a US state or NUTS1 or NUTS2
regions in Europe, and our sample contains 314 such regions across the 19 countries listed.
In the Appendix we report the number of regions in each country and show that there is
substantial within-region variation (Table 3.D.3).
Before moving on to our results, we report some raw correlations that motivate the
analysis. The firm level correlation between degree share and management practices has
been established in the literature (see Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), Bloom et al. (2014b),
and with more detail on Germany in Bender et al. (2016)), and is the starting point for
this study. Figure 3.4.2 plots the correlation between average management scores of firms
within 20 equally sized bins in terms of degree share, showing a positive and precise
relationship.18 This graph includes country fixed effects, but the relationship is as strong
17 For example, see Strauss and de la Maisonneuve (2007) for OECD country estimates.
18 These relationships are as strong using the unlogged degree share, but we use the natural log since this
provides a better fit to the data (the equivalent plot of the unlogged degree share reveals a non-linearity in the
relationship).
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NOTES: Scatter plot of average firm management practices on average ln(1+degree share) within 20 evenly
sized bins. Variation is within country. The solid line represents the line of best fit.
without these.
This strong relationship exists for both managers and non managers as shown in Table
3.4.2 which reports the regression equivalent.19A Wald test on the coefficients on managers
and workers in column (4) shows that these are not significantly different from each other,
and we keep our focus on total workforce skills in the analysis that will follow.
Table 3.4.2: Firm Skills and Management Practices, Basic Regressions
Dependent variable:
Management Z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(1+degree share) 0.262***
(0.015)
Ln(1+degree share), managers 0.207*** 0.138***
(0.013) (0.011)
Ln(1+degree share), non managers 0.198*** 0.156***
(0.010) (0.010)
Observations 6,363 6,363 6,363 6,363
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. All
columns estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at the region level in paren-
theses (for consistency with later analysis). All columns include country and year
dummies.
Figure 3.4.3 allows us to visualise our analysis using distance to universities, now
19 The relationship between firm skills and management practices remains highly significant and of similar
order of magnitude when a full set of controls are included, as can be seen in column (2) of Table 3.5.5.
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plotting average management scores within 20 equally sized bins. This shows that there is
a negative correlation between our distance measure and both management scores and
the firm level degree share.
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NOTES: Scatter plot of average management Z-score on average travel time within 20 evenly sized bins.
Variation is within country. The solid line represents the line of best fit.
Finally, we examine the relationships between skill prices and regional degree share.
A key assumption in our regional skill premium analysis is that a higher price of skills
in a region reflects lower supply and we therefore expect a negative correlation. We find
that this is the case, (see Appendix Figure 3.C.1), and that the correlation is stronger when
we omit capital regions. This seems intuitive, as demand shocks and other unobservables
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that raise both the skill premium and the supply of skilled workers may be considered
more likely in hubs of economic activity.20
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Distance to University, Firm Skills and Management Practices
We begin with our analysis of the reduced from relationships between firm management
practices, degree share and distance to university (Table 3.5.1). The dependent variable in
Panel A is the standardised management score. Column (1) is a simple correlation, country
and year dummies plus survey controls to reduce noise in the data. The relationship
between management scores and distance is negative and significant. Column (2) adds
region fixed effects which have little impact on the main coefficient. In column (3), industry
dummies and firm controls (as reported) are added and these reduce the magnitude of
the coefficient slightly to -0.05. Column (4) adds geographic controls (population density,
longitude and latitude, not reported here) none of which are significant, and the our
coefficient is unchanged. Column (4) is the core specification, and implies that plants
that are an extra hour of drive time away from their closest university (which is roughly
two standard deviations) have on average 0.05 standard deviations worse management
practices. In the next section we show that this result is robust to alternative specifications
and sample selection.
Panel B reports regressions of firm level degree share on distance to university. Again,
there is a significant and negative correlation between distance and degree share of -
0.16 (column (1)). This decreases slightly in magnitude as we add controls in the order
discussed previously. The result in column (4) implies that an extra hour of driving time
reduces the log degree share by 0.12, representing over a tenth of the standard deviation
across firms.21
This analysis suggests that, within regions, firms located close to universities have
both higher human capital and higher management scores. In the following sections we
will provide evidence to suggest that the mechanisms underlying this is, at least in part,
the role of universities in increasing the supply of skills in their local area. While we
20 To reflect this, our regional regressions that follow include a dummy variable indicating regions that
contain a capital city.
21 We also estimated column (4) for managers and non-managers separately and found that the effect is
negative and highly significant for both (the coefficient on distance for degree share of managers is -0.087,
and the coefficient for non managers is -0.12, both are significant at the 1 per cent level).
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Table 3.5.1: Distance to University, Plant Management and Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: Dependent variable is Management Z-score
Distance -0.067*** -0.070*** -0.049*** -0.050***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Ln(employment, plant) 0.200*** 0.199***
(0.017) (0.017)
Ln(employment, firm) 0.073*** 0.073***
(0.012) (0.012)




B: Dependent variable is Ln(1+Degree Share)
Distance -0.160*** -0.144*** -0.114*** -0.119***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027)
Ln(employment, plant) 0.060*** 0.059***
(0.019) (0.019)
Ln(employment, firm) 0.020 0.020
(0.017) (0.017)




Observations 6,363 6,363 6,363 6,363
Number of clusters 314 314 314 314
Region dummies no yes yes yes
Industry dummies no no yes yes
Geography controls no no no yes
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10%
level. All columns estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at the
region level in parentheses. See Table 3.4.1 for a description of the key vari-
ables. All columns include country dummies, year dummies, and survey
controls for interviewer gender, interviewee job tenure, interviewee senior-
ity, interview reliability, interview day of week, time and duration, and
dummy variables for the analyst conducting the interview. Missing values
are mean-coded, and dummies included to indicate where this is the case.
Geography controls include population density, longitude and latitude.
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cannot rule out the possibility that better managed firms are locating near to universities,
or universities are providing other support that raises management practices with these
data, we go some way towards addressing these concerns.
3.5.2 Regional Skill Premia, Firm Skills and Management Practices
We begin the regional analysis with simple correlations linking the university location to
regional skill premia (Table 3.5.2). Unsurprisingly, we find that there is a direct relationship
between a universities per million people and measures of skill supply: regional degree
share (Panel A) and the skill premium (Panel B). Column (1) includes only country
dummies, and shows that there is a positive correlation between university density and
the logged regional degree share, significant at the 5 per cent level. This suggests that a
one per cent rise in university density is associated with a 15 per cent rise in degree share.
Controlling for observable geographic characteristics at the regional level (temperature,
distance to the coast, oil and gas production, population, and a capital region dummy)
actually increases precision, and does not affect the size of the coefficient (column (2)). As
we expect, we see a negative correlation between university density and the skill premium,
though this is less precise (Panel B).
Table 3.5.2: Regional Skills and Universities
(1) (2)
A: Dependent variable is Ln(region degree share)
Ln(1+universities per million people) 0.153** 0.147***
(0.069) (0.044)
B: Dependent variable is skill premium
Ln(1+universities per million people) -0.030* -0.030*
(0.015) (0.014)
Observations 208 208
Country dummies yes yes
Geographic controls no yes
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level.
All columns estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at the coun-
try level in parentheses. All columns contain country dummies. The unit
of observation is a region. Geographic controls include a capital region
dummy, temperature, inverse distance to the coast, Ln(oil production) and
Ln(population).
Next we summarise the relationships between regional skill premia, and firm manage-
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ment practices and human capital (Table 3.5.3).
The dependent variable in Panel A is the standardised management score. Column
(1) reports a simple correlation (controlling for country and year fixed effects) showing
that management scores are negatively and significantly related to regional skill premia.
Column (2) adds 2 digit industry dummies which slightly reduces the coefficient and
firm controls (consistent with our previous analysis) which reduces our coefficient. The
addition of plant level geographic controls (longitude, latitude and population density) in
column (3) increases significance.22 Column (4) adds survey controls and our coefficient is
slightly reduced.23 The coefficient of -0.74 implies that a one per cent rise in the degree
premium leads to a 0.0074 standard deviation reduction in management scores. To assess
the magnitude of this effect, we apply it to the variation between US states. It implies that
a one standard deviation rise in the skill premium reduces management scores by -0.04
standard deviations, representing 15 per cent of the cross-state variation.24 Column (5)
reports the result when capital regions are dropped, the relationship is now stronger and
significant at the 1 per cent level, suggesting that unobservables that raise management
practices and also raise the skill premium are more prevalent in capital regions.
The relationship between skill premia and degree share is less precisely estimated
(Panel B), but still negative. In fact our coefficient gets stronger and more precise as
geographic controls are added, in particular the capital region dummy. In column (4),
the coefficient is -0.821, and significant at the 5 per cent level. As in Panel (A), excluding
capital regions altogether increases the magnitude of the effect and its significance.
3.5.3 Robustness and Heterogeneity of Main Results
3.5.3.1 Summary of Robustness Tests
The results so far provide strong evidence that distance to university and regional skill
premia matter for firm management practices. We test the robustness of the relationships
between management practices and both the distance and skill premium measures, and
the results are detailed in Appendix 3.B. First, we show that the distance results are robust
22 We show that the core specification, column (4) is robust also to the addition of regional geographic
controls in the robustness (see Appendix Table 3.D.11, row (8)).
23 Here we exclude the analyst dummies. This model using region-level variation has fewer effective
degrees of freedom and we find that the analyst dummies have a large effect, reducing the magnitude of the
coefficient and raising the standard errors (see robustness tests in Appendix Table 3.D.11). We therefore leave
them out of this core specification.
24 The cross-state standard deviation of the degree premium in the US is 0.058. -0.7 x 0.058 = -0.04, which is
15 per cent of the cross region standard deviation in management scores (0.28).
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Table 3.5.3: Regional Skill Premia, Plant Management and Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A: Dependent variable is Management Z-score
Skill Premium -1.028** -0.668* -0.802** -0.737** -0.925***
(0.481) (0.371) (0.363) (0.349) (0.258)
Ln(employment, plant) 0.274*** 0.274*** 0.240*** 0.254***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.032)
Ln(employment, firm) 0.081*** 0.082*** 0.062*** 0.053***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.020)
Ln(plant age) -0.025 -0.026 -0.037* -0.031*
(0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.018)
MNE 0.521*** 0.516*** 0.467*** 0.388***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050)
capital 0.060 0.061
(0.054) (0.048)
B: Dependent variable is Ln(1+Degree Share)
Skill Premium -0.648 -0.576 -0.786** -0.821** -0.914***
(0.493) (0.400) (0.351) (0.340) (0.282)
Ln(employment, plant) 0.077** 0.079** 0.074** 0.062***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.023)
Ln(employment, firm) 0.016 0.017 0.011 0.018
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
Ln(plant age) -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.017
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.022)
MNE 0.355*** 0.349*** 0.337*** 0.295***
(0.045) (0.046) (0.047) (0.048)
capital 0.124** 0.132***
(0.049) (0.047)
Observations 4,553 4,553 4,553 4,553 3,880
Number of clusters 208 208 208 208 198
Industry dummies no yes yes yes yes
Geographic controls no no yes yes yes
Survey controls no no no yes yes
Capital regions yes yes yes yes no
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. All
columns estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at the region level in
parentheses. Regressions are weighted using population in the region as a share
of country population. All columns include country and year dummies. Industry
dummies are 2 digit SIC code, geography and survey controls as before (but exclud-
ing the analyst dummies) (see Table 3.5.1). See Table 3.4.1 for a description of the
key variables.
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to different specification assumptions with respect to the clustering of standard errors,
allowing non linearities in the distance measure, including additional geographic con-
trols (in particular local population density), or more detailed fixed effects. The distance
coefficient remains negative and significant on the inclusion of country - year dummies,
and region-industry dummies. Significance is lost in some of the more demanding specifi-
cations, for example using county or city level fixed effects, but the coefficients are still
negative. Results are also robust to different sample choices.
Analogue robustness tests are carried out on our regional skill premium regressions
(using the full sample that includes capital regions), These show that the sign of the rela-
tionship between skill premia and management practices is robust to different assumptions
on specification and sample, but the significance of these results is lost in some cases. In
particular, when standard errors are clustered at the country level, or when the regressions
are unweighted (more noise is expected as skill premia are likely to be worse measured in
less populous regions where sample sizes are smaller). In addition, we explore whether
the expected relationships exist for alternative measures of regional skills such as a raw
regional wage ratio or various quantity measures (such as degree share or regional years
of education). In general, the coefficients on these measures are as expected but they
tend not to be significant. Reassuringly, we find that our regional measure of university
presence (universities per million people) has a positive and significant relationship with
management practices.
3.5.3.2 Heterogeneity Across Firm or University Type
Next, we explore whether there is heterogeneity in these relationships across observable
dimensions. We find evidence of heterogeneity in effects between plants that belong to
multi-plant enterprises (defined as either being part of multinational firms or firms that
have more than one production site domestically) and those that are single-plant firms.
This appears to be the case in both the distance and skill premium specifications (Table
3.5.4). Column (1) shows our distance regression with a dummy for multi-plant firms.25
In column (2) we add an interaction term between distance and the multi-plant dummy.
This is positive but not significant, but the effect for single-plant firms is slightly larger. In
columns (3) we replicate column (2) on the sample for which skill premia are available.
The average effect across all plants on the reduced sample is similar in this sample (0.056
25 We vary our previous regressions here slightly by including a multi-plant dummy rather than only the
MNE dummy from before.
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compared to 0.050 in the full sample), but the effect of distance in single-plant firms
is double the size (-0.11), and the interaction term is larger and more significant (the p
value is 0.102). Columns (4) and (5) show that similarly the skill premium has a stronger
relationship with management practices in single plant firms, now the interaction term is
significant at the 5 per cent level.
The finding that regional skill supply has a stronger effect on management practices in
single-plant firms is intuitive. Plants that are part of a larger firm are likely to have access
to wider labour markets and we therefore might expect recruitment decisions to be less
influenced by the local skill environment. It also may well be the case that management
practices and processes are set centrally at their headquarters, so are less sensitive to the
local skill environment of specific plants.26
Table 3.5.4: Heterogeneity by Multi-plant Status
Dependent variable:
Management Z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distance -0.050*** -0.058* -0.109***
(0.019) (0.034) (0.037)
Distance X Multi 0.012 0.080
(0.043) (0.049)
Skill Premium -0.710* -1.026**
(0.376) (0.399)
Skill Premium X Multi 0.411**
(0.163)
Multi 0.267*** 0.261*** 0.280*** 0.400*** 0.152
(0.031) (0.036) (0.045) (0.043) (0.126)
Observations 6,363 6,363 4,553 4,553 4,553
Number of clusters 314 314 208 208 208
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. All
columns estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at the region level in
parentheses. Multi is a dummy denoting multi-plant status, which we define as a
plant that either belongs to a multinational enterprise, or a domestic multiplant firm.
Second, we investigate whether specific types of university are driving the distance
results. Heterogeneity across universities may tell us something about the mechanism
through which universities might impact on local firms. If we find stronger effects
for universities with business departments, this could imply that it is the managerial
skills that are important for the management of firms rather than general human capital.
Furthermore, we might worry that the effects we have found are due to universities
26 We explore heterogeneity across other firm characteristics, and in general there is no evidence of this in
the distance specifications, while the skill premium regressions do display some heterogeneities across other
characteristics (for example listed status and larger firms).
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providing consulting services or other support to local firms rather than the provision
of human capital, and stronger effects universities with business departments could
suggest this type of mechanism is at work. The results show that there is no evidence
of heterogeneity for universities offering business type courses or any other subject type
(law and social sciences, medicine and science or arts and humanities), suggesting that
universities affect firm management via their effect on general human capital rather
than through the teaching of any particular discipline (see Table 3.D.4 in the Appendix).
We also examine whether the university effect is stronger for universities that were
founded before the plant. If better managed firms have based location decisions on the
proximity to existing universities, then we may expect a stronger coefficient when we look
at universities founded before the plant. In fact, we find that there is no differential effect
in such cases, therefore, it does not appear better managed plants locating near established
universities are driving our results.
Finally, we check whether the relationships between management practices and skills
measures that we have found exist for all the types of management practices scored in the
WMS, or whether skills are more important for a subset of these. We run our regressions
distance and skill premium regressions with the standardised scores for each of the four
different management practice groupings as dependent variables: operations, monitoring,
targeting and people management. We find that the negative relationship between our
both distance and skill premia applies across all practice groupings. This is consistent
with the empirical fact that management practices within firm are correlated: a firm that
scores highly on one managerial question will tend to score highly on all of them (Bloom
et al., 2014b). The coefficients vary in significance but not in a consistent manner across
the two specifications, so we cannot conclude that these results are driven by a particular
subset of management practices (see Appendix Table 3.D.5).
3.5.4 Firm Human Capital and Management Practices
In order to better interpret the endogenous firm level relationship between degree share
and management practices and assess the likely sign of bias, we estimate the effect of
firm degree share on management practices using distance to nearest university as an
instrument for firm level degree share. We treat these results with caution, as they rely not
only on the exogeneity of university location, but also on the assumption that universities
affect the management of firms only via their impact on firm degree share, rather than
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through direct consultancy, training services or other externalities. While it is not possible
to prove exclusion, we argue that the fact that universities with business departments do
not have differential effects helps to address concerns that universities affect management
practices through other channels. Similarly, we cannot rule out endogenous university
location within regions, though we do show that there is no differential effect where the
plant’s closest university was founded before the plant itself.
The results of the instrumental variables analysis are summarised in Table 3.5.5. Col-
umn (1) gives the correlation between total workforce degree share and management
practices, controlling for country and year dummies which we saw in Table 3.4.2. This is
robust to the inclusion of the full set of controls (column (2)). Column (3) reports the just
identified IV regression, where degree share is instrumented with drive time. The first
stage F-statistic is of a large magnitude (19.7) and so we do not appear to have a problem
of weak instruments (Staiger and Stock, 1997; Stock, Wright and Yogo, 2012).27 Column (4)
shows the results of using an additional instrument: the number of universities within
100km of the plant, which is of course correlated with drive time but also reflects the
presence of other universities in addition to the closest one. The results are very similar to
our just identified model.
Table 3.5.5: Firm Degree Share and Management Practices with IV estimates
Dependent variable:
Management Z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specification: OLS OLS IV IV
Ln(1+degree share) 0.262*** 0.156*** 0.420*** 0.418***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.142) (0.130)
Observations 6,363 6,363 6,363 6,363
Number of clusters 314 314 314 314
Region dummies no yes yes yes
Industry dummies no yes yes yes
Firm controls no yes yes yes




F statistic 19.70 16.52
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level.
Standard errors clustered at the region level in parentheses. All columns
include country and year dummies.
27 Note that the first stage is equivalent to specification in Panel B, column (4) from Table 3.5.1.
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The IV specification in (3) is robust to a multitude of tests, summarised in Appendix
3.B. We also provide some additional reassurance on exclusion and the exogeneity of
university location. To address the concern that universities affect management channels
other than human capital we explore whether universities with business departments
have a direct effect on management practices (both a main effect and interacted with
distance28), see Appendix Table 3.D.6. The excluded instrument for firm human capital
is now the distance to universities without business departments. Business departments
do not appear to have a direct effect on management, and the IV coefficient is of similar
magnitude. We carry out an equivalent exercise for universities founded before the plants,
where now the excluded instrument is universities founded after the plant; and find no
effect of pre-existing universities on management practices which is inconsistent with a
view that better managed firms endogenously locate near to universities.
This analysis suggests that OLS estimates are biased downwards.29 We use the IV
coefficient to estimate that if the average firm doubled its degree share, this could imply
higher management scores of 0.3 standard deviations:30 over half the size of the difference
between the average UK and US plant (see Appendix Table 3.D.1).
3.5.5 Extensions
3.5.5.1 Panel Estimates: Management Practices and Skill Premia Over Time
The core results in this paper are based on cross sectional analysis, and while we have
addressed concerns regarding identification to the extent possible, we cannot entirely rule
out that the results are driven by other omitted variables or endogenous plant location.
Therefore it is valuable to examine whether our relationships survive when variation is
within firm. A subset of firms in a subset of countries (twelve of our sample of 19) were
re-interviewed during the sample period (2005-2010).
We begin by examining whether our firm level relationship between degree share and
28 This is a form of the over-identification test, and a similar strategy is used by Card (1995) when estimating
the returns to schooling. He allows distance to have a direct effect, and uses distance interacted with family
variables as the excluded instrument for college education
29 In general, we might expect there to be upward bias, but a negative bias could occur if for example,
communication technologies that are complementary with management practices, and raise management
scores when employed, also reduced the requirement for skilled workers. It could also reflect attenuation due
to measurement error in firm human capital (which is a survey response).
30 The average firm in the sample has a degree share of 14 per cent. In this indicative experiment, we double
the degree share to 28 per cent. This implies an increase in the natural log of the degree share of around 0.7.
Multiplying this by the coefficient on degree share gives a 0.3 standard deviation rise in management scores
(0.7*0.42). The average plant in the sample has 164 employees. This experiment would involve raising the
employees with a degree from 23 to 46.
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management practices survives when we include firm fixed effects (Table 3.5.6). Column
(1) is a simplified version of the endogenous OLS regressions in Table 3.5.5, column (1),
estimated on the panel sample for comparison. This sample includes all firms that were
interviewed in more than one wave over the period 2005-2010. Management scores and
control variables were interpolated between survey waves so that observations are annual.
Column (2) includes firm level fixed effects. The coefficient falls by nearly two thirds, but
is still highly significant. This suggests that firms increasing their share of skilled workers
over time are also improving their management practices. The smaller magnitude of the
coefficient in the fixed effects specification may indicate that the omitted variables were
positively correlated with both skills and management practices (in contrast to the IV
findings), but it could also reflect attenuation due to measurement error in firm degree
share which becomes more of an issue in the panel.
Moving now to the regional skill premium analysis, we also find some (more tentative)
evidence that our effects are not driven entirely by unobserved factors. Column (3) shows
the cross sectional relationship between the management z-score and the log of the wage
ratio31, for the ten countries in the panel where annual wage ratio data were available.32
We drop capital regions, which we have seen before tend to dampen our results using skill
premia.33 This shows a significant negative relationship between management and the
skill premium, as before. Column (5) adds firm fixed effects and our coefficient is now
smaller, and significant at the 10 per cent level. This specification is demanding on the
data as it requires variation within the firm in response to changes in regional skill prices
over a short time frame.
Taken together, we consider that these results offer further support for the skill biased
management hypothesis, indicating that our cross sectional results are not merely driven
by firm level unobservables.
31 We use this measure rather than the degree dummy coefficient from regional regressions on micro
labour force data used in the cross section as there were insufficient observations in some region-year cells to
calculate the latter measure robustly on an annual basis.
32 These are Australia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Poland, Sweden, UK and US. Japan and
Poland were not included in our core cross section analysis, as we were not able to obtain the microdata
to run wage regressions. However, ready-made regional average wages (for skilled and unskilled workers
respectively) were purchased from the statistical agencies in these countries. We note that the results in this
table are very similar when Japan and Poland are excluded. In addition, to be consistent with our cross section
analysis, we exclude India from these regressions, but the coefficient is only slightly smaller when India is
included.
33 The coefficient is negative, but smaller in magnitude when capital regions are included.
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Table 3.5.6: Panel Regressions
Dependent variable:
Management Z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(1+degree share) 0.223*** 0.0854***
(0.0256) (0.0251)
Ln(wage ratio) -0.802** -0.323*
(0.318) (0.187)
Observations 7,048 7,048 5,358 5,358
Number of clusters 218 218 164 164
General controls yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes no yes no
Region dummies yes no no no
Firm fixed effects no yes no yes
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10%
level. All columns estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered
at the region level in parentheses. Sample includes all firms that were
interviewed in more than one wave over the period 2005-2010. Man-
agement scores, degree share and general controls were interpolated
between survey observations. All columns include country-year dum-
mies. General controls include firm and plant employment and MNE
status in column (1) and (3) (this drops out when firm fixed effects
are included).
3.5.5.2 Performance Equations
Using the subsample of firms where sales data are available, we estimate basic production
functions to examine interactions between management scores and distance to university.
The results are in Table 3.5.7.
Column (1) is a simple regression of the natural log of sales on labour, capital, firm
and industry controls34 plus region fixed effects, but excluding firm level human capital.
Column (2) includes distance to university showing that is negatively, but insignificantly
associated with productivity. The interaction between management practices and distance
is negative, but also not significant at conventional levels. Column (3) constrains the
sample to single-plant firms, and the interaction term becomes much larger in magnitude
and significant at the five per cent level, suggesting that single-plant firms benefit less in
terms from raising management scores when far from universities. Column (4) shows that
this result is not there for multi-plant firms. In further results (not reported here) we check
that similar interaction effects do not exist for labour and capital. We take this analysis as
34 We include 2 digit sic dummies and full noise controls (including a full set of analyst dummies), hours
worked, plant age and dummies for missing values. We mean-code missing values of capital and employees,
and include a dummy to indicate this. Capital is missing for 24% of the sample, and employment is missing
for 3% of the sample). Results are robust to dropping these observations. Materials are not included here, as
this variable is missing for 75% of the sample.
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Table 3.5.7: Performance Equation Regressions
Dependent variable: Ln(Sales) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Management Z-score 0.104*** 0.116*** 0.189*** 0.0596
(0.0243) (0.0283) (0.0665) (0.0370)
Ln(capital) 0.521*** 0.520*** 0.407*** 0.551***
(0.0568) (0.0567) (0.0607) (0.0644)
Ln(labour) 0.493*** 0.493*** 0.483*** 0.477***
(0.0546) (0.0546) (0.0791) (0.0636)
Distance -0.0508 -0.0692 -0.0976*
(0.0377) (0.0647) (0.0542)
Management Z-score x Distance -0.0298 -0.170** 0.0405
(0.0357) (0.0716) (0.0506)
Observations 4,833 4,833 1,306 3,527
Number of clusters 276 276 219 268
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. All
columns estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at the region level in
parentheses. The sample of 4,833 plants are the subsample of the 6,363 plants
in our distance analysis for which sales data are non missing. Where missing,
capital and labour are mean-coded and a dummy variable included to indicate
this. All columns include region and year fixed effects, 2 digit sic dummies and
noise controls. Log hours and log plant age are controlled for (mean-coded if
missing, with dummies to indicate this). Column (3) is estimated on the sample
of single-plant firms. Column (4) is estimated on multi-plant firms.
further evidence of complementarities between skills and management practices, though
this appears to be the case only for single-plant firms.
3.6 Conclusions
We have presented robust evidence that skills and management practices are complements
using a newly analysed dataset on international universities and newly collated data on
international subnational skill prices. Our proxy for skills access at the firm level is a
measure of distance to closest university. Firms closer to universities have both higher
degree share and management scores. These results can help us to understand one of the
channels through which universities affect regional economic performance (Valero and
Van Reenen, 2018). Using our estimates of regional skill premia, we provide evidence that
universities might shift the supply and relative price of skills, which we then show are
related to firm human capital and management scores.
We revisit the endogenous relationship between firm skills and management practices
and use distance as an instrument for firm skills to gain a better understanding on the likely
sign of the bias. The results are indicative due to the caveats discussed, but imply that the
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basic OLS relationship is biased downwards. In our preferred specification, doubling the
firm level degree share implies a 0.3 standard deviation increase in management scores,
which accounts for over half the difference between the management practices of the
average US and UK firm. Drawing on the analysis by Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen
(2017), we can calculate what this means for productivity: an increase in management
scores of 0.3 standard deviations could lead to around 3 per cent higher productivity.35
Of course an increase in skilled workers can also be expected to raise productivity via a
general human capital effect which is not captured here.
Complementarity between productivity enhancing management practices and general
human capital is relevant for policymakers seeking ways to improve management in
lagging firms, and productivity in general for two main reasons. First, complementarity
implies that policies to raise human capital do not only raise productivity via a direct
impact on worker skills, but also via an indirect effect as firms with a skilled workforce
are more likely to adopt better management practices. Second, it implies that the payoffs
from implementing polices to raise general human capital and policies specifically aimed
at improving management practices (such as managerial training) are higher when such
polices are implemented together. Similarly, the evidence presented in this paper suggests
that managers seeking to implement or maximise the effectiveness of modern management
practices should ensure that they recruit sufficiently skilled workers and managers.
There are a number of directions for future work. First, the measure of firm level
human capital used in this paper (degree share) does not account for skills acquired from
vocational education or on-the-job training. Future work will seek to understand better
the specific types of skill that are relevant with respect to modern management practices,
and how these can best be acquired. Second, the analysis in this paper is based on the
manufacturing sector and it would be valuable to explore whether there is evidence of
similar complementarities in the service sectors which dominate as a share of GDP in
advanced economies like the US and UK.36 Finally, it would be interesting to consider
how workforce skills might complement different manager types (Bandiera et al., 2017),
and how these interact with management practices as determinants of firm performance.
35As discussed in in Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2017), causal estimates of the impact of management
practices on total factor productivity have showed that increasing WMS style management scores by one
standard deviation increased TFP by 10 per cent (Bloom et al., 2013). Therefore, the impact of raising
management scores by 0.3 standard deviations would be 3 per cent higher TFP. Associations estimated on the
international data in Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2017) are of similar order of magnitude.
36 The WMS has been conducted in other sectors, and national statistics offices are beginning to conduct
their own management surveys across sectors, for example the Management Practices and Expectations
Survey carried out by the UK’s Office for National Statistics in 2018.
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3.A.1 World Management Survey
We use WMS survey waves conducted between 2004 and 2010, across 19 countries. These
countries are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, France, Germany, Greece,
India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom
and United States. Ireland was also surveyed, but it is excluded from our analysis because
it does not use post codes and hence it was not possible to accurately identify the location
of the firms.
Here we describe the key features of the data and how it is used in this paper. Further
details on the survey methodology is found in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) (see also
Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2017) for more recent updates) and at the WMS website
(http://worldmanagementsurvey.org/).
The WMS Sample
The sampling frame in the WMS was based on firm-level accounting databases, which
provide sufficient information on companies to conduct stratified telephone surveys
(company name, address and a size indicator). The sampling frame was all firms with a
manufacturing primary industry code with between 50 and 5000 employees on average
over the most recent three years of data prior to the survey.37
Scoring Management
The survey evaluation tool defines 18 management practices in four broad areas. Each
is scored from 1 (worst) to 5 (best practices). Table 3.D.7 lists the 18 dimensions and the
nature of questions asked. These areas were developed together with an international
consulting firm as processes that, if adopted, should be expected to raise performance.
Innovative steps were taken to maximise the quality of data: in particular the use of a
“double-blind” interview method to reduce biases; open ended questions, and careful
selection of interviewers and interviewees. Internal validity is tested by re-interviewing
(with a different interviewer and interviewee) a sub-sample of firms. There was a positive
and highly significant correlation between the scores from first and second interviews. The
validity of the interpretation of high management scores as “good” management practices
is supported by the existence of strong positive associations between management scores
the scores with observable measures of firm performance: including sales, profitability
37 In Japan and China, this was 150-5000 since the database used, BVD Oriana, only samples firms with
more than 150 employees.
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and survival probability, within and across countries. We normalise the management
score to a mean zero, standard deviation one Z-score - across all countries and firms in the
sample.
Other Variables from WMS
In order to geocode the plants, we required post codes. Detailed plant location data
(other than region) were not collected in the original surveys. A separate project was
conducted during 2011 to collect post-codes of the plants in the survey. This project was
able to yield a 97.5 per cent response from the sampled firms.
Information on plant-level skills was collected in the surveys. Interviewees were asked
what share of the total workforce, managers and non managers had degrees.
Consistent with Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and subsequent papers, we used a
number of other variables as controls, and for heterogeneity analysis. These include:
number of employees in the plant and firm, plant age, MNE status, listed status, whether
the plant belongs to a multi-plant firm, union representation and 2 digit SIC industry
codes. We also add survey controls in our regressions to reduce noise. These include the
gender, tenure and seniority of the manager who responded, the day of the week and
hour of the interview, the duration of the interview, a measure of interviewee reliability as
coded by the interviewer, and dummy variables to indicate the interviewer.
Missing values for plant employment, firm employment and interview noise controls
were imputed using the average of these variables and a dummy variable is included in
regressions where this is the case. For plant age, we followed the following imputation
strategy. We first use firm age if that was available. Otherwise, we “hot-decked” plant
age using regressions of plant founding dates on all other regressors for the sample that
was not missing plant age.38 We experimented with a simpler strategy of using the region
average plant age and found similar results.
Financial data used in the performance regressions were sourced from accounting
databases, as described, for example, in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007).
3.A.2 World Higher Education Database
The World Higher Education Database (WHED) is a database of higher education in-
stitutions around the world compiled by the International Association of Universities,
in collaboration with UNESCO.39 The WHED can be accessed online for a fee, and we
38 The full list of covariates is the same as that used in our core regressions.
39 For more information see: http://www.whed.net/home.php
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obtained underlying data as at 2010. The key information relevant for this study includes:
details on location, founding date and academic divisions (for example business, social
sciences, law, medicine, science, arts and humanities). A full description of this database
is available in Valero and Van Reenen (2018).
3.A.3 Geographic Data
Our empirical strategy requires measurement of the distance between plants and universi-
ties. Based on their postcodes, we geocoded plants and universities using the GeoPost-
codes database. Drive times and distances between plants and universities were then
calculated using google maps. Additional geographic information was then added using
GIS software.
GeoPostcodes Database
The GeoPostcodes database is a commercial website providing data on the region,
city, longitude and latitude of postal codes in countries.40 We purchased country-level
databases for 18 of our countries in March 2012.41 We use this database to match postal
codes to geographic coordinates and regions. In Table 3.D.8 we show the geocoding
success rates across countries for WMS plants and WHED universities. On average, there
are high levels of success- with a 96 per cent match for plants and 95 per cent match for
universities.
A fraction of plants and universities appear to be in the same postcode and thus have
the same geographic coordinates (this affects 10 per cent of the plants). This could be due
to postcodes being fairly large geographies in certain cases or measurement errors in the
postcodes. In robustness checks we exclude these plants and find similar results.
Google Drive Times
We calculate the drive times between each plant and its nearest university. This was
done using the traveltime command in stata.42 This command uses the geographic
coordinates of two points and uses google maps to calculate the drive time (in hours)
between them. A corresponding driving distance (in km) is also calculated. To minimise
computing times we limited the search of the nearest university within a 100km Euclidean
radius of each plant. Where a plant did not have a university within this radius, we find
40 For more information, see: http://www.geopostcodes.com/UK
41 In the UK we used the geocode command in stata to geocode the plants and universities. Information on
this command is available at https://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s457450.html, it uses googlemaps to
geocode postal codes
42Information on traveltime can be found here: http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s457449.html
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the nearest university at any distance and winsorised the resulting drive times using the
regional maximum. This was done to minimise outlier bias.43
Drive times in google maps are calculated using information from GPS-enabled devices
of users. To ensure that seasonality or varying traffic conditions were not affecting our
results, we calculated another set of drive times several months later. The correlation
between the two measures was 0.95.
CIESIN Population Data
We control for population density at the location of the plant. The Center for Interna-
tional Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) provides the Gridded Population of
the World (GPW) that depicts the distribution of population across the world in 2000.44
We use GIS software to spatially intersect each plant with population density data from
the CIESIN within a 100km buffer and find the average population density within that
buffer.45
3.A.4 Regional Labour Force Data
Labour force data were obtained for 18 countries in the survey. The sources are outlined
in Table 3.D.9. Microdata were obtained for 14 countries. In most cases these were
labour force or household surveys, but in the case of Germany this was administrative
labour force data. Where we were able to obtain access to microdata, we ran wage
regressions by region. This allowed us to estimate the wage premium for having a degree,
as the coefficient on a degree dummy, once other key characteristics were controlled for
(experience, experience squared and gender). The specific years for which we were able to
access data varied by source, but we tried to obtain as many years as possible between
2003 and 2010. For our cross-sectional analysis, observations were pooled over years in
order to maximise the number of observations in a region, and therefore we included year
dummies in the wage regressions. We also calculated raw wage ratios and the percentage
of the labour force with a degree. These measures of the relative price of skills, or quantity
of skills are used in the robustness. We calculated yearly raw wage ratios for use with the
43 This affected 1.4 per cent of the sample. In robustness checks we exclude these isolated plants from the
analysis and find no difference in results. It should be noted that for a fraction of the plants and universities
that shared postcodes, the resulting google drive time would be reported as zero. In the robustness checks we
excluded these plants and find no significant difference in results.
44 Data are available here: http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/collection/gpw-v3. Population density
is represented as centroids in a features file. These centroids correspond to the smallest geography available
for the country. For example in the US, this is the Census block group.
45We also checked the robustness of results with varying buffer sizes including using only the nearest
centroid.
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panel of WMS firms.
In the case of China, Japan, New Zealand and Poland, it was not possible to access
microdata. However, regional aggregates of wage ratios and college share were available.
For China, these came from summary statistics of the 2005 census; and for the other three
countries the data were prepared for this purpose by the relevant statistical offices. It was
not possible to obtain data for Portugal.
3.A.5 Final Analysis Sample Selection
An initial 10,163 interviews were available. Ireland was dropped because it does not use
postal codes, and hence we could not establish the exact location of the plants. A further
416 interviews had missing or mis-reported postal codes. As mentioned previously, a
few plants were interviewed multiple times either during follow up waves or during
the same wave as a second interview for validity checks. In our core sample for cross
sectional analysis, we keep the most recent interview of the plant, however, our results
are robust to keeping all interviews for each plant and running a pooled cross section.
We drop 785 observations with missing observations of firm level degree share which is
the key (endogenous) explanatory variable; and 43 observations that are singletons in a
particular region. This results in a final analysis sample of 6,363 plants for our analysis
using distance to universities.
For consistency, the sample we use for the regional analysis is a subsample of this,
consisting of 4,553 plants in the 13 countries for which we were able to calculate what
we consider to be reliable regional skill premia from regional wage regressions. The
final sample for the regional analysis drops an additional six observations in two regions
(Arica y Parinacota and Los Rios in Chile which both became operational in 2007) where
population data were not available in our regional dataset (we use regional population
data from Gennaioli et al. (2013) to calculate weights for the regional regressions). We
exclude India, where the sample sizes in the source data (NSS) by region were often small
and likely to give unreliable estimates - in particular in some states there were very few
observations in the manufacturing sector, or with degree level education. We include
India in the robustness (see Table 3.D.11, row (17) and our coefficient on the skill premium
is dampened slightly but remains highly significant). Results are robust to alternative
sample specification, including keeping observations where firm level degree share is
missing, keeping all survey waves or using the raw wage ratio which was available for
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more countries as a ready-made regional aggregate.
3.B Robustness Tests on Core Results
We report the main experiments on our core distance specification Table 3.D.10. The
sample of 6,363 plants is used unless otherwise stated. In Panel A we check the standard
errors, clustering at the country level, university level (Cameron et al, 2011) and allowing
a spatial aspect using Conley standard errors. None of these adjustments affect the
significance of the result.
We might worry that the distribution of drive times is skewed to the right, as shown in
Figure 3.4.1 and that a simple linear relationship between drive times and management
practices is not the best representation of the data. In Panel B, we allow for non linearities in
distance. First show that taking logs does not affect the sign or significance of the result. A
quadratic in drive time a slightly larger coefficient, and higher order polynomials raise the
standard errors, but the coefficient on drive time remains negative and of similar order of
magnitude, We then include a number of additional geographic controls (Panel C). Adding
a quartic in geography controls leads to a loss of significance though the magnitude of
our coefficient remains similar, and including measures of population density has little
impact. We experiment with different distance measures in Panel D: driving distance,
straight line distance and the number of universities within a 100km radius. In each case,
the coefficient on distance takes the expected sign, but significance is lost. More noise is
to be expected as these measures do not take into account geographical or other relevant
features.
Next we show that our result is not sensitive to sample selection. Keeping all survey
waves increases noise, but the magnitude of the coefficient is unchanged. The same
goes for dropping observations so that the sample is consistent with that used for the
regional analysis, and excluding firms with the same postal code as their closest university.
Dropping winsorised observations strengthens the result, and dropping capital regions
has no effect.
Panel F uses more granular fixed effects. First, we include country-year fixed effects
and this does not change our result. We then turn to more demanding specifications,
comparing observations in increasingly smaller cells - first region-sector, then county and
finally city - dropping cells with only one observation. Significance is lost but the sign of
the relationship is still negative. Finally, we show that using 3 digit industry dummies
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instead of 2 digit has no effect on the magnitude or significance of our main result.
Analogue robustness checks on the skill premium regressions are in Table 3.D.11. In
general, the sign of the relationship is robust to different assumptions, but the significance
of the relationship is lost in some cases. In particular, when standard errors are clustered
at the country level (Panel A), or when regressions are unweighted (Panel B). More noise
is to be expected in the data unweighted by some measure of population, as skill premia
are likely to be worse measured in less populous regions within a country. In Panel C,
additional controls are included and in general, the results remain significant. In particular,
the inclusion of local population density does not affect the size or significance of the
coefficient on degree premium.
We also explore whether the expected relationships exist for alternative measures
of regional skills, such as raw regional wage ratios or various quantity measures such
as regional degree share or years of education. In general, the signs are as expected,
but results not significant in these other measures. The regional measure of university
presence, universities per million people, does have a positive and significant relationship
with management practices.
Finally, in Panel E we show that the result is robust to alternative sample choices:
keeping all survey waves, keeping India, firms with missing degree share or dropping
capital regions (which actually strengthens the result in magnitude and significance).
Robustness tests on the IV regressions are summarised in Table 3.D.12, These follow
a similar structure to the robustness on the core distance specifications, and overall, the
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Table 3.D.2: Additional Descriptive Statistics
Mean S.D Min Max Count
University characteristics
Uni has business finance 0.62 0.48 0 1 6363
Uni has law or social sciences 0.74 0.44 0 1 6363
Uni has medicine or science 0.76 0.43 0 1 6363
Uni has arts humanities 0.71 0.45 0 1 6363
Uni has all listed depts 0.15 0.36 0 1 6363
University founding 1941.8 98.5 1088 2011 6363
Missing founding 0.054 0.23 0 1 6363
University founded before plant 0.60 0.49 0 1 6363
Google maps and GIS variables
Driving distance 0.27 0.52 0 13.5 6363
Straightline distance 0.22 0.57 0 35.7 6363
No. of universities within 100km 34.3 55.3 0 441 6363
No. of universities within 50km 19.4 38.1 0 316 6363
Avg pop density within 50km radius 1.69 2.51 0 20.9 6363
Avg pop density nearest centroid 3.00 7.29 0 84.9 6363
Plant and university share postal code 0.11 0.31 0 1 6363
Distances are winsorised 0.016 0.13 0 1 6363
Regional skills variables
Ln(average regional wage ratio) 0.65 0.33 0.17 2.02 5541
Mincer years of education coefficient 0.10 0.039 0.033 0.21 4559
Average years of education 9.20 2.83 3.02 12.8 6326
Average regional degree share 0.20 0.13 0.016 0.50 6352
For Performance Regressions
Ln(Sales) 10.5 1.74 0 16.6 4833
Ln(Capital) 9.48 1.79 -1.85 16.0 4833
Missing Capital 0.24 0.43 0 1 4833
Ln(Employees) 5.74 1.08 0 12.5 4833
Missing Employees 0.035 0.18 0 1 4833
Ln(Hours) 3.76 0.12 3.56 4.38 4833
Missing Hours 0.0081 0.089 0 1 4833
NOTES: The subject variables are dummies indicate provision at nearest university.
University founding gives founding year. Driving distance is the google driving distance
(‘00km) to nearest university. Straightline distance is the straight line distance (‘00km)
to nearest university. No. universities within 100km (50km) is a count within the given
radius. Avg pop density within 50km radius and nearest centroid are calculated using GIS
software. An indicator is created for plants and universities that share a postcode, and
for plants with no university within 100km radius (distance is winsorised to regional
maximum). ln(average regional wage ratio) is based on calculation from microdata or
ready-made data as shown in Table 3.D.9.Mincer years of education coefficient is recov-
ered from regional wage regressions. Average years of education and average college share
are measures of skills quantities, obtained from Gennaioli et al. (2013). The productiv-
ity sample is conditioned on plants with non-missing sales. Missing values of capital
or employees are mean coded. Financial data are sourced from accounting databases.
Hours worked is a survey question.
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Table 3.D.3: Within Region Variation
Regions Difference 90th´10th Percentile Plant, Median region
Management Z-score Degree share (%) Distance (hours)
Argentina 15 2.20 1.70 0.42
Australia 6 2.13 2.74 1.77
Brazil 19 2.50 2.56 0.72
Canada 9 2.39 2.40 1.30
Chile 14 1.85 1.56 0.61
China 26 1.66 2.56 1.40
France 20 2.06 2.25 0.83
Germany 15 2.05 2.27 0.50
Greece 9 2.88 2.55 0.70
India 22 2.52 2.08 0.68
Italy 13 2.46 2.09 0.70
Japan 19 1.61 1.55 0.00
Mexico 19 2.31 2.02 0.19
New Zealand 10 1.77 2.55 0.84
Poland 16 2.44 2.16 0.74
Portugal 11 2.29 2.31 0.48
Sweden 19 1.90 2.50 0.87
United Kingdom 12 2.54 3.07 0.56
United States 40 2.18 2.58 0.55
NOTES: Number of regions=314. This table shows region-level variation in Management Z-score,
Degree Share and Distance variables, by country.
Table 3.D.4: Heterogeneity by University Characteristics
Dependent variable:
Management Z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Subject is: Bus Law, soc. sci Med, Sci Arts, Hum. All listed
Distance -0.052* 0.002 -0.008 -0.033 -0.041* -0.074***
(0.029) (0.051) (0.051) (0.046) (0.021) (0.027)
Distance x “subject” 0.003 -0.060 -0.049 -0.019 -0.051
(0.032) (0.051) (0.053) (0.047) (0.046)
“subject” 0.003 0.045 0.024 -0.000 0.025
(0.029) (0.029) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035)




Observations 6,363 6,363 6,363 6,363 6,363 6,363
Number of clusters 314 314 314 314 314 314
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. All columns estimated
by OLS with standard errors clustered at the region level in parentheses. Column (1) reproduces the
core specification in Table 3.5.1, Panel A, column (4).
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Table 3.D.5: Effects of Skills on Different Management Practice Groupings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: Zman Zops Zmonitor Ztarget Zpeople
A: Distance
Distance -0.050*** -0.041* -0.036 -0.065*** -0.031
(0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Observations 6,363 6,351 6,363 6,363 6,363
Number of clusters 314 314 314 314 314
B: Skill Premium
Skill Premium -0.737** -0.443 -0.730** -0.293 -0.934**
(0.349) (0.293) (0.327) (0.299) (0.418)
Observations 4,553 4,550 4,553 4,553 4,553
Number of clusters 208 208 208 208 208
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. All
columns estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at the region level in
parentheses. Column (1) contains the specifications: Panel A, column (4) of Table
3.5.1, and Panel A, column (4) of Table 3.5.3. Columns (2) to (5) replicate this for
different management practice groupings as the dependent variable.
Table 3.D.6: Extended IV Regressions
Dependent variable:
Management Z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specification: OLS IV OLS IV
Ln(1+degree share) 0.155*** 0.388* 0.156*** 0.846**
(0.014) (0.225) (0.014) (0.399)
Distance X Business -0.029 -0.006
(0.019) (0.029)
Uni has Business 0.011 -0.008
(0.025) (0.032)
Distance X Before -0.004 0.088
(0.026) (0.074)
Uni founded before plant 0.019 -0.021
(0.024) (0.046)
Distance
Observations 6,363 6,363 6,363 6,363






F statistic 11.08 7.094
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the region level in parentheses. Regressions contain full set of controls,
consistent with column (5) in Table 3.5.1.
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Table 3.D.7: WMS Management Practices
Categories Score from 1 to 5 based on:
Operations
1) Introduction of modern
manufacturing techniques
What aspects of manufacturing have been formally introduced, including
just-in-time delivery from suppliers, autonomation, flexible manpower,
support systems, attitudes, and behavior?
2) Rationale for introduc-
tion of modern manufactur-
ing techniques
Were modern manufacturing techniques adopted just because others were
using them, or are they linked to meeting business objectives like reducing
costs and improving quality?
Monitoring
3) Process problem documen-
tation
Are process improvements made only when problems arise, or are they ac-
tively sought out for continuous improvement as part of a normal business
process?
4) Performance tracking Is tracking ad hoc and incomplete, or is performance continually tracked
and communicated to all staff?
5) Performance review Is performance reviewed infrequently and only on a success/failure scale,
or is performance reviewed continually with an expectation of continuous
improvement?
6) Performance dialogue In review/performance conversations, to what extent is the purpose, data,
agenda, and follow-up steps (like coaching) clear to all parties?
7) Consequence management To what extent does failure to achieve agreed objectives carry consequences,
which can include retraining or reassignment to other jobs?
Targeting
8) Target balance Are the goals exclusively financial, or is there a balance of financial and non
financial targets?
9) Target interconnection Are goals based on accounting value, or are they based on shareholder value
in a way that works through business units and ultimately is connected to
individual performance expectations?
10) Target time horizon Does top management focus mainly on the short term, or does it visualise
short-term targets as a “staircase” toward the main focus on long-term
goals?
11) Targets are stretching Are goals too easy to achieve, especially for some “sacred” cows areas of
the firm, or are goals demanding but attainable for all parts of the firm?
12) Performance clarity Are performance measures ill-defined, poorly understood, and private, or
are they well-defined, clearly communicated, and made public?
People Management
13) Managing human capital To what extent are senior managers evaluated and held accountable for
attracting, retaining, and developing talent throughout the organisation?
14) Rewarding high perfor-
mance
To what extent are people in the firm rewarded equally irrespective of
performance level, or are rewards related to performance and effort?
15) Removing poor perform-
ers
Are poor performers rarely removed, or are they retrained and/or moved
into different roles or out of the company as soon as the weakness is identi-
fied?
16) Promoting high perform-
ers
Are people promoted mainly on the basis of tenure, or does the firm actively
identify, develop, and promote its top performers?
17) Attracting human capital Do competitors offer stronger reasons for talented people to join their com-
panies, or does a firm provide a wide range of reasons to encourage talented
people to join?
18) Retaining human capital Does the firm do relatively little to retain top talent or do whatever it takes
to retain top talent when they look likely to leave?
NOTES: This table is taken from Bloom and Van Reenen (2010).
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Table 3.D.8: Geocoding Success Rates for Plants in WMS and Universities in WHED
WMS WHED
No. plants Geocode rate No. universities Geocode rate
Argentina 249 0.95 95 0.95
Australia 452 0.95 44 1
Brazil 591 0.94 1852 0.90
Canada 419 1 146 1
Chile 372 0.89 88 1
China 763 0.92 548 0.98
France 639 0.97 281 1.00
Germany 672 0.99 339 1
Greece 272 0.96 38 0.97
India 936 0.97 559 0.99
Italy 314 0.98 93 0.94
Japan 176 0.97 696 0.92
Mexico 190 0.99 1322 0.93
New Zealand 150 0.97 23 1
Poland 364 1 408 1.00
Portugal 311 1.00 114 0.86
Sweden 404 0.98 38 1
United Kingdom 1381 0.94 174 0.99
United States 1347 0.95 2184 1.00
NOTES: This table shows the geocoding success rates for WMS plants and WHED univer-
sities using the GeoPostcodes database. The 9081 universities represent the population of
universities in the WHED database for the relevant countries
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Table 3.D.9: Labour Force Survey Data Sources
Country Source Years used
Microdata:
Argentina Permanent Household Survey(EPH), Insituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC) 2008-10
Australia HILDA Survey, MelbourneInstitute 2005-10
Brazil National Household Sample Survey (PNAD), InstitutoBrasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) 2003-2009
Canada Labour Force Survey, StatisticsCanada 2003-2010
Chile
National Socioeconomic





National de la Statistique et des
Etudes Economiques (INSEE), Centre Maurice Halbwachs
2003-2010
Germany
Sample of Integrated Labour
Market Biographies (SIAB), Research Data Centre (FDZ)
of the Germany Federal Employment Agency (BA)
at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB)
2003-10
Greece Labour Force Survey, HellenicStatistical Authority (ELSTAT) 2003-10
India National Sample Survey,Employment and Unemployment 2004, 06, 08
Italy Historical Database of theSurvey of Italian Household Budgets 2004, 06, 08, 10
Mexico
National Income and Expenditure





from analysis at Jonkoping University, using Statistics
Sweden microdata (MONA)
2005, 07, 08, 10
UK UK Labour Force Survey, UK DataService 2003-10
US IPUMS-CPS 2003-10
Regional data:
China China 2005 Census 2005
Japan National Statistics Centre,Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2006-10
New
Zealand Statistics New Zealand 2003-10
Poland Central Statistical Office,Poland 2004, 06, 08, 10
NOTES: Citation requirements for Canada, France and Germany follow. Canada: The analysis
on Canada is based on Statistics Canada Microdata file: Labour Force Survey, which contains
anonymized data collected from 1987 to 2010. All computations on these microdata were prepared
by the authors, and the responsibility for the use and interpretation of these data is entirely with
the authors. France: Sources cited as Emploi (en continu) - série 2003 - 2012 (version production
et recherche) - [fichier électronique], INSEE [producteur], Centre Maurice Halbwachs (CMH) [dif-
fuseur], and Emploi (en continu) - série 2003-2012 - () [fichier électronique], INSEE [producteur],
Centre Maurice Halbwachs (CMH) [diffuseur] Germany: This study uses the factually anonymous
Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (version 1975-2010). Data access was provided via
a Scientific Use File supplied by the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employ-
ment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB).
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(1) Core specification -0.050*** (0.019)
A. Standard errors
(2) Cluster at country -0.050** (0.021)
(3) Cluster at university -0.050*** (0.019)
(4) Conley standard errors, 100km -0.050*** (0.018)
B. Non Linearities in distance
(5) Ln(1+drive time) -0.105*** (0.039)
(6) Quadratic in drive time -0.081** (0.035)
(7) Cubic in drive time -0.099* (0.055)
(8) Quartic in drive time -0.122* (0.073)
C. Additional geographic controls
(9) Quartic in geography controls -0.037* (0.020)
(10) Average population density within 50km -0.051*** (0.018)
(11) Average population density nearest centroid -0.057*** (0.018)
D. Alternative measures of distance
(12) Driving distance (’00km) -0.050* (0.028)
(13) Straight line distance (’00km) -0.026 (0.020)
(14) No. universities within 100km 0.001 (0.000)
E. Sample
(15) Keep all waves (N=8,074) -0.041** (0.018)
(16) Skill premium sample (N=4,533) -0.053** (0.022)
(17) Exclude same postal codes (N=5,669) -0.042** (0.019)
(18) Exclude winsorised (6,261) -0.066** (0.025)
(19) Drop capital regions (N=5,548) -0.051** (0.020)
F. Fixed effects
(21) Country X year dummies -0.050*** (0.019)
(22) 1,207 region X industry dummies (N=5,227) -0.056* (0.030)
(23) 724 county dummies (N=4,553) -0.045 (0.031)
(24) 851 city dummies (N=2,756) -0.209 (0.296)
(25) 152 3 digit SIC industry dummies -0.049*** (0.296)
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. All
columns estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at the region level in
parentheses. Each row represents a different robustness check on Panel A, column
(4) of Table 3.5.1.
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(1) Core specification -0.737** (0.349)
A. Standard errors
(2) Cluster at country -0.737 (0.421)
B. Weighting
(3) WMS weights -0.879** (0.404)
(4) No weights -0.312 (0.280)
C. Additional Controls
(5) Quartic in geography controls -0.196 (0.332)
(6) Average population density within 50km -0.721** (0.351)
(7) Average population nearest centroid -0.740** (0.341)
(8) Regional geographic variables -0.659* (0.376)
(9) Analyst dummies -0.329 (0.332)
(10) Country X year fixed effects -0.700** (0.348)
(11) 3 digit SIC industry dummies -0.621* (0.354)
D. Alternative measures of regional skills
(12) Log average regional wage ratio (N=6,738) -0.262 (0.171)
(13) Mincer years of education coefficient -1.145 (2.126)
(14) Average years of education (N=7,814) 0.010 (0.034)
(15) Ln(average regional degree share) (N=6,738) -0.016 (0.062)
(16) Ln(1+universities per million) (N=7,845) 0.074** (0.033)
E. Sample
(17) Keep all waves (N=5,649) -0.817*** (0.312)
(18) Keep India (N=5,199) -0.583** (0.254)
(19) Keep firms with missing degree share (N=5,164) -0.786** (0.332)
(20) Drop capital regions (N=3,880) -0.925*** (0.258)
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. N=4,553
unless stated otherwise. All columns estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at
the region level in parentheses. Each row represents a different robustness check on Panel
A, column (4) of Table 3.5.3. Regional geographic variables include temperature, inverse
distance to the coast, and cumulative oil production, and are sourced from Gennaioli
et al (2013). WMS weights are calculated by dividing the number of plants in a region
surveyed in the WMS by the number of plants in the country.
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(1) Core specification 0.420*** (0.142)
A. Standard errors
(2) Cluster at country 0.420*** (0.143)
(3) Cluster at university 0.420*** (0.153)
B. Non Linearities in distance
(4) Ln(1+drive time) 0.393*** (0.132)
(5) Quadratic in drive time 0.382*** (0.136)
(6) Cubic in drive time 0.360*** (0.130)
(7) Quartic in drive time 0.361*** (0.130)
C. Additional geographic controls
(9) Quartic in geography controls 0.336** (0.162)
(10) Average population density within 50km 0.439*** (0.147)
(11) Average population nearest centroid 0.468*** (0.140)
D. Alternative measures of Distance
(12) Driving distance (’00km) 0.371** (0.179)
(13) Straight line distance (’00km) 0.388** (0.183)
(14) No. universities within 100km 0.413 (0.314)
E. Sample
(15) Keep all waves (N=8,074) 0.329*** (0.127)
(16) Skill premium sample (N=4,533) 0.498** (0.196)
(17) Exclude same postal codes (N=5,661) 0.372** (0.156)
(18) Exclude winsorised (6,260) 0.477*** (0.158)
(19) Drop capital regions (N=5,548) 0.458*** (0.156)
F. Fixed effects
(20) Country X year dummies 0.352*** (0.123)
(21) 1,207 region X industry dummies (N=5,227) 0.369** (0.156)
(22) 724 county dummies (N=4,553) 0.265 (0.172)
(23) 2,756 city dummies (N=2,756) 0.166 (0.181)
(24) 152 3 digit SIC industry dummies 0.414*** (0.148)
NOTES: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 5% level and * 10% level. Standard
errors are clustered at the region level in parentheses. N=6,363 unless stated other-
wise. Each row represents a different robustness check on column (3) of Table 3.5.5.
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Chapter 4
Industry in Britain: An Atlas1
1 We would like to thank Steve Machin, Max Nathan and Nigel Rogers for their helpful comments.
The Economic and Social Research Council have given financial support through the Centre for Economic




Britain is a place where people worry about the geographic spread of industry. Take the
following two quotes:
[1] A policy of balanced distribution of industry and the industrial population throughout the
different areas or regions in Great Britain; and of appropriate diversification of industries in those
areas or regions would tend to make the best national use of the resources of the country.
[2] The maldistribution of the industrial population has been and is being still further intensified.
Unemployment throughout the country is no real problem to-day. The most urgent problem is the
attainment of full development, of the maximum use of our resources and the achievement of the
fullest efficiency.
Anyone that has followed the UK economy in recent years understands what these
writers refer to. Employment is at record levels, but there are concerns about the pro-
ductivity of British workers, wages, job security and the spread of economic activity and
opportunity across the country.2 In fact, both statements are over 60 years old. The first is
from the 1940 “Barlow Report” which identified the unequal patterns of industry across
the UK; the second is from a Parliamentary debate in 1957, which asked what had changed
since 1940, concluding that little had.3 Concerns that some regions of the UK are falling
behind others, and that the location of companies helps explain this, are longstanding.
Agreement that something should be done about it is rarer. Determination to adopt
policies that address regional disparities has ebbed and flowed over the past 50 years.4
There are signs that the 2017 Parliament could see an intensification of efforts to seek a
more even spread of industry in Britain. Chancellor Philip Hammond has said that a
new “hands on” industrial strategy will help left-behind areas; shadow chancellor John
MacDonnell has promised a “comprehensive” industrial strategy that would “spread
wealth across the country”, and a new industrial strategy with a regional focus is a large
2 See Costa and Machin (2017) for a recent summary of the data on real wages and living standards at the
national level in the UK.
3 The Barlow Report (1940) was formally “The Report of the Royal Commission on Distribution of
Industrial Population” one of its findings was that “The continued drift of the industrial population to
London and the Home Counties constitutes a social, economic and strategical problem which demands
immediate attention”. The Commission suggested regional imbalance was of national concern, recom-
mended the decentralisation of industry away from congested areas, and proposed a central authority to
tackle the problem; a board for industrial location which would be responsible to the Board of Trade. See:
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C8722
4 Examples include the Distribution of Industry Acts of 1945 and 1950; geographic policies of the 1970s
(known as Regional or Urban Policy) which attempted to shift industry away from cities seen as ‘declining’
including inner-city Glasgow (see Smith and Wannop, 1985), and, most recently the “Northern Powerhouse”
agenda, a series of policies pursued by HM Treasury seeking to create an economic hub including Greater
Manchester and the major cities of Yorkshire and Lancashire.
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part of Liberal Democrat leader Vince Cable’s economic strategy.5 Reflecting this political
interest Britain’s main business department and finance ministry are working on a new
“Industrial Strategy” which looks set for launch over the coming months.6
Summary of this paper
Despite the rising interest in addressing the UK’s uneven economic performance,
no one has published a comprehensive analysis setting out the latest facts on Britain’s
business geography. This paper begins to fill that gap. We use data on firms as the basis
of a comprehensive mapping of UK Industry.7 The full set of maps is presented as a
separate document, including measures of industrial specialisation across sectors (at the
SIC section level). This paper presents the most striking maps and findings together with
some tentative conclusions.
Ten stylised facts stand out, many of which challenge the prevailing wisdom in the
UK. We summarise these here, and expand in the next section.
1. The three patterns of industry. Using measures of industrial specialisation based
on employment, we find that the location of business activity in Britain varies
considerably by industry, and follows three broad patterns:
• Uniform. Some industries are fairly evenly spread around the country, with a
similar concentration of activity in most locations. Often, these industries pro-
vide products or services that must be sold locally: for example, retail services
includes firms such as hairdressers and gyms. Outside large cities, agriculture
is spread relatively evenly across the UK. More surprisingly, manufacturing is
relatively evenly spread outside London.
• Scattered. In these industries, activity is concentrated in a number of locations,
creating a scatter of strong dots across the country. This includes firms operating
in science and technology sectors and mining and quarrying. The fact that
finance is scattered across multiple hubs is a challenge to the belief that banking
only occurs in the South East.
• Single hub. In these industries there is one location where activity seems to
be concentrated. The creative sectors and information and communication
5 See Phillip Hammond, interview on the local economy of Stoke on Trent (January 23rd 2017) and John
MacDonnell speech (26th September 2016).
6 See e.g. BEIS Building our Industrial Strategy, January 2017.
7 See the Data Appendix for a description of key datasets, which are useful for analysing businesses in the
UK.
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technology are examples: in both activity is focused in London and the South
East, though there are also pockets in cities such as Manchester and Edinburgh.
Given the expectation that creative industries and “tech” are potential growth
industries, this will concern those seeking a more even spread of opportunity
in Britain.
2. Firm size distribution. Firm size matters for industrial performance: larger firms
tend to invest more and have higher productivity. However, UK industry is domi-
nated by small firms with around 99% of firms being classed as “small” (0-49 em-
ployees). So-called “non-employing” businesses (firms where the owner-manager is
the only worker) are the largest category making up around three-quarters of firms
in all regions. Our maps show that mid-sized firms (50-249) are relatively evenly
spread across the UK; large firms are very sparsely spread: currently, only 55% of
local authorities have 10 or more large firms. More encouragingly, maps showing
the increase in mid-sized firms show that this growth is relatively evenly spread.
3. Business demography. The rate at which firms start up and go bankrupt is rel-
atively evenly spread, with maps showing that these “births” and “deaths” are
equally likely across UK regions. This suggests that the ease with which a company
can be established and wound up are unlikely to be explain regional productivity
differences.
4. The spread of productivity. The output per hour of a British worker varies con-
siderably by location. At the bottom of the productivity scale is mid Wales; the
countryside around Brecon is an area with little industry and agriculture as the
main employer. At the other end of the scale there are three high-productivity hubs:
the oil industry around Aberdeen, the area around Greater Manchester and a band
of productivity in the South. Contrary to popular belief the high productivity of
London does not spread into the South East but rather spreads west along the M4
towards commuter towns like Reading and Slough which have their own high
productivity companies.
5. Leader and laggard sectors. The highest productivity sectors, real estate, mining
and utilities, are small employers and so play little role in aggregate performance.
Of the high employment sectors that drive national productivity the leading sectors
are finance, information and communications, construction and manufacturing.
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Professional, scientific and technical services vary within and across regions - this
sector houses some very high productivity firms together with much weaker ones.
However, it is important to consider high employment sectors with weak productiv-
ity, such as retail and wholesale trade, administrative services and accommodation
and food services. Raising average productivity in these sectors could have a large
aggregate effect due to their high employment shares.
6. Innovation in the regions. We use data on research and development (R&D) expen-
diture and patents to gauge innovation by region. In absolute terms, London and
the South East dominate, accounting for nearly a third of business spending on R&D.
However, in terms of R&D as a percentage of GDP, the East of England stands out.
At a more disaggregated level, Britain’s most innovative NUTS2 regions (equiva-
lent to grouped counties, unitary authorities or districts) are East Anglia, Cheshire
and Hertfordshire; reflecting the impact of Cambridge University, chemicals firms
located along the River Mersey and pharmaceuticals and life sciences firms located
in and around Hertfordshire.
7. Unbalanced exporting. Britain has a sizeable current account shortfall at 3.4% of
GDP (Q1 2017). Only 11% of firms export and those that do export are most likely
to be based in London, the South East or the East of England. The North East has
the lowest share of exporters at fewer than 6% . A poor and unbalanced export
performance has long been of concern, but Britain’s exit from the EU will create
new challenges in this area. It is estimated that all local authorities are likely to
become worse off following Brexit, but that the largest impacts are expected to be
in cities that specialise in finance and business services.8 Understanding the local
impacts of Brexit through changes to trade (together with immigration, FDI and
innovation) will be crucial for policymakers developing an industrial strategy with
region-specific elements.
8. The UK’s coastal malaise. A number of maps outline concern about the economic
performance of Britain’s coastal towns. Maps of survival rates show that firms
located near the coast are more likely to go out of business than those further inland.
These areas also tend to specialise in accommodation and food services, which tend
to be low productivity industries with a high churn of businesses. Other research
8 See Dhingra and Overman (2017).
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shows that skills are particularly weak in these areas, perhaps reflecting the demands
of the local labour market.9
9. The power of a single firm. Some of the patterns in the regional data indicate local
domination by single firms. For example, the high productivity in north Lancashire,
Derby and Brentwood is influenced by the major plants of BAE Systems, Rolls Royce
and Ford, respectively. Further examples are Tata Steel in Port Talbot and Airbus in
Broughton (Flintshire), both in Wales. The same can also be true for service sector
firms, for example Sky in parts of Scotland. The local impact of losing or gaining a
large company can be large.
10. The German benchmark. It is well-known that the UK’s aggregate productivity is
far behind that of its key comparator countries: Germany, France and the US. We
compare the economic performance of British regions to those in Germany. The
resulting maps are concerning, showing that Britain’s best performing regions (with
the exception of Central London) are far behind the German average. Germany
stands out as a multi-hub country, with around ten identifiable high-productivity
areas: by contrast in the UK the South East dominates. Whilst Germany also faces
regional challenges, with longstanding poor performance in East Germany, these
poor performing regions are catching up. Whereas in Britain, the laggard regions
appear to be falling further behind.
Next steps
The UK has good quality firm-level data, and it is crucial that this is put to best use
in guiding policy. The LSE Growth Commission (LSE, 2017) made a series of recommen-
dations to strengthen the institutions governing industrial strategy. A key component
here would be the publication of an annual “Industrial Strategy Report” on the state of
British business akin to the UK’s other regular publications such as the Inflation Report
and Financial Stability Report and the Economic and Financial Outlook which help guide and
explain monetary and fiscal policy. This paper provides some of the types of analysis
that could be usefully included and built upon in such a report. Further work is needed
at more spatially and sectorally disaggregated levels, and there could be scope for more
standardisation of ONS datasets, for example to provide detailed sectoral GVA for local
areas on an annual basis allowing comparisons over time. Further improving the processes
9 House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee (2006), Coastal Towns Second
Report of Session 2006-07.
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for accessing and linking the micro-data would help researchers to conduct more detailed
analyses.
This paper provides a snapshot of the current state of play, but it remains unclear
what the optimal distribution of industry is, and therefore what the ultimate goal of
regional policy should be. While this paper does not consider this question in detail,
any industrial policy has to proceed cautiously and in full knowledge of facts on the
ground. Broadly, the evidence suggests that area-based initiatives can lead to displacement
rather than aggregate gains, though it is possible to design policies that deal with these
issues.10 Moreover, there are tensions between “jam-spreading” (spreading resources
across locations) and the ability to build up successful hubs that exploit network effects.11
It is increasingly recognised that greater local control is important: more space for local
authorities to experiment with different types of policy. This, together with improved data
collection and evaluation should help increase policy effectiveness.12
Policies targeted at particular regions and/or sectors are likely to involve trade-offs
and claims from competing stakeholders. The UK needs a new institutional framework
to help make these tough decisions. The guiding principle should be the elimination of
market failures, and the new framework should inject some form of independent oversight,
perhaps borrowing from the structures and processes used by the Bank of England, the
Office for Budget Responsibility and the UK’s highly-regarded independent competition
authorities.
4.2 Ten Stylised Facts on UK Business
4.2.1 Fact 1: Three Patterns of Industry
There are a number of reasons that the location and type of business activity matter.
In all countries productivity varies considerably by industry - manufacturing is more
productive than retail services in every OECD country for example - so it may be the case
that regional productivity differences are driven by industrial patterns. Moreover, where
an industry exhibits significant “network externalities” (that is, if it pays to be in an area
where competitor firms are located) then the presence of an agglomeration or a “cluster”
of companies has been shown to be an important driver of firm and regional economic
10 See for example Einio and Overman (2016) and Criscuolo et al. (2016).
11 See Overman (2013).
12 See Nathan and Overman (2013) for discussion of the appropriate spatial scale for industrial policy
interventions, including the delivery of horizontal policies in specific places, or in a decentralised fashion.
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performance. The challenge for policymakers however is that explicit cluster policies have
generally been found to be ineffective, and a key question is to consider the appropriate
spatial scale for more horizontal interventions to address market failures (for example in
the supply of skills or access to finance) which might stimulate or enable agglomerations
to grow.13
There are a number of ways that business activity can be measured in spatial terms:
• Firm numbers. A basic measure of business activity is a simple count of businesses
in a given area. For detailed spatial analysis, it is usually more appropriate to use
the “local unit” or “plant” which reflects the location of activity, rather than the
business enterprise - for which the location reflects the company’s headquarters
(many companies have numerous plants). It might be that certain areas have more
firms or employment due to their higher population, therefore it is often more
relevant to consider the number of firms normalised by population, a measure of
business “density”. We consider those of working age.
• Employment data. Businesses vary in size, so looking at employment can give a
better measure of the extent of economy activity. Again, it is useful to consider
employment as a percentage of the local population. Another interesting measure
for understanding the nature of local economic activity is the share of a particular
sector’s employment in total local employment.
• Industrial specialisation. The location quotient (LQ) gives a measure of industrial
specialisation in a particular region. The LQ compares a sector’s local share of
employment with that sector’s share in national employment. A location quotient
greater than one for a particular area suggests that the area is specialised for a
particular industry. This measure can also be calculated based on number of firms.14
• Geographical concentration of industries. There are a number of measures that can
be used to understand whether specific industries are geographically concentrated
in a small number of areas, or more evenly spread around the UK. One simple index
is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for geographical concentration. For each
13 See Nathan and Overman (2013).





, where Eir are employee jobs in industry i in
region r, Er is the total number of employee jobs in region r, Ei is total employee jobs in industry i and E is
the national total of employee jobs. A firms based LQ can be calculated by substituting employment with the
number of firms.
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sector, this is calculated as the sum of the squared shares of that sector’s national
employment in each region. The index takes a value of 1 where all employment is
concentrated in one region.15
Figure 4.2.1: Businesses and employment
A: Local authority businesses per 10,000 
of the population 
B: Local authority employment per 
10,000 of the population 
 
 
NOTES: Business Counts (2016) and employment (2015), per 10,000 local population aged 16+ at local
authority level. Business data for “local units”. Source: IDBR, BRES, APS (ONS).
Facts and maps
The most comprehensive data for understanding the population of businesses in the
UK is BEIS BPE, as this includes unregistered, non-employing businesses which tend
to be sole proprietors and sometimes partnerships. In the latest data, it was estimated
that there were 3 million such businesses in the UK, which together with the registered
population of around 2.5 million puts the total number of businesses in the UK at 5.5
million. However, the data on unregistered businesses are not reliable at geographical
15 The HHI for a given industry (i) is given by HHIi “
řR
r“1 S2r . Where Sr is the share of national
employment in that sector in region r, and R is the total number of regions. When all the employment for that
industry is concentrated in one region, the HHI takes a value of 1. When employment is evenly spread across
region, HHI takes a value of 1R .
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levels more disaggregated than the UK “region” (e.g. North East or London), so it is
preferable to use IDBR based data on the population of registered businesses when
considering the measures above. Because we are looking at local business activity, plants
or “local units” are more relevant than business enterprises or “reporting units”.16
Figure 4.2.1 plots firms and employment per 10,000 working-age population. Panel
A shows that there are some local authorities with over 1,000 plants per 10,000, or 1 for
every 10 people. Some of these are rural locations including mid-Wales, where the density
on this measure is driven by a high share of micro businesses (see Fact 2). The areas with
the highest employment rates tend to be in London, followed by Cambridge, Aberdeen
City and Oxford (Panel B).
Figure 4.2.2: Industrial specalisation: uniform sectors
A.  Location quotient: Retail and 
Wholesale Trade 
B.  Location quotient: manufacturing 
 
NOTES: Source: Calculations based on employment data at local authority level, BRES 2015.
16 Based upon the IDBR (as extracted from NOMIS), which covers registered businesses only,
in 2016, there were 2.5 million reporting units and 3 million local units. The reporting
unit and local unit are equivalent for most firms in the UK (around 95% , see discussion at
http://doc.ukdataservice.ac.uk/doc/7989/mrdoc/pdf/7989_ardx_userguide.pdf).
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Maps of industrial specialisation (LQ) at the broad sector level17 reveal three dis-
tinct patterns. Some industries are evenly spread around the country. In these uniform
industries there is a similar concentration of firms in all locations.
For many of the industries that follow this pattern a uniform spread is intuitive:
often they provide products or services that must be sold locally: for example retail and
wholesale trade services have a uniform pattern (Figure 4.2.2, panel A). The sector includes
hairdressers, gyms and shops - these are all businesses that are likely to be present in most
UK towns. Outside large cities agriculture is spread relatively evenly across the UK (see
maps Appendix). More surprisingly, manufacturing is also quite evenly spread across the
regions, but is relatively absent in some areas including and around London (Panel B).
Figure 4.2.3: Industrial specalisation: scattered sectors
A. Location quotient: “science and 
technology” 
B. Location quotient: Finance  
 
 
NOTES: Source: Calculations based on employment data at local authority level, BRES 2015. “Science and
technology” sectors allocated at the 4-digit level.
In some industries, activity is restricted to a number of locations, dotted across the
17 Here we use the standard SIC 2007 “section” level, for an outline of the
SIC2007 hierarchy see https://onsdigital.github.io/dp-classification-tools/standard-industrial-
classification/ONS_SIC_hierarchy_view.html
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country. In these scattered industries, the maps show a number of specialist hubs in the UK.
This includes firms in “science and technology” sectors18 (Figure 4.2.3, A), professional,
scientific and technical services, and mining and quarrying. The fact that there are over
15 identifiable financial hubs outside London is a challenge to the common belief that
banking only occurs in London and the South East (Figure 4.2.3, B).
Some industries have a single hub. In these industries, there is only one location
with significant activity. The most striking examples are information and communication
technology and the “creative” sectors19: in both of these areas activity is focused in London
and the South East (Figure 4.2.4).
Figure 4.2.4: Industrial specalisation: single hub sectors




NOTES: Source: Calculations based on employment data at local authority level, BRES 2015. “Creative”
sectors allocated at the 4-digit level.
The maps of the “science and technology” and “creative sectors” are particularly
interesting as these are considered to be the key parts of the “knowledge economy”.
As discussed, it is also possible to calculate a summary statistic of industrial concen-
18 We grouped 4-digit SIC codes into “science and technology” sectors using the definition developed by
NESTA in Bakhshi et al. (2015), which is based on Eurostat classifications.
19 Again, as defined by NESTA in Bakhshi et al. (2015). See Chapain et al. (2010) for discussion of creative
clusters and innovation.
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tration, by sector. One example is the HHI, which we summarise at the aggregate sector
level in Appendix Table 4.C.1. Mining and quarrying is the most concentrated industry,
which is unsurprising as these activities are driven by the suitability of the area, chiefly
the availability of resources. However, finance and insurance activities and the “creative”
sectors also show high levels of geographical concentration. Agglomeration is important
for activities with returns to density - be it from access to a common skill pool, shared
amenities and supply chains or knowledge spillovers.20
However, the aggregate industry level in many cases also masks differences at more
detailed aggregations. For example, in finance some parts of the sector are highly con-
centrated (such as fund management and reinsurance) but there are also much less con-
centrated subsectors including support activities, leasing and non-life insurance (see
Appendix Figure 4.B.1 for HHI across 4 digit subsectors in finance).
4.2.2 Fact 2: Firm Size Distribution
The size distribution of British firms is important because of longstanding differences
in the way that the typical firm of various sizes operates. Large firms tend to be more
productive as they are able to benefit from economies of scale and economies of scope,
and they also tend to be better managed21, use better technologies and are more likely to
export. In general, larger firms invest much more than small ones relative to their size:
for example the top 400 firms accounted for approximately £15.7 billion in R&D spend
in 2015, 75% of the UK’s total. Small firms, on the other hand, tend to be more labour
intensive. These differences will tend to mean that a location where there are many small
firms may have high employment, but low productivity and low pay. Areas where large
firms co-locate may drive investment and productivity.
It is common in the data to consider the following categories:
• Micro (0-9). This category includes sole proprietors, partnerships and other firms
with a small number of employees. Zero employee businesses make up nearly 80%
of this category. Examples of this type of company include tradesmen, and the new
on-call service industries in which owners operate a personal services company;
20 Kline and Moretti (2013) consider the effects of a large-scale regional (largely infrastructure) development
programme in the US, and provide evidence of lasting gains in manufacturing due to agglomeration economies
which were not present in agriculture. Interestingly, they find that these programmes created a displacement
of economic activity, so that there was little gain at the national level. For a review of the research frontier on
agglomeration economies using firm level data, see Duranton and Kerr (2015).
21 See, for example, Bloom et al. (2014b) and Awano, Heffernan and Robinson (2017)
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this could include Uber and Deliveroo, for example. A large portion (73% ) of such
businesses are unregistered for PAYE or VAT.
• Small (10-49). This category includes firms with between 10 and 49 employees.
While firms of this size are small in employment terms, they can be very large on
other measures. Investment firms, for example, will often be in this category but
could manage very large balance sheets. Around 4% of UK businesses are classed
as “small”. In some datasets, micro and small businesses are together classed as
“small”.
• Medium (50-249). There were around 40,000 of these mid-sized firms in 2016 (less
than 1% of total firms). As above, these firms could be considered large on other
measures. British Land, for example, has fewer than 200 employees, but has a market
cap of over £6 billion. As a share of its total business population Britain is sparse
in this group relative to Germany, where this stands at 1.8% 22 of total firms and
which is famous for its “Mittelstand”, the specialist and export oriented medium
sized companies.
• Large (>250). Firms with over 250 employees are relatively rare - there are around
10,000 of them in the UK on the latest data (0.2% of total firms). They are usually
companies, but there are also a small number of partnerships in this size band.
Public data show that the top private sector employers are Tesco, Compass Group
and Intercontinental hotels - between them these three companies employ over
1m Britons. The sectors that have the highest shares of large firms are mining and
quarrying, manufacturing and finance.
Facts and maps
The dominance of small firms applies across the UK. Non-employing and small busi-
nesses dominate in all regions making up around 99% of firms (Table 4.2.1). This share has
risen in recent years, driven by the rise in self-employment and zero employee businesses
which has been the most rapidly increasing category of firm (Appendix Figure 4.B.2).
Turning now to the private sector (for which detailed firm size splits are available in
the BPE and therefore including unregistered businesses), small firms account for around
99% of firms across sectors (see Appendix Figure 4.B.3), though the split between non
employing businesses and those with 1-49 employees varies: accommodation and food
22 Figure based on calculation using 2015 data on number of businesses by size band from Destatis.
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Table 4.2.1: Firms by size band-percentages of total firms by region
Region None 1-49 50-249 250+
London 78% 21% 0.6% 0.2%
South East 78% 22% 0.5% 0.1%
South West 77% 23% 0.5% 0.1%
East of England 76% 23% 0.6% 0.1%
Wales 76% 24% 0.6% 0.1%
Yorkshire and the Humber 75% 24% 0.7% 0.1%
East Midlands 75% 24% 0.6% 0.1%
North West 75% 25% 0.7% 0.1%
West Midlands 74% 25% 0.7% 0.1%
North East 73% 26% 0.7% 0.1%
Northern Ireland 73% 26% 0.7% 0.1%
Scotland 71% 28% 0.8% 0.2%
NOTES: Source: BPE (2016), total economy.
services has a relatively lower share of non-employing businesses (30% ) and a higher
share in the 1-49 bracket (68% ). In education, 94% of businesses are non-employing-these
types of businesses include personal tutors, sport or music instructors or other educational
businesses.
Again, for detailed spatial analysis we use data on local units from the IDBR, which
excludes unregistered businesses. We plot maps of the share of local authority firms in
different size bands (Figure 4.2.5). This shows that micro-businesses make up a high share
of local businesses throughout the UK (panel A), even though unregistered businesses are
not included in this map. Small and medium sized businesses (panels B and C) are also
quite evenly spread, but large businesses show more of a patchwork (panel D).
Figure 4.2.6 shows that there are a number of local authorities where the share of
medium sized businesses has grown. This can be either due to entry of new medium-sized
plants, or due to growth in existing businesses - we turn to analysis of firm entry and exit
in the next section. Analysis of the distribution of “high growth” firms across space and
sectors is an area for future work.23
23 There are a number of different ways to define “high growth” businesses. A common definition is firms
that report more than 20% in turnover or employment growth in the most recent year (Brown and Lee, 2014).
The OECD classifies businesses as high growth if they have more than 10 employees, and are growing in
either turnover or employment at a rate of 20% or higher over three years. Eurostat’s definition is the identical
but uses a lower threshold of only 10%.
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Figure 4.2.5: Share of total firms of different size bands
A. Micro (0-9) % total firms  B. Small (10-49) % total firms 
 
    
C. Medium (50-249) % total firms D. Large (>250) % total firms 
  
 
NOTES: Calculations based on local units at the local authority level (2016), excludes unregistered businesses.
Source: IDBR, ONS.
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Figure 4.2.6: Medium sized firms, change in local share, 2010-16
 
NOTES: Calculations based on local units at the local authority level (2016), excludes unregistered businesses.
Source: IDBR, ONS.
4.2.3 Fact 3: Business Demography
When headline numbers are used in isolation the number of active firms in an area or
category might appear stable. Across the UK, for example, the share of large firms to
total private sector firms has remained at around 0.1% since 2000.24 The stability of such
numbers can mask the extent to which business populations are fluid or sticky. One obser-
vation made by economists following the 2008 crash was that the number of bankruptcies
was surprisingly small. A subsequent worry arose that inefficient or unproductive firms
may be hanging on (often aided by their banks).25 An economy in which this happens
risks a kind of economic ossification. The concern, in productivity terms, is that factors of
production - everything from bank loans and market capital, workers, and software and
patents - could be misallocated or “stuck” in outdated companies, unable to flow to new
24 Figures for the private sector only, using BEIS BPE which is a consistent source of information for a time
series of businesses by size band. Note that figures are rounded.
25 Forbearance refers to the practice of banks granting companies with interest payment holidays. Most
analysis to date has estimated a limited impact on productivity.
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and innovative ones.26 Looking at the flow of companies - the extent to which existing
companies wind up, and new ones are started up - is one way to examine these concerns.
• Birth rates. This is the number of new firms established divided by the existing
active business population. “Birth” is defined as an enterprise registering for VAT or
PAYE. Active business are defined as those that had either turnover or employment
at any time during the reference period.
• Death rates. This is the number of firms that go out of business, divided by the
active business population at the start of that year. It includes businesses that have
ceased trading and are identified as those that deregister for VAT or PAYE.
• Survival rates. This is the share of firms that survive for a specified number of years
after their “birth”.
Figure 4.2.7: Business demography
A. Company birth rates, 2015 (%) B. Company death rates, 2015 (%) 
 
 
NOTES: Company births as % of active population and company deaths as % of active population by local
authority. Source: ONS Business Demography.
26 There is a growing body of literature on resource misallocation and productivity in the UK, with a
particular focus on capital market frictions, see for example Riley, C. and Young (2015), Barnett et al. (2014)
and Besley, Roland and Van Reenen (2017).
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Facts and maps
The ONS business demography dataset gives detailed breakdowns of company births,
deaths, active enterprises and survival rates, and also includes data for Northern Ireland
in its aggregates. Across the UK, there were 383,000 company births in 2015, 252,000
deaths and 2.6 million active enterprises. The birth rate is therefore higher than the death
rate (at 14% versus 9% respectively). The number of births has exceeded the number of
deaths since 2011: as birth rates have grown steadily in all regions and death rates fallen
after an initial rise to 2012 following the financial crisis.27
Figure 4.2.8: Net rate of change in number of businesses, 2015
 
 NOTES: Calculations based on company births and deaths by local authority. Source: ONS Business Demog-
raphy.
Figure 4.2.7 shows that most local authorities in Britain have birth rates over 10% . In
some areas, such as Bolsover, Barking and Dagenham and Newham, over 25% of active
businesses were registered in the previous year. Conversely, Figure 4.2.7 shows that for
most of Great Britain, death rates are below 10% , and peaks are close to this with 17%
in North East Lincolnshire and 14% in Spelthorne and Lambeth being the three highest
27 ONS analysis at the Local Enterprise Partnership level using data from 2004-2011 showed that the
financial crisis had a negative effect on birth rates, and positive effect on death rates, but that effect on death
rates was slower to materialise.
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values.
Figure 4.2.9: Survival rates
A. 5-year survival rates (%) B. 3-year survival rates (%) 
 
 
NOTES: 5 year and 3 year survival rates, % of companies that started up in 2010, by local authority. Source:
ONS Business Demography.
However, in all three of these birth rates outstrip death rates, meaning the number
of businesses in these local authority areas grew overall. In fact, there are only two
areas where business numbers are in decline - North Kesteven and Eden. This is in stark
contrast to figures for 2010, when 285 areas registered a decline (Figure 4.2.8). Yet, overall,
these maps reveal that firm “births” and “deaths” are spread relatively evenly across the
UK, and therefore do not appear to be a key explanatory factor of spatial differences in
performance.
This does not change when we consider 3 and 5-year survival rates. Figure 4.2.9 shows
that 5-year survival rates are quite evenly spread, but there appears to be a pattern of
lower 3-year survival rates in coastal areas, in particular in the South West, North East
and West of England (Figure 4.2.9).
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4.2.4 Fact 4: The Spread of Productivity
It is well known that UK average productivity levels lag our main comparators (in the
latest data, UK productivity was around 30 percentage points lower than that in France
and the US, and 36 percentage points less than in Germany) but this overall headline
masks significant variation across space. There is large variation in performance across the
regions of the UK, but there is also substantial variation within regions. These differences
are longstanding, and there has been little progress towards reducing them despite a
number of policy initiatives over the years.28 Understanding these patterns and the
reasons underlying them is crucial for policy makers developing an industrial strategy for
the UK.
At its most basic, productivity gives a measure of output produced per unit of input,
and labour productivity is the most common measure of this type. The standard measure
of output is “Gross Value Added”, this is the value of goods and services produced in an
area. It is calculated as output minus intermediate consumption. Dividing GVA by the
number of workers, or the total hours worked, gives two alternative measures of labour
productivity. GVA per hour is more directly comparable as workers in different regions or
sectors might work different hours on average. In some cases, GVA per worker is easier to
calculate as it requires employment data (which are recorded in the BRES firm level survey
data or the IBDR), rather than additional estimates of average hours worked (which tend
to be based on Labour Force Survey or Annual Population Survey data).
The ONS produces regional and sub-regional estimates of productivity that are as
consistent as possible with the national accounts. It is important to note that such measures
are produced on a nominal basis only and do not correct for differences in prices between
different areas of the UK. 29
Facts and maps
Figure 4.2.10 illustrates the spatial variation in GVA per hour for NUTS3 regions
- which are equivalent to counties, unitary authorities or districts. At the bottom of
the productivity scale is “West Wales and the Valleys”; an area with little industry and
agriculture as the main employer. Here, productivity is 21 percentage points lower than
the UK average.
At the other end of the scale there are three high-productivity hubs: the oil industry
28 For recent discussion, see Overman (2017).
29 The ONS are working on producing productivity data using the “production approach” which does
correct for differences in regional prices.
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Figure 4.2.10: Productivity
A. GVA per hour (UK average=100) B. GVA per hour % change (2008-2015)
 
 
NOTES: Note: GVA per hour at NUTS3 level in 2015, with UK average set to 100 (index), and change over
time. Source: ABS, ONS.
around Aberdeen, the area around Greater Manchester and a band of productivity in the
South. Contrary to popular belief the high productivity of London does not spread into
the South East but rather spreads west along the M4 to commuter towns like Reading
and Slough. Productivity in London overall is 30 percentage points higher than the UK
average, the figure for “Inner London-West” is 45 percentage points and this the highest
productivity sub-region in the UK. Figure 4.2.10 shows that the situation of many of the
low productivity regions (most of Wales and the North of England) in 2015 has worsened
over time.
The ONS has recently published some analysis of productivity distributions within
sectors and regions.30 This is based on the ABS, and therefore excludes certain sectors and
unregistered businesses.31 This analysis shows that there is a wider dispersion in high
overall productivity regions like London and the South East than in lower productivity
regions like Wales and the North East (Appendix Figure 4.B.4). London shows the highest
30 ONS (2017b)
31 The ABS excludes agriculture, finance, the public sector.
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dispersion and also a higher proportion of high productivity businesses. Interestingly,
this analysis shows that productivity differences between regions are not primarily driven
by a different sectoral mix (at least at the broad sector level), but rather differences in
productivity within the same sector across regions.32 For example, London’s higher
productivity is not simply due to its sectoral make-up, but largely reflects the fact that
within certain industries (and particularly in the knowledge intensive service industries)
London firms are more productive than firms in the same sector in other regions. We
discuss sectoral differences in more depth in the next section.
The types of factor underlying spatial differences in productivity between firms in the
same sectors include differences in factor markets (for example access to skills, capital,
infrastructure, technology and R&D or management practices) or in product markets
(competition, regulation or other factors that affect demand conditions).33 They could also
reflect the differential clustering and associated spillovers. In the UK, recent CBI analysis
suggests that the most important factors based on correlations with local area productivity
are skills, transport links, management practices and export/innovation intensity (CBI,
2017).
4.2.5 Fact 5: The Leading and Lagging Sectors
Building on the existing sectoral support in the coalition’s industrial strategy, the current
government’s approach is most likely to continue to include a strong element of sectoral
support for strong and growing sectors that possess international comparative advantage.
It is important to understand which sectors are likely to benefit from government interven-
tion, and also whether there are cases where a broader “missions” approach might be more
appropriate.34 However, consideration of the productivity performance across sectors
reveals that some of the sectors with the highest share of employment have particularly
low levels of productivity (Figure 4.2.11). Industrial policies specific to these sectors might
generate large aggregate gains.
Facts and maps
We begin with a simple aggregate calculation of sectoral GVA per worker. The benefit
of this measure is that it can be calculated using ONS GVA and employment aggregates
32 In similar analysis at a more spatially disaggregated level, the CBI also concludes that sectoral mix is not
the primary driver of differences in productivity (CBI, 2017), but it does identify some NUTS3 areas that do
either appear to lose or gain due to their sectoral mix.
33 See Syverson (2011) for a review.
34 See Davis, Martin and Valero (2017) for a response to the government’s January 2017 Green Paper on
industrial strategy and more discussion on these issues.
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for the whole economy including sectors excluded from the ABS (in particular finance,
agriculture and the public sector). Figure 4.2.11 plots sectoral productivity relative to the
UK average, and also the employment share of each sector. Real estate and mining have
very high relative productivities35 and are excluded from the chart for scaling reasons - but
these sectors both have low employment shares (1.8% and 0.2% respectively). Similarly,
electricity and gas and water and waste have high productivity but represent a very small
employment share in the UK.














NOTES: Analysis excludes Northern Ireland (2% of UK GVA) as consistent employment data by sector is not
available; non-market economy sectors (education, human health not included on chart). Mining and real
estate excluded. Source: ONS GVA income approach - all sectors, and employment from BRES, NOMIS.
High productivity sectors with higher employment shares include finance, ICT, con-
struction and manufacturing. Professional, scientific & technical services is an area where
the UK has experienced strong productivity growth in recent years (Appendix Figure
4.B.11), and possesses strong comparative advantage in global trade (see discussion in
Fact 7), yet overall its productivity is just below the UK average. This can be explained by
the fact that this sector has a high degree of dispersion both within and across regions in
35 At 726% and 521% of the UK average respectively.
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the UK (see discussion below) - there are some very high productivity firms within this
sector, but also some less productive firms.
Lower productivity sectors with a high employment share are a particular concern
with respect to holding back average UK productivity: these include wholesale and retail
trade, accommodation and food and administrative services. These sectors are commonly
referred to as “low-wage” or “low-productivity” sectors. Given their high employment
share, large aggregate gains could be made by raising their productivity performance: if
the productivity in these sectors rose to that of the average UK firm, aggregate productivity
would rise by 13%.36
It is important for policymakers to understand these differences, since the policy
prescriptions for raising productivity in these different types of sector vary. In higher
productivity sectors, high-end skills and policies to stimulate innovation are likely to
be important. In lower productivity sectors, investment in existing technologies, better
management practices, and improved basic or technical skills appear more relevant.37





 NOTES: Source: ABS, BPE. Indexed to UK overall average. Non-financial business economy (excludes finance,
agriculture which has only partial coverage, and public sector). This analysis uses BPE employment for
registered businesses only.
36 This figure is based on a simple calculation whereby the productivity in these three sectors is set at the
UK average level, a new total UK GVA is then calculated based on multiplying GVA/worker by the number
of workers by sector, and then adding up the sectoral totals. This is then divided by total employment to get
the new UK average productivity level.
37 For more discussion of policy prescriptions for the “low-wage” sectors, see Thompson et al. (2016).
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Now focusing on the sectors covered in the ABS, we can look in more detail at pro-
ductivity by firm size band, and the distribution of firms within sectors. Figure 4.2.12
shows that in most sectors, the smallest firms (those in the 1-9 size bracket38) have lower
than average productivity. Notable exceptions are administrative services and retail and
wholesale trade, where large firms seem to have relatively low productivity on average.









NOTES: Output per worker at the NUTS3 level, for 2 digit subsectors of the professional, scientific and
technical services industry. Source: ABS and BRES, ONS.
More work is needed to understand the dispersion of firms within sectors and regions.
Recent ONS analysis has begun to address this. Patterns differ between and across regions
between “low” and “high” productivity sectors. In both wholesale and retail trade and
accommodation and food service industries, the distribution of firms is quite similar across
regions, though London does perform marginally better than other regions (see Appendix
Figure 4.B.5). By contrast, in professional, scientific and technical activities, there is a much
bigger spread in London (and in other regions too), and median productivity in London is
much higher than in other regions (Appendix Figure 4.B.6).
38 This includes registered non-employing businesses as firms with an employment of 1 - the sole proprietor.
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It is useful to consider a more granular disaggregation of sectors to understand what
is driving these patterns. As an example, we examine the distribution of NUTS3 regional
productivity at the 2-digit level for professional, scientific and technical services (Figure
4.2.13). This shows that the regional dispersion in this sector is in fact driven by scientific
research and development, this is likely to reflect the fact that in many cases, and by its
nature, the payoffs from investments in R&D are uncertain.
4.2.6 Fact 6: Innovation in the Regions
Innovation is an important source of growth in the long term, and is crucial for enabling
certain sectors to stay on the global technology frontier. It is also an area where market
failure is well-understood - since innovations tend to generate spillovers which are not
always internalised by the firm producing the innovation, the market left to its own
devices tends to underinvest in R&D. This is a key justification for government subsidy
of innovative activity, and efforts to encourage spillovers. Key measures of innovation
include:
• Research and development (R&D) expenditure. This is the standard measure of
innovation input. Often this is expressed as a share of GDP, to give a measure of
R&D intensity. Data are recorded by source of R&D expenditure, often split between
government, business or higher education institutions.
• Patents. Patents are a standard measure of innovation output. Patent quality can be
determined by linking to subsequent citations in future patents or academic papers.
• Intangible assets. Traditional measures of innovation do not always capture all the
innovative activities of firms, particularly in the service sector. Intangible assets such
as branding and organisational practices, together with more traditional R&D, have
been shown to be important for a number of sectors. Yet, intangible assets tend to be
treated as intermediate consumption, rather than investment in the national accounts,
and the UK’s investment performance is substantially better once intangibles are
accounted for.39
Facts and maps
In absolute terms, London and the South East (combined) dominate R&D spending,
accounting for nearly a third of total business R&D (Appendix Figure 4.B.7). But over
39 See, for example, Goodridge, Haskel and Wallis (2014).
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20% of UK business R&D is carried out in the East of England, and there it accounts for
over 3% of GDP. At a more disaggregated level, Britain’s most innovative regions are
East Anglia, Cheshire and Herefordshire; reflecting the impact of Cambridge University,
chemicals firms located along the River Mersey and a clustering of the life sciences and
pharmaceuticals industry in Hertfordshire (Table 4.2.2 and Figure 4.2.14).
We observe a broadly similar pattern across the regions in patents filed to the Eu-
ropean Patent Office (EPO) per million of active population (Appendix Figure 4.B.8).
London does better on this measure than the previous measure, which looked at only
business R&D, reflecting research institutes and universities (both prevalent in London)
filing patents. Zooming in further (Figure 4.2.14, panel B), the top five performers are
again not surprising. At NUTS 3 level, the top five performers are all well-known, large
technology clusters: Cambridgeshire CC (strong in pharmaceuticals and life sciences),
Coventry, Oxfordshire (pharmaceuticals, Harwell cluster and UK national research facil-
ities) and Wiltshire CC plus Swindon (home to Intel as well as air and space industry).
Areas in England generally do better than areas in Scotland and Wales (four of the five
worst performing areas are here, only one is in England).
Table 4.2.2: Business Research and Development as a share of GDP
Top 10 NUTS2 regions % Bottom 10 NUTS2 regions %
East Anglia 3.33 South Western Scotland 0.4
Cheshire 3.29 Devon 0.39
Herefordshire, Worcestershire
and Warwickshire
3.13 Greater Manchester 0.38




Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire 2.19 Highlands and Islands 0.28
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and
Bristol/Bath area
1.81 Inner London - East 0.26
Hampshire and Isle of Wight 1.69 Outer London - South 0.26
Essex 1.48 Cornwall and Isles of Scilly 0.22
West Midlands 1.21
Outer London - East and
North East
0.1
NOTES: Total intramural R&D expenditure by business enterprise sector (2014), as a percentage of GDP.
Source: Eurostat.
Given the dominance of services in the UK economy, and the fact that traditional
measures of R&D fail to account for many of the innovative activities in the service sector,
more work is needed to calculate intangibles across space.
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Figure 4.2.14: Innovation
A: Business R&D as % GDP B: Patents per million 16+ population, 
2012 
  
NOTES: Left: Total intramural R&D expenditure (GERD) by sectors of performance and NUTS 2 regions for
2014. Right: Patent applications to the EPO by priority year by NUTS 3 regions for 2012 (latest year available).
Source: Eurostat.
4.2.7 Fact 7: Unbalanced Exporting
Exports are an important potential source of growth for businesses. This is not only due to
the direct impact of increasing sales through access to new international markets, but also
due to the long-run effects of trade on productivity. Trade can have positive effects through
increasing competition, making firms seek efficiencies and stimulating innovation.40 Yet,
in aggregate, the UK runs a trade deficit, exporting substantially less than it imports, and
this has been the case since the late 1990s. This is largely driven by a trade deficit in goods
overall - in fact the UK runs a trade surplus in services, but the volume of services trade is
much smaller than that in goods.41
The relatively poor aggregate export performance of the UK has long been a concern
for policymakers, and today the UK faces significant new risks in this area due to Brexit
40 See for example, Bloom et al. (2014a) or Sampson (2016).
41 See LSE Growth Commission (LSE, 2017), Chapter 4 for a summary of the UK’s trading position.
247
(discussed in more detail at the end of this section). The EU is the UK’s largest trading
partner, and reduced access to the Single Market is the likely outcome whatever form
Brexit takes.42
Research points to a number of factors explaining the UK’s existing export shortfall.
One explanation is the size distribution of UK firms, as we have seen UK business is
dominated by smaller firms but it is larger businesses that are more likely to be exporters.
Limited access to finance can hold back exports too. Recent research into what explains
firms’, propensity to export suggests that financial factors - including the availability of
equity finance-play an important role. Exporting can imply fixed start-up costs, meaning
that entrepreneurs unable to access capital cannot finance their exports.43
It is useful to consider the following measures of export performance:
• Exporter status. The ABS is a good source of information on whether or not busi-
nesses export, and allows regional, sectoral and size-band analysis of the share of
firms that export both goods and services.
• Export intensities. The value of exports per worker at a local level can be calculated
using regional estimates of goods (obtained from the HMRC regional trade database)
and services exports (from ONS experimental export statistics).
• Revealed comparative advantage. This is a measure of a country’s specialisation
in a particular sector in trade. It is calculated by comparing the sector’s share in
a country’s exports to that sector’s share in global exports. If the ratio of these
two measures is greater than 1, a country is said to have a revealed comparative
advantage in a sector. It is useful to bear RCA in mind when assessing the share of
firms in different sectors that engage in export activity.
Facts and maps
Figure 4.2.15 illustrates the stark relationship between firm size and export activity.
This is actually more pronounced for goods than for services, but in both cases, the share
of business exporting increases as firm size increases.
Spatial patterns of exporting are uneven at the regional level (Figure 4.2.16). London
and the South East host the highest number of exporting firms, and they represent around
12% of total firms in both regions. The lowest share of exporting firms for any region
stands at fewer than 6% in Wales, only marginally higher than in the North East.
42 See the CEP’s Brexit analysis, collated at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit08_book.pdf
43 See Manova (2013) and Chaney (2016).
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Figure 4.2.15: Exporters by size band, per cent of total firms (2015)
 
 
NOTES: Source: ABS, ONS.







NOTES: Notes: Exporters of goods and/or services total count and as a share of total reporting units. Source:
ABS, IDBR, ONS.
It is also useful to consider a more comparable measure of export activity: export
intensity gives the average value of exports per worker. Regional data on total exports are
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available for goods exports from HMRC’s regional goods database and for service exports
from the ONS experimental regional statistics for the services trade. We apportion this
data to NUTS3 regions, for a more spatially disaggregated picture.44
We have seen in Figure 4.2.16 that the North East has a low share of exporting firms.
The more granular data on goods (Figure 4.2.17, panel A) also point to the North East
performing particularly badly on the export intensity measure - with the exception of
Northumberland, which has higher export intensity than the rest of the region. However,
we cannot make any inference whether a few or many firms are responsible for this.
Generally, areas with higher exports per worker are concentrated in the higher productivity
areas of London and the South East and in pockets of Scotland. This concentration is even
more pronounced for services exports per worker (4.2.17, panel B).
Figure 4.2.17: Exports per worker
A: Good exports per worker (£) B: Service exports per worker (£) 




NOTES: Calculations based on HMRC regional goods exports database, ONS service trade experimental
statistics, Business and Register Survey. Notes: NUTS1 data apportioned to NUTS3 level based on sectoral
employment and export intensities; all data for 2015.
44 The most granular level export statistics are currently released at the NUTS1 level. We model NUTS3
goods and service exports. For this, we use the existing regional HMRC goods exports statistics and the ONS
experimental service exports statistics. Both are at NUTS1 level, splitting exports out by broad sectors. To
meaningfully apportion regional exports to NUTS3 regions we obtain, at the two digit level, export intensities
from the Input Output tables and employment figures, also at two digit level, for each of the NUTS3 regions.
These are used as factors to allocate a share of regional exports to its respective NUTS3 regions.
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Examining these two maps further suggests that high export areas are also areas of
high productivity. Figure 4.2.18 examines the correlation for service exports (panel A),
where it appears strong. For goods exports, however, the relationship is less clear (panel
B).
Table 4.2.3 shows that there is also large variation by sector. The sectors are ordered by
the share of firms that export goods and/or services. As we would expect, manufacturing
has the largest share of goods exporting firms, at around 22%. There are large shares
of service exporting firms in mining and quarrying, ICT, arts and entertainment and
professional, scientific and technical services. These shares are related to areas where the
UK has global comparative advantage. In goods, 18 out of 110 traded sub-sectors have an
RCA larger than one; the highest RCA being in Aerospace. In services, RCA is calculated
at a more aggregated level; in 5 sectors the UK has an RCA larger than one, including
insurance, finance, other business and cultural/recreational services.45





Mining & quarrying 27% 9% 18%
Manufacturing 25% 23% 9%
Wholesale & retail, repairs 17% 15% 4%
Information & Communications 14% 3% 13%
Arts & entertainment 14% 3% 12%
Professional, scientific & technical 14% 2% 13%
Water & sewerage 13% 11% 4%
Education 12% 3% 9%
Administrative & support 9% 3% 7%
Transport & storage 6% 2% 5%
Other service 6% 3% 4%
Health & social work 3% 0% 3%
Real estate 3% 0% 2%
Construction 2% 1% 1%
Accommodation & food 1% 0% 1%
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 1% 1% 0%
Electricity & gas 0% 0% 0%
NOTES: Notes: ABS exporters of goods and/or services (2015), ONS. Sectors in order according to overall
share of exporters of goods and/or services.
Recent CEP analysis has estimated the local impacts of Brexit due to the increases in
trade barriers under differing assumptions for “soft” and “hard” Brexit. Dhingra and
Overman (2017) find that all local authorities would see a loss in GVA following Brexit,
45 For more detail, see the chapter on “Openness” in the LSE Growth Commission (LSE, 2017).
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Figure 4.2.18: Exports and productivity
A. Service exports and productivity
 
B. Goods exports and productivity 
 
NOTES: Data at NUTS3 level. Sources: ONS service trade experimental statistics, HMRC regional goods
exports database, BRES, ONS Regional and Subregional Productivity (Jan 2017). Data for 2015.
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but the most affected areas in both scenarios are those in the South of England and urban
areas which are specialised in certain sectors where trade with the EU is most prevalent.
Specifically, cities that specialise in financial and business services, which are predicted to
experience the largest rise in tariff and non-tariff barriers following Brexit. Understanding
the local impacts of Brexit through changes to trade, together with immigration, FDI and
innovation will be crucial for policymakers developing an industrial strategy with place
based elements.
4.2.8 Fact 8: The UK’s Coastal Malaise
Regional imbalances are a long-standing weakness of the UK’s economy, most prominently
those between the North and South.46 Like the North, the UK’s coastal areas have also
long been considered to lag behind the more productive Southern mainland but present a
different challenge. As a group, coastal areas generally are geographically isolated and
have more unbalanced, low skill low productivity economies. They tend to depend on
single, and often declining, sectors creating greater exposure to economic shocks in some
places (tourism in former seaside towns, but also former agricultural and mining hubs).
Facts and maps
Figure 4.2.19 illustrates the previous point - UK coastal areas are relatively more intense
in the accommodation and food service sector than the rest of the country, a sector that is
at the core of tourism activities.
This is also evident in a slightly dated analysis of 121 seaside towns, which provides
some evidence that many seaside towns are still almost fully dependent on tourism for
employment, with the employment in tourism in 21 towns even at above 50% (Beatty,
Fothergill and Gore, 2014). As tourism is a highly seasonal activity, shocks and generally
the economic cycle will be felt much more strongly in these areas. While low skill low
productivity sectors are large employers, higher productivity sectors are underrepresented,
for example the professional, scientific and technical services (Figure 4.2.19, panel B).
Their current low skill base (ONS, 2014) will likely make a move to more productive
sectors difficult. At the same time, coastal areas’ population dynamics present further
challenges to their economies. As illustrated by Figure 4.2.20, mortality rates are much
higher in and around the British coasts than inland, in particular the capital region. An
older, sicker and more rapidly ageing population will mean rising demand for health
46 Recent analysis of mortality rates has shown that North-South disparities have risen since the 1990s, see
Buchan et al. (2017).
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Figure 4.2.19: Specialisation in selected sectors
A. Employment LQ, accommodation and 
food service 
B. Employment LQ, professional, 
scientific and technical 
 
 
NOTES: Calculations based on employment data at local authority level, BRES 2015.
and care services, a sector already accounting for a large share of employment in many
areas, and generally will exert additional strain on local economies and in particular local
governments that commission and fund care.
The maps in this section are based on local authorities, which clearly illustrate a
difference between coastal and inland areas. However, of the development of industrial
policies to address such disparities requires more detailed analysis, with a clear definition
of “coastal” versus “inland”. Different definitions are currently applied to analysis at the
local authority level - from simple distance to the coast measures or grouping all coastal
communities with a sea border as coastal if 50% of its population is within 50 kilometres
of the sea (used by Eurostat) to highly detailed area classifications used by the ONS in
their analysis of census data (ONS, 2014).
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Figure 4.2.20: Crude death rate per 1,000
 
 
NOTES: ONS, data for 2015.
4.2.9 Fact 9: The Power of a Single Firm
Our “bottom-up” approach to mapping business in the UK produces some striking results.
Ribble Valley and Hyndburn appear as a centre for wholesale and retail trade, and Salford
appears as an important location for real estate activities outside of London; South Dorset
as an important location for finance.
Patches of high productivity in north Lancashire, Derby and Brentwood are influenced
by the major plant of BAE Systems, Rolls Royce and Ford, respectively. Further examples
are Tata Steel in Port Talbot and Airbus in Broughton (Flintshire), both in Wales. The same
can also be true for service sector firms, for example Sky in parts of Scotland.
This also occurs in other European countries. For example, in Germany Volkswagen
drives the strong productivity performance of the Wolfsburg area - its residents largely
depend on Volkswagen and its suppliers for employment. VW alone employs 60,000,
in a city with a working age population of only 77,000. Elsewhere, BMW, which is
headquartered in Munich and produces nearby in Milbertshofen, is of lesser importance
to the immediate area.
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It is reasonable to assume that the smaller the geographic area, the more likely it is
that a single firm drives its economic performance. Over and above their direct impact
on local GVA, large firms can also generate spillovers.47 In fact, research based on the US
has shown how the performance of single large firms can help explain fluctuations at the
national level.48
Figure 4.2.21: Car companies and manufacturing employment
A. Car companies, employment B. Share of manufacturing employment 
 
NOTES: Source: Car manufacturing plants obtained from SMMT, and employment data from Bureau Van
Dijk. Local authority employment from NOMIS. Notes: Two Rolls Royce plants are excluded as they do not
manufacture cars but focus on defence and civil engineering.
The implication that individual companies can be hugely important for local or regional
economies is clearly a risk - if the company fails the region will be in trouble - but it is also
an opportunity and shows that attracting just a few successful companies to a small area
can transform its economy.
Facts and maps
The companies mentioned above are all listed companies, and the location of their
47 See Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti (2010) for evidence that “million dollar” plants generate local
spillovers in US counties. Bloom et al (2016) use a similar methodology to find evidence that such plants
generate spillovers in terms of better management practices in nearby plants.
48 See for example Gabaix (2011).
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major sites are public knowledge allowing us to map them precisely. Maps can be drawn
for any given sector, as an example we choose the car industry.
In Figure 4.2.21A we plot all the 19 car manufacturing plants in Britain, and their em-
ployment. Figure 4.2.21B shows their share of local authority manufacturing employment
(the underlying data for these charts is summarised in the Appendix (Table 4.C.2)). 49
These data show that Mini’s Cowley plant makes up 89% of manufacturing employment
in Oxford, though it only represents 3% of total employment (excluding public adminis-
tration) there. Toyota in South Derbyshire makes up the highest share of total non-public
administration employment, at 10%.
4.2.10 Fact 10: The German Benchmark
Germany is an interesting comparator for the UK for a number of reasons. The two
economies are neighbours in a global ranking of countries by GDP, ranking 4th and 5th
respectively. Both have a strong industrial heritage yet have faced economic underper-
formance with a strong regional dimension: broadly speaking in the UK there has been
a division between North and South, whereas in Germany the division is between East
and West. Finally, Germany is a good place to examine policy solutions: its economy was
seen as the weak link in Europe in the early 2000s, yet since the 2010-12 euro crisis it has
outperformed its EU peers, including the UK. In this paper we compare the UK’s regional
and sectoral productivity and innovation to Germany, similar exercises can be carried out
for other comparator countries such as France and the US.
Facts and maps
A number of points emerge from a comparison of German and British productivity
performance on a geographic level:
• The aggregate gap: At an economy-wide level there is a large gap between the UK
and Germany. In the latest data, UK GVA per hour is 36 percentage points below
that of Germany.50 Most of Britain’s high performing regions (with the only excep-
tions being in central London) are far behind the German average (Figure 4.2.22).
Likely reasons for the aggregate gap include Germany’s higher investment in both
physical capital and R&D, strong export performance, better quality vocational and
technical education and management practices in firms. Since the financial crisis, UK
49 We map these companies’ plants rather than their headquarters, information on which is available from
a mix of Bureau van Dijk, company websites and other sources and which we triangulate with each other.
50 ONS (2017a)
257
productivity performance has been particularly poor and in the latest ONS aggregate
data is lower than its pre-crisis level. Comparing the sources of productivity growth
pre and post crisis (to 2014) reveals that in Germany, productivity overall, and Total
Factor Productivity51 (TFP) have continued to grow post 2008, while in the UK TFP
growth has been negative (see Appendix Figure 4.B.9).
Figure 4.2.22: NUTS3 GVA per hour versus German average (=100)
UK Germany 
 
NOTES: GVA per hour at NUTS3 level in 2014, with Germany’s overall productivity set to 100 (index). Source:
UK data from ONS Regional and Subregional Productivity release (Jan 2017), German data from the federal
states national accounts (VGRdL).
• Germany’s regional strengths: multiple productivity hubs. Germany has many
high productivity hubs across the South and West including Bayern, Baden-Württemberg,
Hesse and North Rhine-Westphalia. Figure 4.2.23 shows many spots of the high-
est productivity: many of these are high-productivity areas around German cities
including Cologne, Frankfurt, Stuttgart and Munich - and many of these cities are
connected by a hinterland that is itself high productivity. By contrast, the UK’s high
51 TFP is the portion of productivity that is unaccounted for by measurable factor inputs such as capital
and labour, and reflects the efficiency or intensity with which inputs are used in the production process. It is
therefore a measure of technological progress.
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productivity regions are few, and are more tightly bunched. The only example of a
linking is a high-productivity area that spreads west along the M4 towards Bristol.




NOTES: GVA per hour at NUTS3 level in 2014, with the overall country’s level set to 100 (index). Source: UK
data from ONS Regional and Subregional Productivity release (Jan 2017), German data from the federal states
national accounts (VGRdL).
• Germany’s regional weaknesses: the east. A productivity map of Germany sug-
gests that despite its aggregate higher productivity than the UK, the country’s
regional disparities appear more stark than those in the UK. The German Länder
that were part of the German Democratic Republic until 1990 are systematically
lower productivity; that this has been identified in Germany as a problem since
reunification suggests that regional productivity differences can become entrenched
and hard to shift even in strongly performing economies.
• Catch up growth: Between 2000 and 2014 the low-productivity regions in Germany
have caught up with better performing ones. This can be seen in Figure 4.2.24 - in
2000 the distribution is “bi-modal” with a peak showing the large number of low
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Figure 4.2.24: Distribution of regional productivity
 
A. Distribution of regional productivity, UK 
 
B. Distribution of regional productivity, Germany 
 
 NOTES: Distribution of GVA per hour at NUTS3 level, with the overall country’s level set to 100 (index).
Source: UK data from ONS release (January 2017), German data from the federal states national accounts
(VGRdL).
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productivity regions; by 2014 the second peak has disappeared: more regions have
caught up with the average region. The UK on the other hand has seen the opposite
process and is starting to develop a “thick tail” of poorly performing regions. This
suggests that while Germany’s lagging regions may be catching up, the UK’s are
falling behind.
• Regional innovation. In 2015, the UK spent 1.7% of GDP on research and devel-
opment (R&D) while Germany spent close to 3%.52 Mapping R&D for the UK and
Germany (Figure 4.2.25) shows thatthis is more heavily concentrated in the South
(in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg’s industrial regions) though Lower-Saxony in
the North also has two areas with above 2.5% of GDP spending. All these areas are
home to Germany’s carmakers as well as other high tech industry.
Figure 4.2.25: Business R&D as a percentage of GDP
UK Germany 
 
NOTES: Total intramural R&D expenditure (GERD) by sectors of performance and NUTS 2 regions. Data for
2013 (latest year where data are available for both countries). Source: Eurostat.
52 The US also spends closet to 3%; the OECD average is 2.4%. This includes government spending. The
portion of R&D that is carried out by businesses shows a similar pattern: UK businesses spend around 1% of
GDP on R&D, while German ones (and those in the US) spend close to 2%.
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• Gaps across the sectors. The productivity gap exists in most sectors when the UK
is compared against Germany (Appendix Figure 4.B.10), the only exceptions are
mining and finance. The service sectors have driven productivity growth in the
UK both before the financial crisis and since, whereas manufacturing has been
more important in Germany (Appendix Figure 4.B.11). Productivity growth in
professional, scientific, technical and administrative services has held up relatively
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4.A Data Appendix
In this paper we provide a geographic view of British business performance. We use what
we consider to be the best available data in each map and chart. There are a number
of official sources available and navigating them can be confusing and time consuming.
Given the rising interest in UK corporate performance and location across Whitehall and
the fact that the ONS is reviewing the way it collects economic data, this section provides
a brief overview of the available data and its strengths and weaknesses.
Access to data varies considerably by dataset. First, high-level summaries are available
in ONS or other government publications. Often the accompanying spreadsheets to these
give more detail, and the ONS also publishes extra analysis in user requests. Second,
detailed statistics with more granular breakdowns can be accessed via “NOMIS” (the ONS
service for detailed UK labour market statistics). Third, it is also possible to work with the
underlying microdata (administrative or survey data) in a secure environment.53 Where
possible in this paper we use disaggregated summary statistics released by the ONS, as
this has the advantage that the data have been prepared in a way that is consistent with
ONS methods for the National Accounts.
Table 4.A.1 summarises the features of key datasets which are useful for understanding
British business. An underlying source of business data is the Inter-Departmental Business
Register (IDBR). This is a live record of VAT or PAYE registered businesses. Firm-level
data, (“microdata” ) can be accessed via the Business Structure Database (BSD) which
gives an annual snapshot of the IDBR, and detailed summary statistics are available in
NOMIS. The IDBR provides information on location, industry, employment, turnover,
foreign ownership, legal status, birth and death of the business. Data are divided into
“local units” (the plant) and “enterprises” (the overall business organisation, many of
which consist of more than one plant or business site).
The ONS publishes two main annual reports based on IDBR data: “UK Business:
Activity, size and location”, and the “Business Demography”. Detailed summary statistics
are made available on the ONS website or NOMIS. “UK Business: Activity, size and
location” is useful for geographical analysis, since it gives data on local units or plants as
well as information at the “reporting unit” business level. The “BIS Business Population
Estimates” is another source which includes an estimate of the unregistered business
53 Either the ONS Virtual Microdata Laboratory (VML) - a physical location where researchers can work on
the data, or the UK Data Service secure lab, a service that allows researchers to work in a separate desktop on
their own approved computer.
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population, obtained by combining IDBR data with the ONS Labour Force Survey and
HMRC self-assessment tax data.54
The IDBR provides the population of firms from which samples are chosen for business
survey data. The largest business survey in the UK is the “Annual Business Survey”
(ABS), which covers the production, construction, distribution and service industries
representing approximately two thirds of the UK economy and contributes to the UK’s
National Accounts. Financial and other business data are collected in this survey at
the reporting unit level, and for geographic analysis needs to be apportioned to local
units. The ONS releases a number of annual publications based on the ABS (for example
“ABS: UK non-financial business economy statistical bulletins” or “ABS: Exporters and
Importers in Great Britain”) and other resources and summary statistics, often at highly
disaggregated levels.
The microdata are also accessible in the VML or secure lab, and the names of the
related datasets have changed over the years. The ABS has been carried out since 2008
and includes only financial data: including variables on turnover, gross value added and
investment. It is supplemented with employment survey data from the “Business Register
and Employment Survey” (BRES, see below for more detail). The predecessor to the ABS,
the “Annual Business Inquiry” (ABI) included an employment survey and was used to
create the “Annual Respondents Database” (ARD). Recently, the ONS has developed the
“ARDx” combining the ABI (1998-2008) and ABS (2009-2015).55 Microdata for Northern
Ireland are not available.
BRES is the official source of employee and employment estimates by detailed geog-
raphy and industry, and gives a broader sector coverage than ABS. The BRES sample
does not include Northern Ireland, and the UK data archive does not hold equivalent
employment data for Northern Ireland. While the ONS conducts other surveys of em-
ployment (such as the “Labour Force Survey”), BRES is the recommended source for
detailed analysis of geography and industry. BRES summary statistics are available in
NOMIS. While discussion of wages is outside the scope of this paper, we note that the
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) is a panel survey of hours of work and
wages collected from businesses (rather than individuals, as is the case in the Labour Force
Survey). This data can be combined with other business microdata using IDBR reference
54 For more detailed discussion comparing sources for business population and demographics see
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/16418/guide_to_the_uk_business_population_and_demography.pdf
55 For a description of the ARDx, see http://doc.ukdataservice.ac.uk/doc/7989/mrdoc/pdf/7989_ardx_userguide.pdf
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numbers.
The “UK Innovation Survey” (UKIS) provides the main source of information on busi-
ness innovation in the UK, and also represents the UK’s contribution to the Europe-wide
“Community Innovation Survey” (CIS). BIS produces a regular publication summarising
the data, and detailed statistics are available in Eurostat at NUTS2 level, and the microdata
can also be accessed.
There are also a number of data sources which are useful for considering particular
parts of the economy or specific measures of business performance. Orbis is an important
source of financial information on companies in the UK (and worldwide), but only covers
the subset of larger firms that are required to file company accounts. In addition, since
2011 researchers have been able to gain access to HMRC administrative tax return data,
via the HMRC Datalab. This contains all information disclosed on tax returns (including
turnover, and investment), but not variables such as employment. There are currently
restrictions over the extent to which these data can be merged with other secured datasets.
Disaggregated data on the value of exports can be obtained for goods and services
separately. The HMRC regional trade in goods statistics which gives detail on the value
of exports/imports and counts of exporters/importers, together with trading partners
by region. The ONS “International Trade in Services” dataset does similar for service
sectors company trade, and the ONS has recently released some experimental estimates
regionalising the value of service (sub-) sector exports.
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Microdata: Annual extract of IDBR 
in the Business Structure 
Database (BSD), UK data service 
secure access (1997-2016) 
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VAT and/or PAYE 
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Summary stats and user requests 
alongside annual publication 
Microdata: Annual extract of IDBR 
in the Business Structure 
Database (BSD), UK data service 
secure access (1997-2016) 
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Largest business 
survey in the UK, 
conducted annually. 
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NOTES: HHI calculated for 4 digit sic codes within finance section. Employment data from NOMIS (BRES,
2015); data on SIC 6530, pension funds, was not available for 2015. Central banking activities are excluded
(this sector is dominated by the Bank of England, a public sector institution in London).
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NOTES: BPE (2016) UK Time Series.
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NOTES: BPE (2016) UK Industry Summary.
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NOTES: ONS (2017) Regional firm level productivity analysis for the non-financial business economy Jan
2017. Analysis excludes Northern Ireland.
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NOTES: ONS (2017) Regional firm level productivity analysis for the non-financial business economy Jan
2017. Analysis excludes Northern Ireland.
274




NOTES: ONS (2017) Regional firm level productivity analysis for the non-financial business economy Jan
2017. Analysis excludes Northern Ireland.
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Figure 4.B.7: Business R&D as per cent of GDP and share of total UK
 
NOTES: Source: Eurostat, R&D expenditure by business. Last updated 3 Feb 2017.
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NOTES: Eurostat, Patent applications to the EPO by priority year by NUTS 1 regions.
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NOTES: Source: EU KLEMS
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Figure 4.B.10: GVA per hour, by sector Germany versus UK (100), 2015
 
 
NOTES: Source: OECD STAN
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 NOTES: Source: EU KLEMS
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4.C Appendix Tables
Table 4.C.1: Industrial concentration, HHI (employment)
Sector HHI
Mining & quarrying 0.209
Financial and insurance activities 0.038
Creative* 0.019
Electricity & gas, water & waste 0.015




Transport & storage 0.006
Public administration & defence 0.007
Admin & support services 0.007
Other service activities 0.006
Accommodation & food 0.006
Science and technology* 0.005
Arts, entertainment & recreation 0.006
Education 0.005
Utilities 0.005
Health & social work 0.005
Manufacturing 0.004
Retail, wholesale & motor 0.004
Construction 0.004
NOTES: Industry definitions: using standard SIC07 sections; *additionally high tech and creative industries
as defined by NESTA (2015). Employment data from NOMIS (BRES, 2015).
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